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ABSTRACT 
 
This study empirically investigates how clustering and social networks affect the 
performance of micro- and small-scale enterprises by looking at the evidence from 
Ethiopia. By contrasting the performance of clustered micro enterprises with that of 
dispersed ones, it was first shown that clustering significantly increases profit. The increase 
in profit from clustering is found to be higher in urban than rural areas. It is also found that 
regional specific factors determining clustering of micro enterprises are different in urban 
and rural areas. Second, it is empirically shown that clustering eases the financial 
constraints of micro enterprises by lowering the capital entry barrier through the reduction 
of the initial investment required to start a business. This effect is significantly larger for 
enterprises investing in districts with  high capital market inefficiency. Third, the impact of 
clustering on the entry and exit decisions of farm households into and from non-farm 
enterprises is examined. Clustering significantly increases the likelihood of entry and 
enhances the survival of rural enterprises. The impact of entry and exit on household’s 
well-being is further investigated. Entry into non-farm enterprises  significantly increases 
household’s income and boosts their food security status, while exit from non-farm 
enterprises is found to significantly reduce household’s income. Finally, the role of ethnic 
ties on the performance of micro enterprises is investigated. The empirical results show that 
ethnic ties affect the performance of producers negatively, which implies that the positive 
effect of ethnic ties, through the reduction of transaction costs arising from market 
imperfections, does not outweigh the negative effects of closed social networks. 
 
Keywords: clustering, micro enterprises, industrialization, finance, entry, exit, well-being, 
ethnic ties, transaction cost, Africa, Ethiopia. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 
The private sector is often listed as a key driving force for industrialization in Africa in the 
development literature. A critically important role is played by micro- and small-scale 
enterprises (MSEs), which constitute the lion’s share of the private sector in Africa. MSEs 
account for more than 90% of all firms outside of the agricultural sector and 50-60% of the 
off-farm employment in Africa (Yoshino, 2011). With this regard, promoting 
entrepreneurship in MSEs and stimulating their growth is viewed as a key instrument in 
poverty reduction efforts both by development agencies and policymakers. 
 
Despite their large employment contribution, MSEs are characterized by low productivity 
and constitute an insignificant share of the commercial output in most African economies 
(Yoshino, 2011). MSEs often operate in the informal part of the economy and they do that 
side by side with a small number of very large firms that are mostly foreign owned, capital 
intensive and have better access to geographically wider markets (Bigsten and Söderbom, 
2006).1 The dualistic nature of the private sector in Africa is an indication of the “missing 
middle”, where we do not often see MSEs gradually growing into middle size firms and 
eventually larger ones.  
 
Lack of market integration is often mentioned as one of the reasons as to why the 
performance of MSEs has remained poor in many African countries (Loening and Mikael, 
                                                   
1 According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey  (WBES) on 17 African countries,  large firms are defined as enterprises that  
   Employ more than 100 workers, while small firms are those employing less than 10 workers. 
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2009; Rijkers et al., 2010). The World Development Report characterizes the private sector 
in Africa as being in a ‘proximity trap’, which is manifested through weak agglomeration 
forces and high transportation costs (World Bank, 2009a). This can result in loss of external 
scale economies that could hinder firms from gaining “sufficient scale to work efficiently” 
(Collier and Venables, 2008). Such loss is particularly important for MSEs in Africa that 
generally operate in thin, fragmented and uncompetitive local markets compared to large 
firms (World Bank, 2009a). Lack of market integration due to low firm density and long 
distances to markets also results in high transaction costs, which could undermine MSEs’ 
capacity to take advantage of trade and investment opportunities (Yoshino, 2011). Market 
failures and the absence of effective institutions to mitigate market failures can further 
increase the transaction cost of doing business for MSEs in Africa (Tyler and Shah, 2006). 
The major challenge for MSEs is therefore, to increase their performance by means of 
improved market integration.  
 
One mechanism that can enhance market integration is the geographic concentration of 
economic activities (Fujita and Thisse, 1996; Krugman, 1991; 1998). An industrial cluster, 
which is the geographic concentration of economic activities within a certain sector 
producing similar and closely related goods, typically leads to a large market that enables 
small firms to operate at a larger economies of scale arising from the division of labor with 
in a cluster (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006a). Taybout (2000) 
indicated that the scale at which firms operate in is determined by the market size, whereby 
low level of economic density may lead to small demand and localized production. 
Industrial clusters further promote division of labor between small and specialized firms 
that help to raise collective innovation potential and inter-firm cooperation, fostering 
learning and innovative advantages (Amin and Thrift, 1994). Moreover, MSEs in industrial 
clusters may benefit from thick market externalities for specialized inputs (Glaeser et al., 
1992), which can affect their investment decisions and choices for factors of production. 
Besides increasing the internal economies of scale, geographic proximity could therefore 
result in external economies of scale that can generally lower costs of doing business 
(Harrison,1992). 
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In recent literatures, industrial clusters are also noted in helping to ease both the starting 
and working capital constraints of MSEs in the absence of a well-functioning capital 
market (Banerjee and Munshi, 2004; Huang et al., 2008; Long and Zhang, 2011). Industrial 
clusters can help facilitate access to both formal and informal finances and trade credit 
through repeated interactions between local producers and traders that promote trust, 
thereby reducing the problem of moral hazard and the cost of monitoring in credit 
relationships (Grabher, 1993; Schmitz, 1995; Nadvi, 1999; Russo and Rossi, 2001). 
Collaborative networks within clusters may also reinforce mutually beneficial relationships 
such as cooperation, allowing access to cheaper credit or the joint purchase of materials at 
lower prices (Banerjee and Munshi, 2004). The specialization and division of labor in 
industrial clusters can also ease the financial constraints of MSEs by lowering the capital 
requirement to invest in the different steps of production (Ruan and Zhang, 2009).  
 
The availability of specialized inputs, local markets and customers within clusters can 
lower the barriers to start a business compared to dispersed locations (Porter, 2000). 
Established relationships and social networks with various agents in the same community 
and the presence of successful local firms can also reduce the “perceived risk of entry” 
(Porter, 2000). Even after establishment, the presence of a strong cluster environment that 
fosters growth and enhances regional comparative advantage plays an important role for the 
survival of enterprises (Schmitz,1995; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). Industrial clusters could 
therefore increase the competitiveness of MSEs and thus impact their performance by 
helping smooth out market failures and reduce transaction costs. However, the ease of entry 
into industrial clusters could result in congestion that leads to diseconomies of scale due to 
fierce competition for limited resources and markets (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006a).  
 
Even in the absence of geographic proximity, social proximity often manifested through 
local group cohesion and common identity such as ethnic ties is also another mechanism 
that can improve market integration (Tyler and Shah, 2006; Yoshino, 2011). In situations 
where market imperfections prevail, social networks with different agents such as 
producers and traders may help facilitate trust and can positively impact business outcomes 
Introduction  
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by reducing transactions costs and providing access to various resources (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005). Firms having close social networks with different agents are well placed to 
have better information about markets and access to credit (Fisman, 2001). Social networks 
may also lower the operating cost of the firm by facilitating contractual relationships and 
reducing the search and reach costs among different agents (Fafchamps, 2002). Although 
social networks can positively impact business outcomes by reducing transaction costs, 
they may also hinder economic performance by limiting access to a wider range of 
business-related ideas and constrain the ability of producers to respond to ‘exogenous 
developments’ (Grabher, 1993; Annen, 2001). 
 
While the advantages associated with geographic concentration of economic activities has 
gained a wider attention in the literature, much of previous researches on industrial clusters 
have evolved around large-scale enterprises operating in large metropolitan regions where 
markets are relatively well integrated, competitive and technologically advanced. For 
example, the advantages of clustering are empirically demonstrated by looking at the effect 
on the performance of large firms in terms of increasing productivity (Lall et al., 2003), 
promoting innovation (Oerlemans et al., 2001), and enhancing market linkage to export 
markets (Bair and Gereffic, 2001). The benefits of clustering are also empirically 
demonstrated in various success stories like electronics, multimedia, and cultural products 
agglomerations in California (Scott, 1996), the technology-intensive industrial regions in 
Baden-Württemberg, Germany (Sabel et al., 1989; Herrigel, 1993) and machine tools 
networks in Northern and Central Italy (Paniccia, 1998). The potential advantages of 
industrial clusters for MSEs that operate in fragmented and uncompetitive markets such as 
in Africa is little studied. The few studies available in Africa focus on case studies, often 
lacking a comparative analysis. For an overview of studies on clusters in Africa, see Banji 
and McCormick (2007), Zeng, (2008) and Yoshino (2011). The positive external 
economies of scale within industrial clusters and their potential economic gains for MSEs 
in comparison to those operating in less concentrated or dispersed locations is therefore not 
fully examined. In addition, although considerable efforts have been made to document the 
existence of spatial concentration of MSEs in Africa, there is not much effort to empirically 
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investigate how that affects their performance using rigorous econometric tools. The few 
exceptions are, for example, the study by Akoten et al., (2006) on the shoe cluster in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia and Akoten and Otsuka, (2007) on a garment cluster in Nairobi, Kenya. 
Moreover, an empirical investigation on the role and impact of social networks on MSEs in 
Africa is very scanty due to limited data on detailed social inter-relationships among 
different agents (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Fafchamps, 2002; Tyler and Shah, 2006).  
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
The general objective of this study is to empirically investigate how clustering and social 
networks affect the performance of MSEs in Africa by looking at the evidence from the 
handloom sector in Ethiopia. Ethiopia provides a relevant context to address this objective 
due to the co-existence of clustered and non-clustered or dispersed MSEs both in urban and 
rural areas. Besides, the availability of large scale surveys conducted by the Central 
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSAE), the World Bank and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) allow us to implement a detailed counter factual investigation 
between clustered and dispersed MSEs and look at the impact of clustering and social-
networks on their performance.  
 
As in the case for many African countries, MSEs in Ethiopia have a substantial coverage in 
the private sector. Increasing landlessness and declining absorptive capacity of the 
agricultural sector for the increased labor force in Ethiopia together with limited growth in 
employment in the public sector has resulted in a substantial number of new job seekers to 
turn to MSEs as the main source of livelihood. According to an estimate by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry in 2004, the number of people earning their livelihood from MSEs in 
Ethiopia was eight times larger than those engaged in medium and large scale industrial 
establishments (MOTI, 2004).  
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A recent study highlights market fragmentation as one of the major constraints that MSEs 
face in Ethiopia (Rijkers et al., 2010). Market fragmentation, which is more pronounced in 
rural parts of Ethiopia results in limited local demand and is one of the reasons why MSEs 
do not invest and grow (ibid). Following the current strategy of Ethiopia that emphasizes on 
agricultural development led industrialization, there has been a pressing need by the 
government to enhance market integration by promoting industrial development that 
encompasses cluster based MSEs. Among the various types of MSEs found in Ethiopia, 
handicrafts in general and the handloom sector in particular is given emphasis by policy 
makers due to its huge employment creation and the existence of naturally emerged clusters 
both in urban and rural areas. The handloom sector supports the lives of more than 227,000 
people with 55% of them existing in rural areas and 48.5% are operated by women (CSAE, 
2003). In addition to its income and employment creation, the sector has strategic 
importance in the economic development of the country through its strong linkage with the 
agricultural sector and a growing demand for its products both domestically and 
internationally. Despite these enthusiasm, however, the conditions at each isolated MSE are 
harsh; productivity and income are low, information and technical know-how are poor and 
they lack capital and market access often producing at best only simple products (Demesse 
et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2011).  
 
Specifically, the study intends to address the following objectives:  
 
(i) Investigate clustering advantages by contrasting the performance of clustered 
micro enterprises, in terms of profit, with that of control groups of dispersed ones 
both in urban and rural areas. The study also aims to identify factors determining 
clustering of micro enterprises in urban and rural areas.  
(ii) Examine the advantage of clustering in easing the financial constraints of 
microenterprises.  
(iii) Investigate how clustering affects the entry and exit decisions of farm households 
into and from non-farm enterprises in rural parts of Ethiopia and examine the 
impact of entry into and exit from non-farm enterprises on household’s wellbeing. 
Introduction  
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(iv)  Identify various socio-economic factors that determine ethnic ties between 
producers and traders and analyze how these ethnic ties affect the performance of 
producers. 
 
1.3 Overview 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the first specific 
objective outlined above where the performance of micro enterprises is contrasted with that 
of control groups of dispersed ones. To correct for selection bias that may arise from 
entrepreneurs’ decision to locate their business in a certain location, clustered 
microenterprises are matched with dispersed ones that have the same observable 
characteristics except for being clustered by using the non-parametric statistical method of 
propensity score matching. In addition, this chapter examines various enterprise and 
regional specific factors that determine the clustering of micro enterprises in rural and 
urban areas. It uses more than 4000 micro enterprises in four regions of Ethiopia; namely 
Tigray, Amhara, the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) and the capital 
city Addis Ababa. The main data is the 2002/03 Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Survey 
conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSAE). This is further 
supplemented by the 2002/03 Welfare Monitoring Survey and the 2002/03 Large and 
Medium Scale Manufacturing Establishment Survey both conducted by CSAE. Chapter 3 
uses the same data set as in Chapter 2 and investigates the role of clustering in easing the 
financial constraints of MSEs by examining whether clustering lowers the capital barrier to 
entry. The financial constraints and capital entry barriers of microenterprises in industrial 
clusters are compared with those investing outside of clusters using parametric econometric 
tools.  
 
Chapter 4 examines how clustering affects the entry and exit decisions of farm households 
into and from non-farm enterprises in rural Ethiopia. In addition to the handloom sector, 
entry and exit decisions of farm households are investigated on other manufacturing sectors 
as well. Chapter 4 further investigates the impact of entry and exit into and from non-farm 
Introduction  
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enterprises on farm household’s well-being by using total household income, the food 
security status of a household and the household’s ability to raise enough money in case of 
emergency, as indicators. The non-parametric statistical method of propensity score 
matching is used to account for selection bias that may arise from households’ entry and 
exit decisions into and from non-farm enterprises respectively. More than 2000 rural 
enterprises from the Amhara region are used in this study. The main data is the 2006/07 
Rural Investment Climate Survey conducted by the World Bank together with CSAE. 
 
Chapter 5 analyzes the importance of social networks formed by ethnic ties in trade 
relationships of small-scale producers using both a non-parametric and a parametric 
statistical method. It investigates how various socio-economic characteristics of producers 
lead to ethnic ties with traders and examine how ethic ties affect their performance. The 
study uses data collected on handloom producers by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration with the Ethiopian Development Research Institute 
(EDRI) from March until May 2008. The survey covered 486 handloom producers in nine 
clusters, three of which are found in the capital city, Addis Ababa, and the rest in the Gamo 
zone in SNNP.  
 
Finally, chapter 6 provides the main conclusions and a discussion of the research. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Value-added of Cluster Membership for 
Micro Enterprises of the Handloom 
Sector in Ethiopia 
 
 
 
Abstract: By contrasting the performance of clustered micro enterprises with that of 
dispersed ones in the handloom sector in Ethiopia, this study shows that clustering 
significantly increases profit. To correct for selection bias, we match clustered and 
dispersed micro enterprises that share similar observable characteristics except for being 
clustered both in urban and rural areas. Results show that clustering is more profitable in 
urban than rural areas. It is also found that regional specific factors determining clustering 
of micro enterprises are different in urban and rural areas, highlighting the need to focus 
on local circumstances when formulating policies to promote clusters. 
 Keywords: cluster, micro enterprises, propensity score matching, handloom, Africa, 
 Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 Paper by Merima Ali and Jack Peerlings, published in World Development (2011) 39(3): 363-374. 
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2.1       Introduction 
 
The question of how to promote the growth potential of micro enterprises in developing 
countries has dominated the center of policy debates since the 1960s. Micro enterprises are 
recognized to have potentials to reach out to small and specialized markets and are flexible 
in allocating resources to changing opportunities. They also generate income and 
employment in labor intensive sectors engaging the poorest segment of the society, 
particularly women and unskilled labor (Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004). Yet, micro 
enterprises encounter various constraints and transaction costs that affect their business 
environment and undermine their development (Anderson, 1982; Boomgard et al., 1992). 
They are often characterized by low productivity, poor information access, limited technical 
know-how and lack capital and market access, mostly serving local markets. In recent 
years, however, it has been recognized that industrial clusters can reduce much of the 
transaction costs faced by micro enterprises and help to overcome their growth obstacles 
(Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006a; Ruan and Zhang, 2009).  
 
The concentration of economic activities within a certain sector producing similar and 
closely related goods may result in cost reducing economies of scale, location economies, 
to micro enterprises in the cluster. These location economies help to increase the 
competitiveness of micro enterprises in a wider market by promoting ‘collective efficiency’ 
through knowledge diffusion, specialization and social cooperation (Schmitz, 1995; 
Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). On the other hand, there could also be increased costs resulting 
from fierce competition among micro enterprises and congestion that can offset the 
potential benefits of clustering (Lall et al., 2003). 
 
Industrial clusters in developing countries are particularly common in traditional and labor 
intensive micro enterprises in rural and poor urban areas. This has attracted the interest of 
policy makers and development agencies like World Bank, UNIDO and ILO because of the 
direct impact such kind of clusters will have on poverty. Owing to the existing policy 
enthusiasm on promoting clusters, it is therefore important to investigate if clustering 
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actually results in significant economic gains to micro enterprises that could positively 
impact poverty.  
 
Previous studies are unable to address the above issue fully, because of lack of income data 
and their orientation towards case studies often lacking comparative analysis. The few 
comparative analyses available, e.g. Visser (1999) and Weijland (1999), do not take into 
consideration the issue of selection bias. Is good performance explained by factors 
determining location economies, or do micro enterprises with certain characteristics look 
out for profitable and productive locations? Recent empirical studies by Baldwin et al. 
(2006) and Saito et al. (2009) show that more productive firms self-select into larger 
markets and are more likely to be clustered in areas that are specialized in particular 
production. This is because the various advantages of bigger markets and spatial 
concentrations are “systematically more attractive to the more efficient firms” (Baldwin et 
al., 2006). With a large market size, low productive firms might also exit from a region or 
location due to high competition, making these regions and locations to comprise of mostly 
productive firms. Failure to address selection bias may therefore result in over estimating 
the impact of clustering on micro enterprises. It is also important for policies aiming at 
promoting clustering to know the extra income that can be generated by isolated micro 
enterprises if they were to cluster. Furthermore, since the development opportunities and 
constraints differ in urban and rural areas, it is important to distinguish factors that 
determine clustering of micro enterprises in these two regions in order to have appropriate 
tailor-made policies. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate clustering advantages by contrasting the 
performance of clustered micro enterprises, in terms of profit, with that of control groups of 
dispersed ones in the handloom sector in Ethiopia both in urban and rural areas. To take 
into account the problem of selection bias, we match clustered micro enterprises with that 
of dispersed ones that have the same observable characteristics except for being clustered 
by using a non-parametric statistical method known as propensity score matching 
(Heckman et al., 1997). To the best of our knowledge this has not been done before. The 
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study also aims to identify factors determining clustering of micro enterprises in urban and 
rural areas.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the conceptual 
approach used in this study. Section 2.3 is a brief overview of the handloom sector in 
Ethiopia. Section 2.4 presents the methodology and Section 2.5 provides discussion of the 
data used. Section 2.6 and 2.7 present the empirical model and the results respectively. 
Section 2.8 provides a general discussion and conclusions. 
  
2.2 Conceptual Approach  
 
An industrial cluster is a sectoral and geographical concentration of similar and related 
firms that are often linked by commonalities and complementarities (Schmitz and Nadvi, 
1999). Martin and Sunley (2003), mention that a cluster consists of two dimensions. One is 
the functional dimension of a cluster that includes the linkages between firms and 
interconnected agents like specialized input suppliers, output buyers, and associated 
institutions such as technical and training centers. Such linkages involve cooperation and 
networking that result in external economies of scale often manifested through social, 
cultural and institutional features (Schmitz, 1995; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). The second 
dimension is related to geographical proximity where economic activities of a certain sector 
spatially concentrate in order to benefit from external economies of scale, that are an 
increasing function of the number of nearby firms (Henderson et al., 2001). Geographic 
proximity promotes social proximity that results in “social embeddedness” which 
encourages face-to-face interaction and circulation of new information (Harrison, 1992). 
Furthermore, geographic proximity facilitates inter-firm cooperation, fostering learning and 
innovation in specialized firms (Grabher, 1993). Although it is important from an empirical 
stand point to consider both the  functional and geographical dimensions of clusters, due to 
unavailability of data, this paper is uniquely concerned in addressing the second dimension. 
Geographic proximity alone does not provide a direct view about the nature and strength of 
local inter-firm linkages, knowledge spillovers and social networks; however, it provides 
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information about the existence of external economies of scale that can arise from the 
various linkages between firms and interconnected agents (Martin and Sunley, 2003). 
  
2.3  The Handloom Sector in Ethiopia 
 
Micro enterprises are the main source of employment next to agriculture in Ethiopia 
(CSAE, 2002). The handloom sector, being one of the most important segments of micro 
enterprises in the country, supports the lives of more than 227,000 people with 55% of 
them existing in rural areas and 48.5% are women (CSAE, 2003). Child labor is a common 
phenomenon in the sector as well, with the number of persons engaged with less than 18 
years of age being 13% (ibid).  
 
In addition to its income and employment creation, the sector has strategic importance in 
the economic development of the country through its strong linkage with the agricultural 
sector and a growing demand for its products both domestically and internationally 
(Demesse et al., 2005). In the handloom sector, micro enterprises are cottage industries 
where most of the labor and capital are provided by the household owning the firm.  
 
Micro enterprises operating in the handloom sector of Ethiopia are found in naturally 
emerged clusters and dispersed from each other in different regions of the country both in 
rural and urban areas. There has not been a comprehensive study about handloom sector in 
Ethiopia that indicates the exact number of clusters in the country and their size in terms of 
geographic scale and number of enterprises. The only closely studied cluster through 
UNIDO intervention is the one found in the capital city Addis Ababa where about 20,000 
micro enterprises are found clustered in a district called Gullele in the northern part of the 
city (ILO, 2005).  
 
The Gullele cluster comprises of weavers most of them coming from the same ethnic group 
who have migrated from the southern part of the country. The business culture in the cluster 
is largely based on imitation where the basic knowledge of weaving has been transmitted 
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from generation to generation. The cluster contains the whole value chain of the handloom 
sector starting from raw material sourcing until the final consumers at the end of the 
marketing channel. In the cluster, weavers perform both individually having their own 
looms and usually working in their homes, and collectively being organized in cooperatives 
working in common sheds. The main products of the cluster can be divided into semi-
finished fabrics and finished products. While the semi-finished fabrics are usually 
channeled to the domestic garment factories for further processing, the finished products 
are sold both in the domestic and export markets. Traders in the cluster play an active role 
in linking weavers working in their homes with retailers and shop owners. Traders also 
travel to rural towns to collect products in bulk and sell them to shops found around the 
cluster. Outside of Addis Ababa, clustered micro enterprises are also common in bigger 
regional cities, touristic areas and rural towns. 
 
Because of lack of information on clustering in the handloom sector outside of Addis 
Ababa, we construct a concentration index at district level to look where micro enterprises 
are spatially concentrated relative to other manufacturing establishments using data from 
the Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Industry Survey. The formula and variables used to 
construct the index are discussed in detail in section 2.5.2. In general, micro enterprises are 
spatially concentrated in Southern Nations Nationalities and People (SNNP), Addis Ababa, 
Tigray and Amhara in descending order. The four regions alone cover 82% of the total 
handloom establishments in Ethiopia. In urban areas SNNP followed by Addis Ababa have 
the largest spatial concentration of micro enterprises while Tigray and Amhara have the 
largest spatial concentration in rural areas. Particularly in Tigray and Amhara, micro 
enterprises are concentrated in rural towns and touristic sites. According to the 
concentration index, we identified 27 clustered districts in the four regions of Tigray, 
Amhara, SNNP and Addis Ababa. However, these are not the only clusters in the country 
as the identification of clusters is clearly dependent on the fact that concentration index has 
been calculated at district level and is based on samples of micro enterprises from the 
Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Industry Survey.  
 
            Value-added of cluster membership for micro-enterprises in Ethiopia  
15 
 
2.4  Propensity Score Matching 
 
In order to capture the impact of clustering on profitability of micro enterprises, the study 
uses propensity score matching (PSM). The main pillars of PSM are individuals (micro 
enterprises), the treatment (clustering) and potential outcome (profit). The idea is to match 
those micro enterprises that receive a treatment (clustered micro enterprises) with that of a 
control group (dispersed micro enterprises) sharing similar observable characteristics. Then 
the mean effect of treatment (clustering) is calculated as the average difference in 
profitability between the treated and non-treated control group.  
 
Let ܦ௝߳(1,0), be an indicator of whether micro enterprise ݆ is clustered or dispersed, that is 
whether micro enterprise ݆ has received a treatment or not. The potential outcome of 
clustering, profit, is defined as, ߨ௝	൫ܦ௝൯ for each micro enterprise݆, where ݆ = 1, … ,ܰ 
denoting the total population. The effect of clustering on individual micro enterprise ݆ can 
then be written as: 
 
௝ܶ = ߨ௝(1) − ߨ௝(0) (1) 
 
With this specification, however, one cannot observe the counterfactual, ߨ௝	(0), that is the 
profitability of enterprise ݆ had it not been located within a cluster. Since the individual 
treatment effect, ௝ܶ  
cannot be estimated, the average treatment effect from the population 
should be computed.  
 
Although there are different ways to estimate the average treatment effect, the one that has 
received most attention in the evaluation literature is the average treatment effect on the 
treated ( ஺்்ܶ), which is defined as:  
 
஺்்ܶ = ܧ(ܶ⎸ܦ = 1) = ܧ[ߨ(1)⎸ܦ = 1] −ܧ[ߨ(0)⎸ܦ = 1] (2) 
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where, ஺்்ܶ  is the average treatment effect on the treated and ܧ[ߨ(1)⎸ܦ = 1] is the 
expected outcome for those micro enterprises which are actually clustered or received a 
treatment and ܧ[ߨ(0)⎸ܦ = 1]
 
is the counterfactual for the treated which estimates what the 
outcome would be if those micro enterprises which in fact are clustered become dispersed 
or do not receive a treatment. Since the counterfactual cannot be observed, it should be 
constructed using dispersed micro enterprises that share similar observable characteristics, 
except for being clustered.  
 
An important assumption of this method is the conditional independence assumption (CIA) 
which states that, the set of observable characteristics should determine both the probability 
(propensity score) of receiving a treatment (being clustered) and the outcome of interest 
(profit of micro enterprises); that is (ߨ଴,ߨଵ)⏊ܦ⎸ݒ	, denoting the statistical independence of (ߨ଴,ߨଵ) conditional on observable characteristics, ݒ. This is a non-causality condition that 
excludes the dependence between the potential outcome and the probability of receiving a 
treatment (Heckman et al., 1997).  
 
If all the variables influencing both the probability of being clustered and profitability of 
micro enterprises are not incorporated, then CIA is violated since the impact of clustering 
will be accounted by information that is not included in the estimation of the propensity 
score (Smith and Todd, 2005). To prevent the violation of CIA, explanatory variables that 
are supported by economic theory are included in the probit model that is used to generate 
predicted probabilities (propensity scores) which will then be used to match micro 
enterprises (see section 2.6.2).  
 
Given that the CIA holds, the PSM estimate for ஺்்ܶ  can be written as:  
 
஺்்ܶ
௉ௌெ = ܧ௉(௩)⎸஽ୀଵ){ܧ[ߨ(1)⎸ܦ = 1,ܲ(ݒ)] − ܧ[ߨ(0)⎸ܦ = 1,ܲ(ݒ)]} (3) 
 
where ܲ(ݒ) is the probability of receiving a treatment (being clustered) based on 
observable characteristics,	ݒ. 
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Once the probit model is estimated to generate the propensity score, a dispersed micro 
enterprise that is ‘closest’ in terms of propensity score has to be selected as a match. This is 
done using the kernel matching method that associates the outcome ߨ of a clustered micro 
enterprise ݆ with the matched outcome that is given by a kernel-weighted average of all the 
dispersed micro enterprises. Since the weighted average of all micro enterprises in the 
dispersed group are used to construct the counterfactual outcome, kernel matching has an 
advantage of lower variance because more information is used (Heckman et al., 1998). The 
weight given to dispersed micro enterprise ݅ is in proportion to the closeness between ݅ and 
the clustered micro enterprise	݆.  
 
In order to eliminate outliers that have very high and very low propensity scores, the 
matching is restricted on the area of Common Support in the sample which is defined 
between the lowest propensity score of the clustered and the highest propensity score of the 
dispersed group. To be effective, matching should balance observable explanatory variables 
across clustered and dispersed micro enterprises. For this a balancing test is performed after 
the match. This test is primarily concerned with the extent to which differences in the 
observable characteristics between the clustered and dispersed groups have been eliminated 
so that any difference in outcome variable (profit) between the two groups can be inferred 
as coming from the treatment i.e. clustering.  
 
2.5 Data 
 
2.5.1 Data Sets 
 
Enterprise level data from the 2002/03 survey on Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing 
Industry, conducted by the Central Statistical Authority of  Ethiopia (CSAE), is used in this 
study. The sampling frame for this survey was obtained from the listing of the 2001/02 
Population and Housing Census which was conducted by CSAE. The survey covered both 
urban and rural parts in 11 regions of the country. Taking into account population size and 
            Value-added of cluster membership for micro-enterprises in Ethiopia  
18 
 
expected distribution of cottage industries, a two stage stratified cluster sample design was 
used for regional (urban) capitals, major (other) urban cities and rural areas (CSAE, 2003). 
For another 8 urban centers a three stage stratified cluster sample design was used to select 
the sample. In each case, sample units were selected systematically using probability 
proportional to size; size being adjusted to the number of cottage industries obtained from 
the 2001/02 Population and Housing Census (ibid). In this data set micro enterprise specific 
variables like gender, age, experience and schooling of the owner operator are incorporated. 
In addition, value of production, cost of raw materials, wages and salaries for paid non-
family workers and other operational costs of the establishment are included. After 
dropping observations with incomplete or inconsistent information, we were able to obtain 
a complete data set from a total of 4336 micro enterprises from 120 districts in four 
different regions of Tigray, Amhara, SNNP and Addis Ababa. 1945 (45%) micro 
enterprises are from urban areas and the rest 2391 (55%) are from rural areas.  
 
The enterprise level data are supplemented by additional location specific variables from 
the 2002/03 Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted by CSAE. It contains information 
regarding markets, transport infrastructure (an all-weather road) and credit (micro finance 
institution) at each district level. Information from the 2002/03 census survey on Large and 
Medium Scale Manufacturing Establishments conducted by CSAE is also used. This census 
incorporates information about large manufacturing establishments of various industries 
located in different zones (a higher geographic unit next to district).  
 
The financial information from the Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Industry Survey is 
used to calculate profit of micro enterprises. Profit2 is defined as value of production minus 
value of raw materials, operational costs and wages and salaries for paid apprentices, 
seasonal and temporary workers and paid permanent workers. A limitation of financial data 
obtained from micro enterprises in developing countries in general and Ethiopia in 
particular is lack of reliable and adequate profit data. In the survey more than 90% of the 
                                                   
2 Opportunity cost of family labor is not included in this calculation. In the operational costs, water and electricity payments, 
transportation cost and cost of repair and maintenance are included. The data to calculate profit is obtained from the 2002/03 
Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Industry Survey. 
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micro enterprises do not keep financial records which might lead to recall problems during 
the time of the survey. Inseparability of the business activity from the household, 
seasonality of production, unwillingness of producers to reveal their earnings, etc. may also 
lead to unreliable measures of profit (Daniels, 2001; de Mel et al., 2009). 
 
It is important from an empirical points of view to check the reliability of the above 
measure of profit by comparing it with alternative measures such as those based on self-
reported profits by producers (de Mel et al., 2009) and various proxies of profits obtained 
through more detailed questions and repeated visits (Daniels, 2001). However, due to 
unavailability of data, our measure of profit is based on financial information obtained from 
producers from a single-visit survey.  
 
2.5.2 Location Quotient 
 
Since the concept of ‘cluster’ and ‘dispersion’ is prone to subjective judgment, several 
standard global indices have been developed to measure spatial concentration of activities. 
The location quotient (ܮܳ) is one of the commonly utilized concentration indices 
(O’Donoghue and Gleave, 2004). It quantifies how “concentrated” a sector is in a certain 
location compared to a larger geographic area such as a nation, region or sub region, 
showing the proportion of specialization of a certain sector in a given location. 
 
ܮܳூ = 	 (݁ூ ݁⁄ ) (ܧூ ܧ⁄⁄ ), (4) 
 
where ܮܳூ the location quotient of industry I in the local region, ݁ூ employment of industry 
I in the local region, ݁	total manufacturing employment in the local region, ܧூ reference 
area employment in industry I, E total reference area manufacturing employment. Here 
total manufacturing employment includes employment in micro, medium and large scale 
manufacturing industries.  
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The location quotient is based upon calculating the ratio between employment of a certain 
sector to some reference unit. It is computed at the finest spatial unit possible, the district, 
both in urban and rural areas taking zone which is a higher geographic region as a reference 
point. In order to calculate the ܮܳ, data from the survey on Cottage/Handicraft 
Manufacturing Industry (2002/03) together with the census data from the Large and 
Medium Scale Manufacturing Establishments survey (2002/03) both collected by CSAE are 
used.  
 
Looking at the impact of a ܮܳ on profitability of micro enterprises results in selection bias 
where more profitable producers might select themselves in locating in areas with higher 
ܮܳ, causing a biased sample with non-random sampling. Biases arising from self-selection 
make the determination of direction of causation difficult because the dependent variable 
(profit) and the independent variable (ܮܳ) are simultaneously determined. In situations 
where an explanatory variable is jointly determined with the dependent variable, OLS 
regression will typically provide inconsistent estimates because the independent variable 
becomes endogenous and is correlated with the error term (Greene, 2008). Even though the 
continuous variable (ܮܳ) may provide richer information, due to lack of a valid 
instrumental variable to control for endogeneity, the estimation is done using a non-
parametric statistical method (PSM). In this method, we classify micro enterprises in to 
clustered and dispersed ones and investigate the impact of clustering on profit after 
controlling for observable factors that can affect the location decision of micro enterprises. 
Those districts with a ܮܳ of greater than one are selected as having clustered micro 
enterprises and those with ܮܳ of less than one are selected as having dispersed micro 
enterprises. This resulted in 2187 (50.44%) clustered and 2149 (49.56%) dispersed micro 
enterprises. A robustness check is also made by increasing the cut-off point of the ܮܳ. 
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2.6 Empirical Model 
 
2.6.1 Modeling Enterprises’ Location Decision 
 
To model where micro enterprises are likely to spatially concentrate (cluster), it is assumed 
that they choose a certain location based on the expected profitability of being located 
there. Consider the existence of two spatial choices (݅	and ݎ), where ݅ indicates an industrial 
cluster and ݎ indicates another location outside of a cluster, and ܰ micro enterprises 
(݆ = 1, … ,ܰ). The profit derived by micro enterprise ݆  if it is located at ݅ is given by:  
 
ߨ௝,௜ = ߚ ௝ܺ,௜ + ߝ௝ ,௜ (5) 
 
ߚ	is a vector of unknown parameters, ௝ܺ,௜ is a vector of explanatory variables and ߝ௝ ,௜ is a 
random term reflecting random preferences of micro enterprise ݆ and unobserved attributes 
of location i (Hausman and Wise, 1978). 
 
The profitability of micro enterprise ݆ at ݅ depends, among other things, on net location 
benefit which is the difference between gross location benefits and location costs. Gross 
location benefits originate from external economies of scale arising from clustering benefits 
from co-locating near to other producers and regional benefits. Regional benefits are those 
that are found outside clusters and depend on the intrinsic features of the site such as the 
quality of local factors of production, availability of bigger markets, credit and transport 
infrastructure, etc (Krugman, 1991). Regional factors provide advantages that are available 
to all producers regardless of industry affiliation through benefits that emanate from overall 
population and wealth of the location. On the other hand, there could also be location costs 
resulting from fierce competition among micro enterprises for limited common resources 
due to congestion. Hence, when the location benefits that pull micro enterprises to a center 
are greater than the location costs that pull them apart, clustering occurs (Henderson et al., 
2001). Regional and clustering benefits, however, are not the only factors affecting 
            Value-added of cluster membership for micro-enterprises in Ethiopia  
22 
 
profitability of micro enterprises and hence their location decision. Enterprise specific 
characteristics such as age, schooling and experience of the owner operator might play a 
role by affecting his/her ability to capitalize on location specific benefits (Combes, et al., 
2008 and Wheeler, 2006). 
 
If micro enterprise ݆ is located at location ݅ to maximize profit, then the probability(݌) that 
݅ is chosen by ݆  is given by: 
 
݌௝,௜ = ݌൫ߨ௝,௜ > ߨ௝,௥൯∀	ݎ ≠ ݅  (6) 
 
where ݌௝,௜ is the probability that enterprise ݆ is located at ݅ and ߨ௝,௜ and ߨ௝,௥ denote the profit 
for micro enterprise ݆ if it is located at location ݅ and ݎ respectively. 
 
If we let ௝݀ ,௜ = 1 if micro enterprise ݆ is located at ݅ (an industrial cluster) and 0 otherwise, 
then without loss of generality, we can write a probit model as:  
 
݌௝,௜൫݅ = 1⎸ ௝ܺ,௜	൯ = Ф(ߚ ௝ܺ,௜)  (7) 
 
where ߚ is a vector of unknown parameters and ௝ܺ,௜ is a vector of explanatory variables that 
capture factors determining the location of micro enterprise ݆ at ݅ and Ф(. )	is a commonly 
used notion for the standard normal distribution function (Greene, 2008). 
 
2.6.2  Variables and Hypothesis 
 
In order to capture factors affecting the probability of being clustered, variables that can 
affect the profitability and hence location decision of micro enterprises apart from 
clustering should be controlled for. Following the above argument, the explanatory 
variables in the probit regression that is used to generate propensity scores for the matching 
are divided into enterprises specific and regional specific factors. 
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Enterprises specific factors  
 
As variables describing the characteristics of micro enterprises, we take gender, age, 
schooling and experience. Gender is indicated by a dummy (1 when male, 0 when female). 
It is expected that gender matters as in urban areas male are more active in the handloom 
sector while in rural areas females are more active (CSAE, 2003).  
 
Schooling is measured in years that range from 0 indicating no formal education until 13 
indicating higher education beyond high school. Industrial clusters tend to attract more 
educated workers or operators with better skills because they are capable of “capitalizing on 
agglomeration benefits” through their superior information processing ability and search 
techniques compared to less educated workers (Freedman, 2008; Combes, et al., 2008). The 
high mobility and entrepreneurial tendencies of young and educated adults also attract them 
to areas with better access to markets and information (Wheeler, 2006). We would therefore 
expect an increase in schooling to have a positive effect on the probability of being 
clustered. 
 
Economic concentration could also be more beneficial for workers whose knowledge and 
skills have accumulated with age and experience. Such accumulation of knowledge is 
expected to be lower for relatively younger operators and for new entrants and increases as 
producers become older and stay in business longer. But once producers have reached a 
certain level of age and experience, the accumulation of knowledge may decline. For this, 
we expect the effect of age and experience on the probability of being clustered to be non-
linear, therefore we include in the probit regression the squared terms in addition to the 
level.  
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Regional specific factors 
 
These are further classified in to concentration of industrial activities and access to various 
facilities outside clusters. 
 
Concentration 
 
We include three variables describing industry concentration; first, concentration of micro 
enterprises from other industries other than the handloom sector in the same district, 
second, concentration of big textile factories in the same zone (group of districts), third, 
concentration of big manufacturing factories from other industries in the same zone. All 
three are measured using location quotients based on employment.  
 
These three variables are indicators of externalities that surrounding industrial activities 
have on the handloom sector (see Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999). For example, Fujita 
and Thisse (1996) and Lall et al., (2003) showed that producers benefit from the existence 
of big firms from the same industry as well as other industries in nearby areas. These inter-
industry and intra-industry benefits include information spillovers, technological 
externalities, availability of pool of skilled workers, and existence of common services such 
as research and training centers, government and regulatory institutions, banking services 
etc.  
 
Large urban areas are more diverse and can support a wider range of industrial activities 
that require buyers and sellers to be in close spatial proximity than rural areas and small 
cities that specialize in a few activities (Fujita et al., 1999). Because of the larger presence 
and concentration of manufacturing activities in the urban areas of Ethiopia, we expect 
micro enterprises to be more likely to cluster around manufacturing industries in urban than 
in rural areas.  
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The concentration of big textile factories in the same zone is expected to have a positive 
effect both in rural and urban areas as there can be backward and forward linkages in terms 
of inputs sharing and information spillover with regards to design, markets and outputs 
between big producers and micro enterprises operating in the same industry. For micro 
enterprises that operate in industries other than the handloom sector and located in the same 
district, they can have a positive effect if their concentration promotes multiple 
specializations, which further triggers information spillover. On the other hand there can 
also be costs due to higher rents for housing and congestion, the latter often resulting in 
fierce competition for limited common resources.  
 
Access to market, transport infrastructure and credit 
 
Market access is calculated following the gravity model of accessibility (Evenett and 
Keller, 2002). According to this model, the degree of interconnection between two 
locations is directly related to the attractiveness of the locations which can be captured by 
employment opportunities and purchasing power of the population and is indirectly related 
to the physical separation between the two locations which can be captured by the presence 
or absence of a transportation link, physical distance or travel time. The general formulation 
of the gravity model following Hansen (1959) is:  
 
ܣ௠ = ∑ ௡ܹ ݂(݀௠௡) (8) 
 
where,	ܣ௠ is the accessibility indicator at location ݉ (which in this case is a cluster), ௡ܹ 
the weight that captures the attractiveness of location ݊ (which in this case is a market), 
݂(݀௠௡) is the “impediment” function that separates the original location ݉ and destination 
݊ as a function of distance ݀௠௡ . The gravity model imposes a distance decay formulation 
on the impediment function that takes the inverse power (Lall et al., 2003). 
 
In order to calculate market access, information from the Welfare Monitoring Survey, 
2002/03 is used. Due to lack of data on purchasing power of the residents, population 
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within each district is used in order to indicate the size of potential market. For a variable to 
be used in the impediment function, average travel time to the nearest market place is used. 
Following the general formulation of the gravity model, market access is then calculated as 
population in 100,000 divided by hours taken to reach the nearest market place in each 
district. In order to capture the impact of distance decay, a square of the above specification 
is used. Economic activities are likely to concentrate around markets because of increasing 
returns to scale in production due to proximity to consumers and reduced transportation 
costs while delivering goods to the market (Krugman, 1991), so we expect market access to 
have a positive effect on the probability of being clustered.  
 
In relation to market access, producers generally are more likely to concentrate in locations 
where the transport infrastructure enables to reach markets at low costs (Henderson et al., 
2001; Krugman, 1998). And hence “activities are pulled disproportionally” towards 
locations with good infrastructure facilities (Henderson et al., 2001). We measure access to 
transport infrastructure by the average travel time taken to reach the nearest all-weather 
road at each district level, which is obtained from the Welfare Monitoring Survey 2002/03. 
Travel time to the nearest all-weather road instead of physical distance in kilometers is 
chosen to take into account for quality of the infrastructure. Although the availability of 
high quality infrastructure eases geographic barriers of interaction, enhancing technology 
diffusion and information spillover (Krugman,1991), it can have an opposite effect as there 
is more need to cluster when there is poor infrastructure. We would expect this effect to be 
more pronounced in rural areas due to their remoteness.  
 
Micro enterprises in developing countries in general and Ethiopia in particular struggle with 
credit constraints, which are one of the key obstacles for their growth (Ageba and Amha, 
2006). Availability of credit services that target micro enterprises such as micro finance 
institutions (MFI) are considered to ease the credit constraints. In this study, average travel 
time in hours taken to reach the nearest MFI is used to capture the availability of credit 
services in near-by areas. We would expect micro enterprises to cluster near MFI; hence an 
increase in average hours to reach MFI would decrease the probability of being clustered.  
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Additional variables 
 
As two additional variables we include a dummy indicating whether or not an enterprise is 
located in Addis Ababa and a dummy indicating whether or not an enterprise is located in a 
rural town. These two dummies are considered relevant since they provide information 
about all kind of externalities that cities provide. 
 
2.7  Results 
 
2.7.1 Estimation Results of the Probit Regression 
 
The results of the probit regression for factors that determine clustering of micro enterprises 
are presented in Table 2.1. The predicted probabilities from the probit regression are used 
to generate matched micro enterprises. Because there is significant differences in many of 
the explanatory variables used including monthly profit between rural and urban areas (see 
Table 2.I.1, Appendix 2.I), the analysis has been performed for urban and rural areas 
separately. 
 
Although some variables (e.g. schooling) increase the probability of being clustered both in 
rural and urban areas, we find some differences. While micro enterprises that are run by 
female and younger operators are more likely to cluster in rural areas, this is not the case in 
urban areas. This confirms the fact that there are more female operators in rural than urban 
areas (CSAE, 2003). Loening et al., (2008) also found that young females are the main 
operators of non-farm enterprises in rural Ethiopia. 
 
The concentration of micro enterprises in the same district but operating in other industries 
has a positive and significant effect in urban areas. This could be because positive 
externalities from information spillover and multiple specializations outweigh the negative 
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effect of congestion and fierce competition. It is also positive in rural areas although not 
significant. 
 
Similarly, concentration of big textile factories in the same zone has a positive and 
significant effect both in urban and rural areas. This points the importance of backward and 
forward linkages in terms of inputs sharing and information spillover with regards to 
design, markets and outputs between big textile factories and micro enterprises operating in 
the same industry. Contrary to what we expected, micro enterprises have low probability of 
being clustered around big manufacturing industries in urban areas. This is probably 
because manufacturing industries in urban areas are located in suburbs that are usually 
located at the outskirts of urban towns often marked by the government as industry or 
export zones.  
 
Micro enterprises have high probability to cluster around markets in urban areas while they 
cluster further away from markets in rural areas. This is in line with the finding that micro 
enterprises in urban areas are more likely to cluster where there is good infrastructure as 
can be captured by time taken to reach to the nearest all-weather road while they cluster in 
remote areas where the all-weather road is not accessible in rural areas. This could indicate 
that there is more need to cluster in rural areas to compensate for remoteness. This finding 
also confirms Weijland (1999) who stated that industrial clusters are important in remote 
areas as they help to attract traders that link cottage industries with distant markets. Traders 
are usually attracted to such clusters because the “trading cost per transaction” is lower 
when producers are concentrated in one area (ibid). A recent study on rural clusters in the 
handloom sector in Ethiopia also showed that traders from the capital city Addis Ababa and 
other urban towns travel to rural areas to collect finished products in bulk from various 
producers operating in clusters (Ayele et al., 2009). These traders that base their business in 
towns like Addis Ababa are mostly born and grown in rural areas and have strong social 
networks and family ties that can enhance trust and help to establish stable transactions 
(ibid).  
 
            Value-added of cluster membership for micro-enterprises in Ethiopia  
29 
 
Table 2.1 Marginal effectsa of the probability of being clustered resulting from the 
probit regressions (standard errors in parentheses). 
 Urban Rural 
Male (dummy)  0.23(0.03)*** -0.14 (0.07)** 
 
Age -0.00(0.01) -0.01 (0.006)* 
 
Age squared  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
 
Schooling  0.02 (0.01)***  0.02 (0.01)* 
 
Experience -0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
 
Experience squared  0.00 (0.00)**  0.00 (0.00) 
 
Concentration of micro enterprises  
(in same district and different industry) 
 0.22 (0.04)***  0.02 (0.02) 
 
 
Concentration of big textile factories  
(in the same zone) 
 
 0.03 (0.01)***  0.07 (0.04)* 
Concentration of big manufacturing factories  
(in the same zone and different industry) 
 
-0.13 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.06) 
Market access  0.004 (0.001)*** -0.05 (0.02)** 
 
Hours to the nearest micro finance institution  0.27 (0.03)*** -0.00 (0.00) 
 
Hours to the nearest all-weather road -0.43 (0.04)***  0.11 (0.05)** 
   
Addis Ababa (dummy)  0.12 (0.05)***      -- 
 
Rural town (dummy)        --  0.72 (0.02)*** 
   
Number of observations  1945  2391 
 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00 
 
Count R2 (correctly classified)b  78.35%  73.61% 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a   Marginal effects are estimated at the sample mean except for the dummy variables. 
b  Count R2 is calculated as the ratio of number of correct predictions to total sample. It shows what proportion of the dependent 
variable is correctly predicted by the model (Green, 2008). 
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Contrary to what we expected, we find a significant result for urban areas where micro 
enterprises cluster further away from MFIs. This could be due to the importance of 
informal finances like borrowing from friends and families in micro enterprises (Steel et al., 
1997; Buckley, 1997), which may have played a substitute role to MFI services by easing 
the constraint on working capital. Furthermore, a current study by Ruan and Zhang (2009) 
showed that industrial clusters, through intensive division of labor, can help micro 
enterprises overcome financial constraints by specializing according to their “capital 
portfolio”. Through trust developed with traders and input suppliers, trade credit also helps 
micro enterprises in industrial clusters to indirectly gain access to working capital (ibid). 
 
Micro enterprises in general are more likely to cluster in the capital city Addis Ababa than 
in other urban areas and cluster more in rural towns. This implies that micro enterprises are 
attracted by all kinds of positive externalities that the capital city and rural towns provide. 
A recent survey conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on 
handloom producers in Ethiopia showed that micro enterprises in rural areas migrate to 
electrified towns searching for better infrastructure, which will enable them to work longer 
hours (Ayele et al., 2009).  
 
2.7.2   Effect of Clustering on Profit 
 
Using the same explanatory variables as in the probit regression, a propensity score 
matching is done on micro enterprises both in urban and rural areas using Kernel 
matching3. The results of the match are presented in Table 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
The matching is done between micro enterprises from the treated (clustered) and non-
treated (dispersed) group that are on the Common Support (see Table 2.3). As shown in 
Table 2.2, in urban areas, matched clustered micro enterprises have a monthly average 
profit that is 89.29 birr (10.38 $)4 higher than that of matched dispersed micro enterprises. 
                                                   
3 STATA software on PSMATCH2 is used that is developed by Edwin Leuven and Barbra Sianesi. 
4 The 2003 exchange rate was l $ = 8.6 birr.   
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This is equivalent to a 100.4% increase in average monthly profit for micro enterprises due 
to clustering5. Similarly, matched micro enterprises in rural areas have a monthly profit that 
is 13.52 birr (1.57 $) higher than that of matched dispersed micro enterprises, which is 
equivalent to a 49.7% increase in average monthly profit due to clustering. It can also be 
observed from Table 2.2 that matched clustered micro enterprises in rural areas have a 
lower level of profit than their urban counterparts.  
 
 
Table 2.2 Average monthly profit in birr for clustered and dispersed micro enterprises 
using   Kernel Matching. The standard errorsa for the Average Treatment 
Effect of the Treated (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ) are in parentheses. 
  Clustered 
(treated) 
Dispersed 
(non-treated) 
Difference 
Urban  
 
 
Unmatched 156.43 114.91 41.52 
Matched (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ) 178.26 88.96 89.29 (16.39)*** 
Rural Unmatched 55.71 36.17  19.54 
Matched (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ)  40.74 27.21 13.52 (4.24)*** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a the standard error for the ஺்்ܶis computed after bootstrapping 100 times 
 
 
Table 2.3 Number of micro enterprises with Kernel Matching on the Common Support 
     Clustered 
(treated) 
Dispersed  
(non-treated) 
Total 
Urban 
 
 
On support 183 931 1114 
Off support 831 0 831 
Total 1014 931 1945 
Rural On support 733 1256 1989 
Off support 402 0 402 
Total 1135 1256 2391 
 
 
To check how the matching has performed in terms of eliminating differences in observable 
explanatory variables between the matched clustered and dispersed micro enterprises, 
                                                   
5 The percentage increase in monthly average profit is calculated as the difference in average profit between matched clustered  
   and dispersed micro enterprises divided by average profit of matched dispersed micro enterprises. 
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balancing tests are undertaken. The ones used in this study are t-tests for equality of means 
on each explanatory variable between clustered and dispersed micro enterprises before and 
after the match (Sianesi, 2004) and a chi square test for the joint significance of variables 
used in the probit model before and after the match (Sianesi, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005). 
 
For urban areas, all explanatory variables before the match between clustered and dispersed 
micro enterprises are not balanced, and the equality of means is rejected at the level of 5%, 
except for variables experience and distance to micro finance institution (Table 2.II.1A in 
Appendix 2.II). After the match, variables like experience and distance to micro finance 
institution are not balanced and the equality of means is rejected at 5% significance level. 
However, the chi square test after the match (Table 2.II.1B in Appendix 2.II) confirms that 
all the variables in the probit model are not jointly significant with prob>χ2 = 0.23. This 
implies that there is no systematic difference in the distribution of explanatory variables 
between the matched clustered and dispersed micro enterprises.  
 
For rural areas, most of the explanatory variables are not balanced before the match, 
especially for location specific variables. After the match, however, all the explanatory 
variables are balanced where equality of means for each variable is accepted at the level of 
5% (Table 2.II.2A in Appendix 2.II). The chi square test after the match also confirms that 
all the variables in the probit model are not jointly significant with prob>χ2 = 0.13 (Table 
2.II.2B in Appendix 2.II). Looking at the balancing test for rural areas further depicts that 
almost all matched clustered and dispersed micro enterprises are from locations outside 
rural towns, and this explains why the ஺்்ܶ  for the matched micro enterprises is only 13.52 
birr compared to the difference in profitability for the unmatched micro enterprises, which 
is 19.54 birr. 
 
The overall balancing tests imply that, the matching procedure has produced samples of 
micro enterprises that can reasonably be regarded as almost similar and any difference in 
profits between clustered and dispersed micro enterprises can be inferred as coming mainly 
from the effect of location economies of clustering.  
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2.7.3  Robustness Check 
 
Since we used a ܮܳ of 1 as a cut-off point to indicate whether a micro enterprise is 
clustered or not, we perform a robustness check to see if a higher cut-off point will also 
result in more profit for clustered micro enterprises. For this, we use the average ܮܳ as a 
cut-off point with ܮܳ of 1.30 and ܮܳ of 1.47 for urban and rural areas respectively. The 
estimated ஺்்ܶ  are given in Table 2.4 below.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2.4 the extra profit earned by clustered micro enterprises 
increases as the cut-off point increases. Clustered micro enterprises earn 123.41 birr (14.35 
$) and 14.57 birr (1.69 $) more than dispersed micro enterprises in urban and rural areas 
respectively. This is equivalent to a 147% and 50% increase in average monthly profit due 
to clustering for urban and rural areas respectively. This implies that highly concentrated 
micro enterprises earn higher profits.  
 
Table 2.4 Average monthly profit in birr for clustered and dispersed micro enterprises 
using Kernel Matching. The standard errorsa for the Average Treatment 
Effect of the Treated (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ) are in parentheses.  
  Clustered 
(treated) 
Dispersed 
(non-treated) 
Difference 
Urban  
 
 
Unmatched 166.81 113.41 53.40 
Matched ( ஺்்ܶ)  207.34 83.93 123.41 (41.69)*** 
Rural Unmatched 53.36 35.93 17.43 
Matched ( ஺்்ܶ)  43.81 29.24 14.57 (5.79)** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a the standard error for the ஺்்ܶ  is computed after bootstrapping 100 times 
 
 
The balancing test for the match confirms that all the explanatory variables for urban and 
rural areas are balanced based on a t-test where the means of each variable is not 
significantly different from each other at the level of 1% at the 95% confidence interval.  
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Table 2.5 Number of micro enterprises with Kernel Matching on the Common Support  
     Clustered 
(treated) 
Dispersed 
(non-treated) 
Total 
Urban 
 
 
On support 172 1102 1274 
Off support 671 0 671 
Total 843 1102 1945 
Rural On support 743 1086 1829 
Off support 562 0 562 
Total 1305 1086 2391 
 
 
2.7.4  Sensitivity Analyses 
 
In cottage industries, total family income is usually composed of net family income from 
enterprise work and family income from non-enterprise work6. Because different family 
members are engaged in enterprise and non-enterprise works, there could be a shift of 
family labor from one activity to the other. For example, due to increased productivity from 
location economies, micro enterprises operating in clusters might systematically use more 
family labor than dispersed micro enterprises by shifting family labor engaged in non-
enterprise work towards enterprise work. As a result, the net family income from enterprise 
work (i.e. profit) would be an over estimation of the true impact of clustering because, 
while the increased earning in micro enterprises operating in clusters could be due to 
location economies, it could also be driven by the shift of family labor across activities. The 
profit change we calculated in this paper, which is equivalent to the change in net family 
income from enterprise work, should therefore be corrected for the amount and cost of 
family labor used in the enterprises.  
 
Due to lack of data on the number of hours worked by each family member both in the 
enterprise and non-enterprise activities, we cannot directly correct profit using the amount 
and cost of family labor. However, we apply two sensitivity analyses that help us capture 
                                                   
6 Remittance and transfers from government and non-government bodies can also constitute total family income. 
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the ‘true’ extra profit from clustering, which is not affected by the shift of family labor 
across activities due to location economies. 
 
The first sensitivity analysis we perform is to compare the profitability of micro enterprises 
operating inside and outside a cluster using non-enterprise income as one of the control 
variables in the generation of propensity scores. Matching micro enterprises between these 
two groups using propensity scores will generate treated and non-treated groups of micro 
enterprises having the same level of non-enterprise income. That is, the matching will 
generate non-treated groups of micro enterprises operating outside of a cluster whose non-
enterprise income does not change even after they are exposed to the treatment i.e. 
operating inside a cluster. If the non-enterprise income is the same for the treated and non-
treated groups, this allows us to assume that there has not been any substitution of family 
labor from non-enterprise work to the enterprise work due to clustering. In other words, 
profit has not been affected by a change in enterprise size due to shift of family labor across 
activities as a result of clustering. One possible reason why there might not be a change in 
family labor use even when there is an increase in profitability from clustering could be 
when all the ‘relevant’ family labor has been absorbed in the enterprise. This could be the 
case when family members working in the enterprise lack the appropriate education and 
skills that would give him/her a higher return if he/she works outside the enterprise and 
vice versa.  
 
The second sensitivity analysis we perform is to estimate the impact of clustering on total 
family income, which is the sum of family income from enterprise work and family income 
from non-enterprise work. This allows us to look at the impact of clustering on the overall 
income of the family and not just one part of it that might be distorted by substitution of 
family labor between activities.  
 
The results of the first sensitivity analysis are shown in Table 2.6. There is still a 
significantly higher profit, 54.15 birr (6.29 $) and 9.36 birr (1.09 $),  for micro enterprises 
operating in clusters both in urban and rural areas respectively, although the resulting 
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increase of average profit for the matched micro enterprises is now lower than what was 
reported in Table 2.2. Indeed it seems that the previous result of profit comparison was an 
overestimation of the impact of clustering because we did not account for the substitution 
of labor from non-enterprise to enterprise work. In the balancing test depicted in Table 2.7, 
the average non-enterprise incomes of the matched treated and non-treated micro 
enterprises are not significantly different from each other both in urban and rural areas, 
showing that there is no variation in family labor between the treated and non-treated 
groups7.  
 
Table 2.6 Average monthly profit in birr for clustered and dispersed micro enterprises 
using Kernel Matching. The standard errorsa for the Average Treatment 
Effect of the Treated (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ) are in parentheses. 
  Clusteredd 
(treated) 
Dispersed 
(non-treated) 
Difference 
Urban  
 
Unmatched 156.43 114.91 41.52 
Matched (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ)  158.48 104.33 54.15 (25.84)*** 
 
Rural Unmatched 55.71 36.17 19.54 
Matched (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ)  40.49 31.13 9.36 (4.70)*** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  a the standard error for the ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ  is computed after bootstrapping 100 times 
 
 
The results of the second sensitivity analysis, the impact of clustering on total family 
income, are presented in Table 2.8. There is a significantly higher total family income; 
70.83 birr (8.24 $) for urban and 8.45 birr (0.98 $) for rural micro enterprises operating in 
clusters. This is equivalent to a 67.3% and 23.1% increase in average total family income 
due to clustering for urban and rural areas respectively. These percentage increases are 
lower than the one reported for the net family income from enterprise work of 100.4% and 
49.7% for urban and rural areas respectively. The reason why there is a lower percentage 
                                                   
7 The balancing test for the other variables also depicts that there is no systematic difference in the distribution of  
   explanatory variables between the matched clustered and dispersed micro enterprises both in urban and rural areas. 
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increase in total family income could be due to the decline in non-enterprise income as the 
family substitutes its family labor from non-enterprise work towards enterprise work. The 
balancing test for the match confirms that there is no systematic difference in the 
distribution of explanatory variables between the matched clustered and dispersed micro 
enterprises with prob>χ2 = 0.16 and prob>χ2 = 0.14 for urban and rural areas respectively. 
 
Table 2.7 t- test for non-enterprise income between treated (clustered) and non-treated 
(dispersed) groups before and after the match. 
 Sample Mean 
Clustered 
(treated) 
Mean 
Dispersed 
(non-treated) 
t-test 
p>|t| 
Urban Unmatched 
Matched 
6.18 
7.38 
   9.64 
   7.18 
0.04 
0.92 
Rural    
 
Unmatched 
Matched 
3.90 
3.96 
   10.83 
     4.97 
0.00 
0.17 
 
 
Table 2.8 Average monthly profit in birr for clustered and dispersed micro enterprises 
using Kernel Matching. The standard errorsa for the Average Treatment 
Effect of the Treated (ࢀ࡭ࢀࢀ) are in parentheses. 
  Clustered 
(treated) 
Dispersed 
(non-treated) 
Difference 
Urban  
 
 
Unmatched 162.62 124.55 38.06 
Matched ( ஺்்ܶ)  176.11 105.28 70.83 (37.41)** 
Rural Unmatched 59.61 47.01 12.60 
Matched ( ஺்்ܶ)  44.97 36.52 8.45 (4.24)** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 a the standard error for the ஺்்ܶ  is computed after bootstrapping 100 times 
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2.8  Conclusions and Discussion  
 
In this paper we examine clustering advantages by contrasting the performance of clustered 
micro enterprises in terms of profit, with that of dispersed ones in the handloom sector in 
Ethiopia both in urban and rural areas. To take into account for the problem of selection 
bias, we match clustered micro enterprises with dispersed ones that have the same 
observable characteristics except for being clustered. We classify these characteristics into 
enterprise specific and regional specific factors that determine the likelihood that a micro 
enterprise will cluster in a certain location. 
  
Although some variables (e.g. schooling and concentration of big textile factories) increase 
the probability of being clustered both in rural and urban areas, there are also some 
differences. While micro enterprises that are run by female and younger operators are more 
likely to cluster in rural areas, this is not the case in urban areas. Furthermore, micro 
enterprises in urban areas are more likely to cluster around markets and where there are 
good infrastructure while they cluster in remote rural areas further away from markets. The 
fact that enterprise and regional specific factors determine clustering of micro enterprises in 
urban and rural areas differently, therefore, calls a need to focus on the existing local 
circumstances when formulating policies that can promote clustering. 
  
The Kernel matching reveals that the average monthly profits are significantly larger for 
clustered than non-clustered (dispersed) micro enterprises both in urban and rural areas. 
This depicts that location economies exist within clusters after controlling for selection 
bias. The robustness check shows that the more concentrated micro enterprises are, the 
higher the percentage increase in profit. The sensitivity analyses show that even after 
accounting for the possible substitution of family labor across enterprise and non-enterprise 
works, profit and total family income increase with clustering.  
 
We also find that the percentage increase in profit from clustering is higher in urban than 
rural areas. Apparently urban clusters provide more location economies than rural clusters 
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probably due to better information spillovers in urban clusters that might arise from 
increased cooperation and joint action among producers in order to meet the requirements 
of large and sophisticated markets in urban areas. 
 
An interesting finding of this study is that there are micro enterprises that are not clustered 
but have the same observable characteristics with that of clustered micro enterprises. 
Whether or not to implement policies to cluster these micro enterprises, and if yes what 
kind of policies, depends on the explanation of why, given their similar characteristics, they 
are operating in isolation. One reason why micro enterprises are operating in isolation 
might be due to entry barriers to operate within clusters. There are many factors that can 
explain barriers to entry in which discussing these factors is beyond the scope of the current 
study. However, one important factor is that micro enterprises are cottage industries 
operating within the household, which cannot afford to rent separate working shops. 
Besides, the strong social norms and family ties might restrict their move to other locations. 
Hence it is difficult for them to abandon their current location and join clustered micro 
enterprises.  
 
As part of its cluster development policies, the government of Ethiopia is building working 
shops around the cluster in the capital city Addis Ababa that micro enterprises can rent at a 
low price or rent on credit. We believe that initiatives such as this could allow those micro 
enterprises working in isolation to easily join clusters.  
 
A possible caveat of the study is that we only use Kernel matching, however, using other 
matching methods like nearest neighboring matching and radius matching provided similar 
results. Another caveat is that because of limited data availability we could not include 
more economic variables like prices in the model and the measurement of profit is based on 
a single-visit survey that lack alternative measures to check its reliability. Despite these 
caveats, the analysis provides a flexible way to overcome selection bias in determining the 
factors behind clustering and its advantages in terms of generating extra profit. 
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Appendix 2.I Data 
Table 2.I.1 Summary statistics of variables and comparison of means between urban and 
rural areas 
Variable  Town Mean S.D Min Max p>|t| 
Age (years) Urban 
Rural 
41.14 
41.91 
15.81 
15.32 
14 
13 
88 
87 
 
0.09 
 
Schooling (years) Urban 
Rural 
2.02 
0.78 
3.22 
1.93 
0 
0 
13 
13 
 
0.00 
 
Experience (years) Urban 
Rural 
15.53 
16.36 
12.91 
13.28 
1 
0 
72 
78 
 
 0.04 
 
Concentration of micro enterprises  
in same district and different industry 
(employment) 
Urban 
Rural 
   0.94 
   0.66 
0.36 
0.72 
0 
0 
2.05 
6.57 
 
 0.00 
 
 
Concentration of big textile factories  
in same zone (employment) 
Urban 
Rural 
1.30 
0.62 
3.12 
1.57 
0 
0 
10.3 
10.1 
 
0.00 
 
Concentration of big manufacturing 
industries in same zone and different 
industry (employment) 
 
Urban 
Rural 
1.42 
0.54 
2.03 
0.97 
0 
0 
6.21 
6.21 
 
0.00 
 
Market access (population in 100,000 
divided by the square of hours to the 
 nearest market place) 
 
Urban 
Rural 
12.79 
2.22 
22.54 
10.83 
0 
0 
57.70 
69.12  
 
 0.00 
Hours to the nearest micro finance 
institution 
Urban 
Rural 
0.36 
3.93 
0.58 
3.27 
0.01 
0.23 
4.02 
22.50 
 
0.00 
 
Hours to the nearest all-weather road  Urban 
Rural 
0.30 
1.59 
0.50 
1.19 
0.01 
0.02 
2.39 
5.71 
 
0.00 
 
Monthly profit  per micro enterprise 
(birr) 
Urban 
Rural 
120.62 
45.44 
239.07 
93.08 
-491.00 
-724.00 
4432.00 
985.00 
 
0.00 
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Appendix 2.II Balancing tests      
 
Table 2.II.1A  t-test for each variable before and after the match for urban areas 
Variable  Sample Mean 
Clustered 
(treated) 
Mean 
Dispersed 
(non-
treated) 
t-test 
p>|t| 
Male (dummy) Unmatched 
Matched 
0.80 
0.79 
0.41 
0.80 
0.00 
0.73 
 
Age  Unmatched 
 Matched 
39.12 
39.05 
43.33 
40.20 
0.00 
0.49 
 
Age squared  Unmatched 
 Matched 
1795.80 
1756.80 
2102.00 
1910.80 
0.00 
0.32 
 
Schooling   Unmatched 
 Matched 
2.65 
2.47 
1.34 
2.36 
0.00 
0.71 
 
Experience  Unmatched 
 Matched 
16.02 
15.33 
14.99 
18.28 
0.08 
0.03 
 
Experience squared  Unmatched 
 Matched 
433.54 
377.77 
379.78 
539.12 
0.06 
0.02 
 
Concentration of micro enterprises 
 in same district and different industry 
 Unmatched 
 Matched 
1.09 
1.11 
0.77 
1.08 
0.00 
0.22 
 
Concentration of big textile factories  
in the same zone 
 Unmatched 
 Matched 
0.32 
0.21 
2.36 
0.20 
0.00 
0.94 
 
Concentration of big manufacturing factories 
 in the same zone and different industry 
 
 Unmatched 
 Matched 
0.55 
0.32 
2.36 
0.42 
0.00 
0.30 
Market access Unmatched 
Matched 
21.17 
25.08 
3.66 
21.68 
0.00 
0.23 
 
Hours to the nearest micro finance  
institution 
 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.37 
0.31 
0.34 
0.51 
0.31 
0.03 
 
Hours to the nearest all-weather road Unmatched 
Matched 
0.18 
0.15 
0.43 
0.22 
0.00 
0.14 
 
Addis Ababa (dummy) Unmatched 
Matched 
0.64 
0.74 
0.14 
0.68 
0.00 
0.25 
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2. II.1B Chi square test for the joint significance of variables for urban areas 
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
Unmatched 0.38 1047.02 0.00 
Matched 0.03 16.24 0.23 
 
 
2.II.2A t-test for each variable before and after the match for rural areas 
Variable  Sample Mean 
Clustered 
(treated) 
Mean 
Dispersed 
(non-treated) 
t-test 
p>|t| 
Male (dummy) Unmatched 
Matched 
0.61 
0.60 
0.66 
0.58 
0.02 
0.54 
 
Age  Unmatched 
 Matched 
40.95 
41.00 
42.77 
40.57 
0.00 
0.59 
Age squared Unmatched 
Matched 
1910.70 
1922.40 
2063.60 
1889.70 
0.00 
0.66 
 
Schooling  Unmatched 
Matched 
0.96 
0.75 
0.61 
0.86 
0.00 
0.30 
 
Experience Unmatched 
Matched 
16.38 
16.46 
167.35 
16.8 
0.95 
0.66 
 
Experience squared Unmatched 
Matched 
449.19 
465.87 
439.88 
505.01 
0.74 
0.35 
 
Concentration of micro enterprises 
 in same district and different industry 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.58 
0.65 
0.72 
0.72 
0.00 
0.09 
 
Concentration of big textile factories  
in the same zone 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.77 
0.75 
0.48 
0.83 
0.00 
0.43 
 
Concentration of big manufacturing 
factories in the same zone and different 
industry 
 
Unmatched 
Matched 
0.68 
0.49 
0.42 
0.57 
0.00 
0.20 
Market access Unmatched 
Matched 
0.05 
0.07 
4.18 
0.06 
0.00  
0.53 
Hours to the nearest micro finance 
institution 
Unmatched 
Matched 
4.22 
4.47 
3.66 
4.56 
0.00 
0.59 
 
Hours to the nearest all-weather road Unmatched 
Matched 
1.80 
2.01 
1.41 
1.92 
0.00 
0.15 
 
Rural town (dummy) Unmatched 
Matched 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
. 
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2. II.2B Chi square test for the joint significance of variables for rural areas 
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
Unmatched 0.29 949.12 0.00 
Matched 0.01 17.65 0.13 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Clustering as an Organizational Response 
to Capital Market Inefficiency: Evidence 
from Handloom Enterprises in Ethiopia 
 
 
 
Abstract: Microenterprises in developing countries often struggle with financial 
constraints. The absence of a well-developed capital market has been listed as a key 
obstacle to industrialization in developing countries in the development literature. In this 
paper, we show that industrial clusters, through specialization and division of labor can 
ease the financial constraints of microenterprises even in the absence of a well-functioning 
capital market. By using data from microenterprises of the handloom sector in four regions 
of Ethiopia, we find that clustering lowers capital entry barrier by reducing the initial 
investment required to start a business. This effect is found to be significantly larger for 
microenterprises investing in districts of high capital market inefficiency, indicating the 
importance of clustering as an organizational response to a credit constrained 
environment. The findings highlight the importance of cluster-based industrial activities as 
an alternative method of propagating industrialization when local conditions do not allow 
easy access to credit. 
Keywords:  clustering, industrialization, finance, microenterprise, Ethiopia 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
Development agencies and policymakers have long stressed the economic importance of 
microenterprises in developing countries in general and Africa in particularly because of 
their large number and their contribution to employment. Reports show that micro- and 
small-scale enterprises constitute the lion’s share of the manufacturing activity in Sub-
Saharan Africa, accounting for more than 90% of all firms outside of the agricultural sector 
(OECD, 2004). They are also sources of income and employment in labor intensive sectors, 
engaging the poorest segment of the society, particularly women and unskilled workers 
(Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004). Yet, lack of access to finance remains to be a major obstacle 
to the expansion of microenterprises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Rajan and 
Zingales 1998; Ayyagari et al., 2008). Inefficient functioning of capital markets together 
with collateral requirements that increase the cost of borrowing are mentioned as major 
causes of microenterprises’ limited access to finance (for example, Tybout 1983; Bigsten et 
al., 2003; Ayyagari et al., 2008). Limited access to finance can affect the investment 
patterns of microenterprises and aggravate entry barriers, which can be a prime obstacle for 
industrialization in Africa (Hernández-Trillo et al., 2005; McKenzie and Woodruff 2006, 
2008). 
 
In recent literature, industrial clusters are noted as one form of institution that can help ease 
the financial constraints microenterprises face when both establishing and expanding their 
business, even in the absence of a well-functioning capital market. Various studies point to 
the importance of industrial clusters in facilitating access to informal finances where 
repeated interactions between local producers and traders promote trust that enables 
reciprocal exchange of information that may reduce the problem of moral hazards and the 
cost of monitoring in credit relationships (Becattini 1990; Grabher 1993; Schmitz 1995; 
Nadvi 1999; Russo and Rossi 2001, Ali and Peerlings 2011b). Collaborative networks 
within clusters may also reinforce mutually beneficial relationships, such as cooperation, 
allowing access to cheaper credit or the joint purchase of materials at lower prices 
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(Becattini 1990; Banerjee and Munshi, 2004). Industrial clusters can also ease the financial 
constraints of microenterprises by affecting the organization of production (Ruan and 
Zhang 2008, 2009). The production system within clusters promotes specialization and 
division of labor, thereby lowering the capital requirement to invest in different steps of 
production. By relying on components manufactured by others, a firm can specialize in its 
own products, which require relatively lower amounts of capital, rather than organizing the 
entire production process. Such division of labor can enable small entrepreneurs with 
limited endowments to invest in and start a business “by focusing on a narrowly defined 
stage of production” that best suit their capital portfolio even in the absence of a well-
functioning capital market (Huang et al., 2008, 414). However, only few studies have 
empirically shown the role of industrial clusters as an organizational response to financial 
constraints (Huang et al., 2008; Long and Zhang 2011; Ruan and Zhang 2009). The few 
studies available focus on the Chinese experience, making it unclear whether the 
phenomenon exists in other countries, particularly in African countries, where the capital 
market is likely to be less developed than in China.  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the advantage of clustering in easing the financial 
constraints of microenterprises operating in Africa by looking at evidence from the 
handloom sector in Ethiopia. Specifically, it investigates whether clustering can lower the 
capital barrier to entry by reducing the initial capital investment required to start a business. 
The study looks at more than 1,000 microenterprises of the handloom sector from four 
regions of Ethiopia operating both in clusters and in isolation. Ethiopia’s handloom sector 
makes a good case for studying the relationship between the capital entry barrier and 
industrial clusters because the technology is rather simple and entry is not affected by 
nontechnical barriers, such as those coming from product differentiation, patents over 
technologies, and control over supply of raw materials. The only major barrier to entry is 
access to capital.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the existing 
literature. Section 3.3 presents a theoretical framework that depicts how clustering can help 
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ease the financial constraints of starting a business in the absence of a well-functioning 
capital market. Section 3.4 discusses the data source and describes the Ethiopia’s handloom 
sector. Section 3.5 formulates the empirical model, and Section 3.6 presents the empirical 
results. Section 3.7 is conclusion and discussions. 
 
3.2   Literature Review: Capital Market Inefficiency and 
Organizational Choice of Production  
 
A number of studies have shown that the level of capital market development is related to 
the organizational choice of production within firms. Acemoglu et al., (2009) showed both 
theoretically and empirically that in countries where there is greater capital market 
development together with higher contracting costs, vertical integration becomes the 
common production system. With inefficiently functioning capital markets, on the other 
hand, a more specialized production would prevail. This is due to the advantage of 
specialization, which allows firms to break down the more complex and integrated 
production process and concentrate on activities in which they have a comparative 
advantage in terms of capital endowments (Huang et al., 2008; Ruan and Zhang 2009).  
 
Using historical evidence, Haber (1991) also noted that in the early periods of 
industrialization (1840–1880), the level of specialization in the cotton textile industry of a 
number of Latin American countries was significantly higher than it was in the United 
States, where the capital market was more developed. Following the creation of modern 
financial intermediaries in the last decades of the 19th century, however, the level of 
specialization in the Latin American textile industry declined substantially. Similarly, 
McKenze and Woodruff (2006) found that credit constrained entrepreneurs in Mexico tend 
to enter into manufacturing enterprises characterized by technologies that can be broken 
down in to smaller steps. Organizational innovations that allow the production process to be 
broken down into small steps make it possible for entrepreneurs with limited capital 
endowment to participate in the production process by reducing the capital entry barrier 
(Leff, 1978; Hayami et al., 1998).  
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A high capital entry barrier is often mentioned as one of the possible reasons for the high 
return to capital found in micro- and small-scale enterprises in developing countries (Udry 
and Anagol, 2006; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; de Mel et al., 2008). Such findings are often 
considered an indication of microentrepreneurs’ unexploited potentials, were the financial 
constraints to be alleviated (Grimm et al., 2009).   
 
However, there are costs involved with specialization, such as coordinating the various 
producers involved in different steps of production. Stigler (1951) suggested that the 
benefits of specialization can best occur when there is clustering that helps to economize 
coordination costs and facilitate transactions through physical and social proximity. 
Industrial clusters would then replace the “internal economies of scale that had been the 
basis of large scale production within a single firm . . . by external economies of scale 
arising from the division of labor between a number of small firms” (Helmsing 1999, 11). 
Although coordination costs might be generally lower in industrial clusters, the continuing 
new entry of firms due to low capital entry barrier may result in diseconomies of 
agglomeration (Sonobe and Otsuka 2006a). These could arise from congestion, which 
would then lead to fierce competition for limited resources such as land (Lall et al., 2003).  
 
Large body of literature has posited the advantages of clustering in terms of information 
spill-over, labor pooling, and market linkages (for example; Marshall 1920; Schmitz 1995; 
Visser 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka 2006a; Ali and Peerlings 2011a). However, very few 
studies have empirically examined the role of clustering in reducing financial constraints. 
Using a sample of 140 footwear-producing enterprises in China’s Wenzhou province, 
Huang et al., (2008) show how industrial clusters can best explain the rapid 
industrialization of that region despite a lack of basic conditions necessary for economic 
growth. The authors show that clustering, through specialization and division of labor, 
enabled a large number of small entrepreneurs to enter the industry by helping them 
overcome the financial constraints in the early stage of industrialization. For the cashmere 
sweater cluster of northern Zhejiang province in China, Ruan and Zhang (2008) found a 
positive correlation between the capital barrier to entry and return on capital when the 
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capital market is not well developed. They also conclude that the division of labor in the 
cashmere sweater cluster helped “tap the entrepreneurial talents that are scattered in rural 
areas, thus making better use of capital” (Ruan and Zhang 2008, 22).  
 
Using firm-level data from China’s industrial census for the years 1995 and 2004, Long and 
Zhang (2011) show how clustering eases both starting and working capital constraints 
through two possible mechanisms. One such mechanism is the specialization and division 
of labor within clusters that allowed a large number of poorly endowed entrepreneurs from 
rural areas to become part of the industrial process. The second mechanism is the proximity 
of various agents within clusters who work to facilitate trust-based trade credit, and hence 
reduce working capital constraints. Using a panel data set, Banerjee and Munshi, (2004) 
also showed a causal relationship between social ties and the pattern of investment in the 
knitted garment cluster in the South Indian town of Tirupur. Producers with strong social 
ties are found to have started their business with almost three times as much fixed capital 
compared to outsiders, highlighting the importance of community identity when the capital 
market is not well developed. 
 
The current study differs from previous work in at least two ways. First, it is the first 
empirical study to look at the relationship between industrial clusters and financial 
constraints from an African perspective, using handloom producers in Ethiopia as an 
example. Second, it compares the financial constraints and entry barriers of 
microenterprises in industrial clusters with those of microenterprises outside of clusters.  
 
3.3  Theoretical Framework: Clustering, Capital Market 
Inefficiency, and Entry Barriers 
 
In this section, we discuss how clustering could help ease the financial constraints of 
microenterprises when starting a business by lowering the required start-up capital in the 
absence of a well-functioning capital market. For the moment, we assume that 
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entrepreneurs can invest only their capital endowment—that is, they cannot obtain credit 
from the capital market.  
 
Let an entrepreneur with a certain capital endowment plan to start a business. The 
entrepreneur faces a production function ܻ that is a function of fixed capital stock		ܭ, 
variable inputs ܺ, and fixed inputs ܼ: 
 
	ܻ = 	ܻ(ܭ,ܺ,ܼ).                                                                                                          (1) 
 
For simplicity, we assume in what follows that output is produced using capital and other 
variable and fixed inputs. Let an entrepreneur also face fixed transaction costs given by ܶ, 
which is a function of the concentration of firms producing similar and related goods in 
nearby areas. Such transaction costs can be incurred while procuring inputs and selling 
outputs. With the concentration of input suppliers and output buyers in close proximity, as 
in the case of industrial clusters, the transaction costs for an entrepreneur will be lower 
(Becattini 1990; Grabher 1993; Schmitz 1995). This could be due either to a reduced 
transportation cost stemming from proximity or to the developed networks among different 
agents that help to facilitate the transaction through the flow of information and mutual 
trust. 
 
For a given level of capital stock and fixed inputs and prices of outputs and variable inputs, 
the short-run profit function for an entrepreneur is then given by  
 
	ߨ(ܭ,ܼ,ݓ௑ , ݌,ܶ) = max௒,௑ 	݌ܻ − ݓ௑ ܺ − ܶ, (2) 
 
where ߨ is profit, ݌ is output price, and ݓ௑  is the variable input price.  
 
Given the capital endowment of an entrepreneur, one would invest in a project if and only if 
there is a positive profit—that is,   
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ߨ(ܭ,ܼ,ݓ௑ , ݌,ܶ) = max௒,௑ 	݌ܻ − ݓ௑ ܺ − ܶ ≥ 0 (3) 
and 
 
ߨଵ(ܭ,ܼ,ݓ௑ , ݌) = max௒,௑ 	݌ܻ − ݓ௑ ܺ ≥ ܶ, (4) 
where ߨଵ(ܭ,ܼ,ݓ௑ ,݌) is optimal profit excluding the fixed transaction costs ܶ. 
 
From the preceding formulation, let ܭ௠ be the capital stock at which, given the values of 
ݓ௑, ݌, and ܼ, profit is equal to the fixed transaction costs ܶ. In other words,  ܭ௠ is the 
minimum capital stock required to start a business. 
 
ߨ௠(ܭ௠ ,ܼ,ݓ௑ , ݌) = ܶ	, (5) 
 
where ߨ௠(ܭ௠ ,ܼ,ݓ௑ ,݌) is profit that equals the fixed transaction costs ܶ at the minimum 
capital stock ܭ௠ . 
 
Following the standard theory of profit maximization, the first-order derivative of profit 
with respect to capital is positive and equal to the shadow price of capital. At the point 
where the capital stock is equal to	ܭ௠, the shadow price of capital is then given by  
 
డగ೘(௄೘,௓,௪೉,௣)
డ௄
= ݓ௄(ܭ௠ ,ܼ,ݓ௑ ,݌) ≥ 0, (6) 
 
where ݓ௄ 	is the shadow price of capital.  
 
Because the first-order derivative is positive, it can be inferred from equations (5) and (6) 
that there is a positive relationship between the fixed transaction costs ܶ and the minimum 
required capital stock ܭ௠. This implies that a reduction in transaction costs (for example, 
due to clustering) will result in a reduction of the minimum initial capital amount required 
to start a business. This could be because an enterprise operating inside a cluster can 
specialize in activities for which it has a comparative advantage or because the other parts 
and components can be accessed easily at a lower cost from nearby firms. With an increase 
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in transaction costs, on the other hand, the initial capital stock required is higher since the 
enterprise would have to produce the intermediate parts itself because it is costly to get 
them from the market. Krugman and Venables (1996) noted that with increased distance 
between firms, transaction costs tend to increase leading to the emergence of large and 
vertically integrated industries since the various firms that would provide parts and 
components are not found in nearby locations. With the concentration of producers of final 
and intermediate goods in close proximity, more division of labor and specialization would 
prevail requiring a relatively lower amount of capital to start a business (Lall et al., 2003).  
 
Previously, we assumed there was a fixed capital endowment. In the case of a perfect 
capital market, entrepreneurs can adjust their capital stock to the profit-maximizing 
optimum, in which case the shadow price of capital equals the market price. However, if a 
business activity requires a higher level of start-up capital than the capital endowment, and 
that extra capital cannot be obtained from the capital market, then entrepreneurs become 
financially constrained. The high level of start-up capital would then prevent a large 
number of poorly endowed entrepreneurs from entry with only a few wealthy people being 
able to invest in a more integrated production. On the other hand, with the co-location of 
intermediate input suppliers and output buyers, there would be increased specialization and 
division of labor that lowers the required start-up capital. Hence, even in the absence of a 
well-functioning capital market, entrepreneurs in industrial clusters would be less likely to 
be financially constrained with a relatively large share of them investing according to their 
level of capital endowment. This argument is further depicted in Figure 3.1, which shows 
the relationship between start-up capital, transaction costs, and the proportion of 
entrepreneurs who can potentially invest, given their endowment. 
 
Let the distribution of capital endowment be given by the function ܩ: ൣ0,ܭ൧ → [0,1], such 
that ܩ(ܭ) is the proportion of entrepreneurs whose endowment is less than or equal to a 
certain capital amount	ܭ. That is, the proportion of entrepreneurs with an endowment less 
than or equal to zero is zero, and the proportion of entrepreneurs with an endowment less 
than or equal to ܭ , which is the highest capital amount required to start a business, is 1.  
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G 
 
According to Figure 3.1, at relatively high transaction costs, ଶܶ, the initial capital required 
to start a business is ܭଶ௠ 	and the proportion of entrepreneurs with a capital endowment 
greater than or equal to ܭଶ௠ is the distance from zero up to ܩଶ . At lower transaction costs, 
ଵܶ , a lower amount of initial capital, ܭଵ௠ 	, is required, which also corresponds to a larger 
proportion of potential entrepreneurs with capital endowment greater than or equal to ܭଵ௠, 
given by the distance from zero up to ܩଵ .  
 
Figure 3.1 Transaction costs, entry barrier, and entrepreneurship  
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3.4  Data  
 
3.4.1  Data Sources  
 
For this study, we had full information on 4,347 microenterprises operating in the 
handloom sector in 118 districts of four different regions of Ethiopia, namely, Amhara, 
Tigray, Addis Ababa, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People (SNNP). The 
data are obtained from the 2002–2003 Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Survey conducted 
by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSAE). In that survey, information specific 
to an enterprise, such as the value of its starting capital, whether it was financially 
constrained when it started its business, and its main sources of starting capital, is included. 
Information regarding the schooling, experience, and age of the owner-operator is also 
included. Out of the 4,347 establishments, the analysis and empirical estimation are made 
on 1,325 enterprises that are established in the five years prior to the time of the survey. 
Additional location-specific variables, such as distance to the nearest all-weather road, are 
obtained from the 2002–2003 Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted by the CSAE. We 
also use the CSAE’s 2002–2003 Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing Survey to define 
clustering. 
 
3.4.2 Definition of Key Variables 
 
Clustering  
 
Different indexes have been developed in the literature to measure the level of clustering of 
certain activities in certain locations. A location quotient that quantifies how concentrated a 
certain sector is in a certain location compared with a larger geographic unit is one of the 
widely used measures of clustering (O’Donoghue and Gleave 2004). The location quotient 
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for the handloom sector is calculated for the most detailed spatial unit possible, the district, 
by using the zone, which is the higher spatial unit next to a district, as a reference point:  
 
ܮܳௗ = 	 (ܪௗ ܯௗ⁄ ) (ܪ௓ ܯ௓⁄⁄ ), (7) 
 
where ܮܳௗ is the location quotient of the handloom sector at district ݀; ܪௗ is employment 
of the handloom sector at district ݀; ܯௗ is total manufacturing employment at district ݀; ܪ௓ 
is employment of the handloom sector at zone ݖ; and		ܯ௓ is total manufacturing 
employment at zone ݖ. Here total manufacturing employment includes employment in 
micro-, medium-, and large-scale manufacturing industries. One possible limitations of this 
measure is that districts that have large share of handloom employment in the total 
manufacturing employment may have the same level of concentration index as those 
districts in which there is only one large enterprise operating in the handloom sector. 
Taking this into account, we checked if there are districts where only one enterprise is 
operating in the handloom sector and we did not find any in our data.  
  
To calculate the location quotient, the Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Survey and the 
Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing Survey are used. The Cottage/Handicraft 
Manufacturing Survey is a large representative survey on micro enterprises covering more 
than 53,000 establishments both in urban and rural parts in 11 regions of the country. The 
sampling frame for this survey was obtained from the listing of the 2001–02 Population and 
Housing Census, which was conducted by CSAE. Taking into account population size and 
expected distribution of cottage industries, a two-stage stratified cluster sample design was 
used for regional (urban) capitals, major (other) urban cities, and rural areas (CSAE, 2003). 
For another eight urban centers a three-stage stratified cluster sample design was used to 
select the sample. In each case, sample units were selected systematically using probability 
proportional to size; size being adjusted to the number of cottage industries obtained from 
the 2001–02 Population and Housing Census (CSAE, 2003). The Large and Medium Scale 
Manufacturing Survey is a census data covering all large and medium size manufacturing 
establishments in the country.  
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Capital market inefficiency 
 
Although one can reasonably assume that Ethiopia’s capital market is not well developed, 
there could be differences between locations with respect to how accessible capital is from 
both formal and informal sources. Such differences could arise, for example, from the 
presence of banks and microfinance institutions and variations in household savings. To 
account for differences in level of access to both formal and informal finances, we define 
the level of capital market inefficiency in each district.  
 
Under a perfect capital market, agents can borrow and lend freely at the market interest 
rate, and the marginal product of capital should be equal among enterprises and across 
different locations. Following the works of Zhang and Tan (2007), Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009), and Long and Zhang (2011), we use the variation in the marginal product of capital 
as a measure of capital market inefficiency, which is calculated as follows. 
 
For a production function with a constant return to scale, the marginal product of capital 
ܯ ௄ܲ is proportional to the average product of capital. If we assume a Cobb-Douglas 
production function of the form ܻ = 	ܭఈܺఉܼఊ, the marginal product of capital is given by  
 
ܯ ௄ܲ = ߙ ቀ௒௄ቁ, (8) 
 
where ܻ is the value of output; ܭ is the capital stock; ܺ	is the variable input; ܼ	is the fixed 
input; and ߙ,ߚ, ߛ are the elasticities of output with respect to capital, variable inputs, and 
other fixed inputs, respectively. The financial market inefficiency 	is then calculated by 
taking the standard deviation  ߪ of the logarithm of equation (8) at the district level ݀:  
 Cap. Mkt. Inffௗ = 	ߪ ൬݈݋݃ ቀߙ ௒௄ቁ൰ௗ = 	ߪ ൬݈݋݃ ቀ௒௄ቁ൰ௗ (9)      
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The preceding formulation indicates that in a perfect capital market, the standard deviation 
of the marginal product of capital among enterprises in a given district would be zero. The 
larger the deviation, the larger would be the financial market inefficiency. Data for the 
value of output and capital stock are obtained from the 2002–2003 Cottage/Handicraft 
Manufacturing Survey and the Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing Survey, both 
conducted by the CSAE. These data encompass enterprises in all the industries of different 
sizes.  
 
3.5 Description of the Handloom Sector 
 
The handloom sector engages more than 221,000 workers, 55 percent of whom operate in 
rural areas and 48.5 percent of whom are women (CSAE 2003). Producers in the sector 
often use simple tools, mainly specializing in hand-woven textiles and not using power-
driven machines. Microenterprises in the handloom sector mostly consist of owner-
operators with an average employment size of 1.4 persons. The sector comprises, on 
average, six different activities ranging from the spinning of cotton into yarn to the tailoring 
and embroidery of weaved products (Figure 3.2). These activities are either performed by 
different specialized producers or integrated in one enterprise. In the specialized system of 
production, often women engage in the pre- and post-weaving activities, whereas the 
weaving is predominantly done by males.  
 
As with many other microenterprises in developing countries, financial constraint, 
especially when starting a business, is a major obstacle in the handloom sector. Table 3.1 
shows this to be the case for 49 percent of the microenterprises in the survey. 
Microenterprises in the handloom sector also have limited access to loans from formal 
banks and lending agencies. 
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   Figure 3.2 Specialized versus integrated production system in the handloom sector  
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As Table 3.1 depicts, none of the responding producers in the sample had borrowed money 
from a formal bank when starting his or her business. Instead, personal savings and 
informal sources of finance played an important role, with 43 percent and 23 percent of 
respondents having sourced their starting capital from own savings and friends and 
relatives, respectively. Assistance from government and nongovernmental organizations 
also represented a considerable share, while credit from microfinance institutions remained 
minimal at best (Table 3.1). The comparison between enterprises operating in more and less 
concentrated districts further indicates that a lower proportion, 42 percent, of producers 
operating in more concentrated districts were financially constrained when starting a 
business compared with 58 percent of producers in less concentrated districts.8 Borrowing 
from friends and relatives was the most important source of start-up capital for enterprises 
in more concentrated districts, probably due to the importance of informal financing in 
industrial clusters. Own savings and informal money lenders, on the other hand, are 
important sources of start-up capital to enterprises operating in less concentrated districts 
(Table 3.1).  
 
Microenterprises in the surveys reported average start-up capital of 132.69 birr (US$14.91)9 
(Table 3.2)10. That is even lower than the average minimum wage in the public sector, 
which is around 320 birr ($22.86) in 201011. Using a more recent data of 2008 on handloom 
clusters in Ethiopia, Zhang et al., (2011) reported a similarly low average value of start-up 
capital that ranges from $12.82 in non-electrified rural areas to $21.68 in the capital city 
Addis Ababa. 
 
Overall, initial investment levels are fairly low for microenterprises in the handloom sector 
compared with those of the large textile factories, which have an average initial investment 
level of 44,500,000 birr ($5,000,000) (Table 3.2). Microenterprises in more concentrated 
                                                   
8 The distinction between more and less concentrated districts is made based on the median value of the location quotient at the  
   district level. 
9 All dollars are U.S. dollars. 
10 The values in Table 3.2 are converted to U.S. dollars using the 5 years average exchange rate (1U.S.$ = 8.9 birr) from 1998– 
    1999 until  2002–2003. 
11 The average exchange rate for 2010 was 1U.S.$ = 13.99 birr.    
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districts reported even a smaller amount of start-up capital compared with those in less 
concentrated districts (Table 3.2). Figure 3.3a shows a similar negative correlation between 
the value of start-up capital and the level of clustering as captured by the location quotient. 
Although informal finances, such as those from friends and relatives could enable 
entrepreneurs in industrial clusters to access finance and invest more, increased 
specialization and division of labor in industrial clusters, on the other hand, might reduce 
the start-up investment needed to establish a business.  
 
Table 3.1 Problems upon starting a business and most important sources of capital 
 Total More  
concentrated  
districts 
Less  
concentrated  
districts 
 Freq.          %           Freq.       %             Freq.       % 
The most important problems faced when starting the business 
 
Financial constraint 2,121 48.74 890 41.96 1,231 58.04 
Lack of technical know-how 354 8.14 164 46.33 190 53.67 
Lack of working premises 99 2.28 49 49.49 50 50.50 
Lack of access to raw material 74 1.70 44 59.46 30 40.54 
Government rules and regulations 5 0.11 1 20.00 4 80.00 
No problem 1,623 37.30 586 36.11 1,037 63.89 
Others 75 1.72 20 26.67 55 73.33 
Total 4,351 100.0 1,754 40.35 2,597 59.74 
 
The most important sources of initial capital 
 
     Informal sources 
Own savings 1,876 43.16 695 37.05  1,181 62.95 
Friends and relatives 1,007 23.17 522 51.84 485 48.16 
Informal money lenders 108 2.48 31 28.70 77 71.29 
Inherited 139 3.20 53 38.13 86 61.87 
    Formal sources 
Large formal banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Microfinance institutions 9 0.21 4 44.44 5 55.55 
Assistance from government/non-
gov. org. 
923 21.23 363 39.33 560 60.67  
    Others 285 6.56 85 29.82 200 70.18 
Source: The 2002–2003 Cottage/Handicrafts Manufacturing Survey.  
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Microenterprises operating in districts characterized by high levels of financial market 
inefficiency reported less start-up capital on average than those operating in districts with 
lower levels of financial market inefficiency (Table 3.2). Figure 3.3b also depicts a similar 
relationship—that is, a negative correlation between the value of start-up capital and the 
level of financial market inefficiency. This may illustrate the poor access to both formal and 
informal finances in financially inefficient districts, causing entrepreneurs to invest in 
activities that require relatively less capital.  
 
           Table 3.2 Comparison of average starting capital across regions and production systems 
(currency in birr)  
Source: The 2002–2003 Cottage/Handicrafts Manufacturing Survey and the 2002–2003 Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing  
Survey. Notes: The average start-up capital is calculated only for the newly established enterprises, that is, those formed in the five 
years preceding the survey. The average exchange rate from 1998–1999 until the time of the survey, 2002–2003, was 1 US$ = 
8.9birr. SNNP = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People. 
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show two important points that correspond with the predictions of the 
theoretical model presented in Section 3.3. First, the majority of microenterprises in highly 
concentrated districts were not financially constrained when starting their business. In 
 Average starting 
Capital 
Average 
capital-labor 
ratio 
Large textile factories  44,500,000  
($5,000,000) 
177,775.20 
Microenterprises  132.69 ($14.91) 338.85 
              Tigray  157.37 ($17.68) 462.87 
              Amhara  123.84 ($13.91) 282.52 
              SNNP  96.52 ($10.84) 242.45 
              Addis Ababa  175.56 ($19.73) 491.27 
More concentrated districts 123.53 ($13.87) 263.19 
Less concentrated districts  149.89 ($16.84) 480.77 
Districts with high financial 
inefficiency 
114.36 ($12.85) 359.54 
Districts with low financial 
inefficiency 
155.27 ($17.45) 410.84 
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addition, they reported low start-up capital versus those operating in less concentrated 
districts. This could be a result of specialization and division of labor in more concentrated 
districts that lowers capital entry barriers for entrepreneurs, enabling them to invest in 
activities that best suit their capital endowment without them necessarily being financially 
constrained. In addition, the informal financing that is common in industrial clusters could 
also have played a role in easing their financial constraint when establishing a business. 
Figure 3.3 Correlation between clustering, start-up capital, and capital market      
inefficiency using locally weighed least-squared smoothing technique.  
 
a. Start-up capital versus clustering  
b. Start-up capital versus capital market inefficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed based on the 2002–2003 Cottage/Handicrafts Manufacturing Survey and the 2002–2003 Large and Medium 
Scale Manufacturing Survey. Note: The correlation is depicted for newly established enterprises, that is, those formed in the five 
years preceding the time of the survey. The unit of the start-up capital is birr.   
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Second, the majority of those in less concentrated districts were financially constrained and 
yet had higher start-up capital costs compared with those operating in more concentrated 
districts. This may be because those investing in less concentrated districts follow a more 
integrated form of production due to the absence of firms providing parts and components 
in nearby areas, which could then result in relatively higher start-up capital costs. In the 
absence of a well-functioning capital market, the high start-up capital costs might cause the 
majority of entrepreneurs investing in less concentrated areas to be financially constrained. 
The capital-to-labor ratios in Table 3.2 also show that producers in less concentrated 
districts were relatively more capital intensive than their more concentrated counterparts.  
 
3.6  Empirical Model  
 
To investigate the relationship between clustering and starting capital, we formulate the 
following OLS regression where the dependent variable is value of initial capital 
investment by each enterprise ݅ (ܭ௜). 
 
	ܭ௜ = ߚଵܮܳௗ + ߚଶCap. Mkt. Inffௗ + ߚଷܴௗ + ߚସ ௜ܹ + ߛܧ + ߝ. (10) 
 
We would expect ߚଵ to be negative; that is, with increased clustering, entrepreneurs tend to 
invest a lower amount of capital due to a reduced entry barrier following specialization and 
division of labor in industrial clusters. Similarly, ߚଶ is expected to be negative indicating 
that with increased financial market inefficiency, entrepreneurs tend to have a limited 
access to capital (both formal and informal) that could then lead them to invest in activities 
that require a relatively lower start-up investment.  
 
The average distance at each district level from the nearest all-weather road is depicted by 
ܴௗ. This variable is used as an indicator of the value of the location in which the 
entrepreneur is establishing a business. For example, accessible locations with good 
infrastructure might be valued higher than remote locations. This can be reflected by a high 
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value of land or high rental prices for buildings, which could also increase the start-up 
capital. The wealth of an entrepreneur, indicated by ௜ܹ, can also affect how much can be 
invested in the business. For example, it might be easier for wealthy entrepreneurs to either 
invest their own savings or have enough collateral that could reduce their cost of 
borrowing. As an indicator of wealth, we use a dummy that captures whether an 
entrepreneur owns a non-residential building or not.  
 
ܧ	is a vector of enterprise-specific factors such as the age, schooling, and gender of the 
owner-operator. Regional and urban dummies are also included to capture regional 
variations. The corresponding enterprise-specific parameters are captured by the vector ߛ, 
and ߝ is a random term. Due to unavailability of data, we are unable to control for the 
possibility of differences in relative input prices across locations, which could have an 
effect on the initial investment size. 
 
We further investigate the relationship between starting capital and clustering between 
enterprises investing in districts of low and high capital market inefficiencies. The 
distinction is made based on the median value of the capital market inefficiency at the 
district level. Based on this, two separate regressions are performed for the two groups 
where the coefficients of the location quotient are compared. We would expect the impact 
of clustering in reducing the entry barrier of the initial capital investment to be higher (in 
absolute terms) for microenterprises investing in districts with high capital market 
inefficiencies.  
 
3.7  Empirical Results 
 
Location-specific variables such as clustering as captured by the location quotient, level of 
capital market inefficiency, and distance to the nearest all-weather road; and enterprise-
specific variables such as the age and schooling of the owner-operator are all based on 
current information at the time of the survey. On the other hand, information on start-up 
capital was asked for at the time of the survey but involves information about the time 
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when the business was actually established. Due to the gap in timing between the 
dependent and many of the explanatory variables, we have restricted the regression 
analyses to only enterprises established in the five years previous to the time of the survey. 
Twenty-five percent of enterprises in the sample started their business during this period, 
giving us 1,325 observations with which to do the regressions.  
 
3.7.1 Clustering and Starting Capital  
 
Taking the logarithm of start-up capital as the dependent variable, column II of Table 3.3 
shows that clustering, as captured by the location quotient, reduces start-up capital. 
Similarly, the greater the capital market inefficiency of a certain district, the lower the start-
up capital is, implying the existence of limited access to both formal and informal finances 
in such locations. Entrepreneurs in accessible locations, as captured by distance to the 
nearest all-weather road, invest a relatively larger amount of capital than do those in remote 
areas. On the other hand, entrepreneurs in urban areas invest relatively less capital than do 
those in rural areas. Whereas the first result may capture the higher valuation of accessible 
locations that could increase the initial investment size, the urban dummy variable, on the 
other hand, may have wider implications in terms of capturing the externalities from the 
existence of large firms and other complementary services in urban areas that may reduce 
the transaction costs of operating a business (Krugman 1991; Fujita et al., 1999). Large 
urban areas are also more diverse, supporting a wide range of industrial activities in close 
proximity (Fujita et al., 1999), which may help facilitate specialization and the division of 
labor. Interestingly, the coefficient of the urban dummy variable is much higher than that of 
clustering, which may indicate that the externalities and multiple specializations in urban 
centers have a greater impact on helping to reduce starting capital. 
 
Entrepreneurs who own non-residential buildings invest a relatively larger amount of 
capital than do those who do not own such buildings. This shows that more wealth leads to 
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higher savings, which one can either invest in a business or use to gain relatively better 
access to capital due to availability of collateral.  
 
Male entrepreneurs are found to invest relatively larger amounts of capital than their female 
counterparts. The relatively limited savings (McKee 1989; Otero and Downing 1989) and 
lack of access to both formal and informal sources of finance among women entrepreneurs 
(FAO 1984) may lead them to invest in activities that have a lower entry barrier. Similarly, 
more educated and young entrepreneurs are found to make larger investments compared 
with less educated and older entrepreneurs. This could be due to better information-
processing ability and search techniques regarding markets in general and credits in 
particular among more educated and young entrepreneurs (Wheeler 2006; Freedman 2008), 
which may result in them taking calculated risks to invest in activities that require larger 
investments with higher returns. 
 
Columns III and IV of Table 3.3 show the comparison of the impact of clustering on start-
up capital between enterprises investing in districts with low and high capital market 
inefficiency, respectively12. As expected, the impact of clustering on reducing start-up 
capital is higher for enterprises investing in districts with high capital market inefficiency, 
which illustrates the importance of industrial clusters as an alternative to propagate 
industrialization when the local conditions do not allow easy access to credit. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
12 A Chow test between the whole sample of enterprises and those investing in districts with high capital inefficiency shows a 
significant difference in coefficients across the two, justifying the need to have separate regressions for enterprises in low and 
high financially inefficient districts.   
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Table 3.3 Clustering and starting capital  
                               Starting capital (log) 
 Full Sample Low capital 
market 
inefficiency 
High capital 
market 
inefficiency  
Clustering (location quotient) -0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.17** 
(0.09) 
-0.28*** 
(0.06) 
Capital market inefficiency (log) -0.19*** 
(0.06) 
    —   — 
Distance to all-weather road (log) -0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
Own building (dummy) 0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.76*** 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
Male (dummy) 2.20*** 
(0.08) 
2.07***         
(0.12) 
2.14***      
(0.13) 
Years of schooling 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04***          
(0.02) 
Age -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Addis Ababa (dummy) 0.72*** 
(0.12) 
0.28 
(0.21) 
1.13***  
(0.17) 
Amhara (dummy) 0.14 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.16) 
Tigray (dummy) 0.63*** 
(0.12) 
0.42***  
(0.14) 
0.71***  
(0.24) 
Urban (dummy)  -0.35*** 
(0.13) 
-0.39 
(0.18)** 
-0.53 
(0.21)** 
R2 0.478 0.470 0.510 
N 1,325 636 689 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
3.7.2 Robustness Check Using a Different Measure of 
Clustering 
 
In this section, we check the robustness of the preceding results by using a different 
measure for clustering. Following the works of Adelman (1955), Levy (1991), Holmes 
(1999), and Sonobe and Otsuka (2006b), we use the average sales-to-value-added ratio of 
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enterprises at the district level as a measure of clustering. This ratio tends to increase as the 
number of enterprises involved in the production process increases. The ratio therefore 
captures the concentration of specialized firms in a given district.  
 
Table 3.4   Clustering and starting capital (using alternative measure of clustering) 
          Starting capital (log) 
 Full  
Sample 
Low capital  
market 
 inefficiency 
High capital  
market 
 inefficiency  
Clustering (sales-to-value-added ratio)           -0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Capital market inefficiency (log) -0.21*** 
(0.06) 
   —     — 
Distance to all-weather road (log) -0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
Own building (dummy) 0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.69*** 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
Male (dummy) 2.19*** 
(0.08) 
2.06*** 
(0.12) 
2.14*** 
(0.13) 
Years of schooling 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
Age 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Addis Ababa (dummy) 0.67*** 
(0.12) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
1.20*** 
(0.18) 
Amhara (dummy) 0.14 
(0.11) 
0 .11 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.18) 
Tigray (dummy) 0.55*** 
(0.12) 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
0.64**         
(0.25) 
Urban (dummy) -0.33** 
(0.13) 
-0.39** 
(0.18) 
-0.47** 
(0.20) 
R2 0.478 0.469 0.511 
N 1,325 636 689 
     Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
     Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
The sales-to-value-added ratio, however, might be affected over time through a change in 
the prices of outputs and inputs, and it may not really capture the concentration of 
specialized firms (Sonobe and Otsuka 2006b). Having that shortcoming in mind, we 
checked the correlation between the location quotient and the sales-to-value-added ratio for 
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the newly established enterprises at the district level, and we find that the two measures of 
clustering are positively correlated. 
 
As can be seen in column II of Table 3.4, similar significant effects are found where an 
increase in the average sales-to-value-added ratio at the district level reduces the amount of 
start-up capital, even after controlling for financial market inefficiency. The comparison 
between microenterprises investing in districts with low and high capital market 
inefficiency also show the effect to be significantly larger for those investing in districts 
marked by high capital market inefficiency (column III and IV, Table 3.4). 
 
3.7.3 Mechanism Check: Clustering and Likelihood of Being 
Financially Constrained 
 
In the preceding section, we found that starting capital is lower for those investing inside 
clusters. In this section, we check if this is actually due to a low capital entry barrier inside 
clusters. For this, we formulate another regression to investigate the relationship between 
clustering and the likelihood of being financially constrained when starting a business. If 
the reduction in starting capital within clusters is due to a low capital entry barrier, we 
would then expect being financially constrained not to be a major concern for those 
investing inside clusters. In other words, if clustering is associated with low capital entry 
barrier, microenterprises investing inside clusters are expected to have a lower likelihood of 
being financially constrained when starting a business. We try to capture this by the 
following probit regression using the same explanatory variables as in the previous OLS 
regression.  
 
ܲ(ܨܥ)௜ = 	 ߚଵܥ݈ݑݏݐ݁ݎ݅݊݃ௗ + ߚଶCap. Mkt. Inffௗ + ߚଷܴௗ + ߚସ ௜ܹ + ߛܧ + ߝ (11) 
 
In the 2002–2003 Cottage/Handicrafts Manufacturing Survey, producers were asked to 
state the most important problem they faced when starting their business. They were 
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provided with different types of business related constraints to rank, where one of them was 
being financially constrained. Based on these responses, we define a dummy (FC) that has a 
value of one if a producer responded that being financially constrained was the most 
important problem he or she faced when starting a business and zero otherwise. ܲ(. )	is the 
probability that FC =1. 
 
Table 3.5 reports the marginal effects of the probit regression. As expected, clustering 
reduces the likelihood of being financially constrained when starting a business and the 
result is robust for the different measures of clustering. This illustrates that the reduction in 
starting capital inside clusters is indeed due to a low capital entry barrier, which allows 
entrepreneurs to invest their limited endowments without necessarily being financially 
constrained.  
 
An increase in the level of capital market inefficiency in a given district, increases the 
likelihood of an entrepreneur being financially constrained when starting a business. 
Similarly, investing in accessible locations increases the probability of being financially 
constrained, which is probably due to the increased value of the location that requires a 
greater amount of start-up capital. Male entrepreneurs in general are less likely to be 
financially constrained when starting a business than female entrepreneurs. Studies have 
shown that female entrepreneurs in developing countries generally lack economic resources 
that can be used as collateral to access credit (FAO 1984; McKee 1989; Otero and Downing 
1989; Buvinic and Marguerite 1990). Culture, social norms, and the type of activities 
women invest in have also been mentioned as possible factors contributing to their limited 
access to both formal and informal finances (McKee 1989).  
 
Entrepreneurs with more years of schooling are less likely to be financially constrained 
when starting a business. This could be because more educated entrepreneurs are more 
informed about different ways of gaining access to credit than their less educated 
counterparts. In addition, educated entrepreneurs might appear creditworthy in the eyes of 
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lenders because of their relative credibility in taking calculated risks and their bookkeeping 
ability that could help facilitate the monitoring process. 
 
  Table 3.5 Clustering and likelihood of being financially constrained 
 
Marginal effects of probability of being financially constrained 
Clustering (location quotient) -0.28***                   
(0.03)    — 
Clustering (sales-to-value-added 
ratio) 
    — -0.02*** 
(0.01) 
Capital market inefficiency (log) 0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
Distance to all-weather road (log) -0.03***                
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Own building (dummy) -0.03                             
(0.03) 
-0.02
(0.03) 
Male (dummy) -0.19*** 
(0.03) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
Years of schooling -0.01**                 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
Age -0.00                 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Addis Ababa (dummy) -0.11**               
(0.06) 
-0.23*** 
(0.05) 
Amhara (dummy) 0.05                      
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
Tigray (dummy) -0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
Urban (dummy)  -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
N 1,325 1,325 
     Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
     Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
3.7.4 The Issue of Causality  
 
Although the preceding results show the relationship between clustering and capital entry 
barriers, the issue of causality could be a concern if there are any unobservable factors 
correlated with clustering that can have an effect on start-up capital. The fact that we have a 
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cross-section data set, and not a panel data set so the time dimension of variables is not 
included, may result in omitted variable bias due to unobservable factors across enterprises. 
Due to lack of valid instruments to control for biases that may arise from unobservable 
factors, we perform a “placebo” test  by taking large firms that have better access to credit 
as a control group and analyse the relationship between clustering and start-up capital in 
their respective situations. Such approach allow us to reduce the risk of endogeniety, if not 
eliminate it entirely, by showing that clustering reduces start-up capital only when there is a 
lack of access to external financing and not because unobservable factors not captured by 
the model are at work. 
 
Compared to micro- and small-scale enterprises, the large firms in Ethiopia, particularly 
state-owned and foreign-owned firms, have better access to credit (World Bank 2009b). 
According to the investment climate survey conducted by the World Bank in 2001–2002 
and 2006–2007, large firms and especially state-owned ones are far less likely to identify 
themselves as constrained by costs of financing because they tend to have collateral either 
through ownership of buildings or land. In addition, the concentration of the banking sector 
by state-owned banks (nearly two-thirds of the banking system) has resulted in preferential 
treatment for state-owned and large firms (World Bank 2009b). Large firms with better 
access to credit are therefore more likely to use the integrated mode of production and 
hence clustering would be less important for them at least in terms of reducing starting 
capital.  
 
Table 3.6 shows the regression results of the logarithm of starting capital on the two 
measures of clustering13, capital market inefficiency, and other explanatory variables using 
the 2002–2003 census data of the CSAE’s Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing Survey. 
The regression, which is performed on the firms established in the five years preceding the 
time of the survey, shows that the clustering variables in both columns have the expected 
signs but are not significant, implying that clustering is not important when there is better 
access to credit. Although the regression is not done based only on data from the textile 
                                                   
13 Clustering of large firms is calculated at the zonal level by taking regions as a reference  point. 
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industry14, the results in Table 3.6 show that clustering relates differently for producers with 
different levels of access to credit. However, these results should be interpreted with 
caution because even if the effect is zero, there may also be other differences between small 
and large firms that are responsible for this result. 
 
Table 3.6       Placebo test on the role of clustering on starting capital for large  
                      firms with good access to credit  
    Starting Capital (log) 
Clustering (location quotient) -0.11 
(0.38) 
  — 
Clustering (sales-to-value-added ratio)            — -0.11 
(0.45) 
Capital market inefficiency (log) -0.32 
(1.14) 
-0.51 
(0.86) 
Distance to all-weather road (log) 0.36 
(0.36) 
0.45 
(0.31) 
Own building (dummy) 2.16*** 
(0.39) 
2.16*** 
(0.39) 
Male (dummy) 1.16* 
(0.59) 
1.14* 
(0.59) 
Public (dummy) 3.47*** 
(0.58) 
3.47*** 
(0.58) 
Foreign (dummy) 1.62*** 
(0.56) 
1.63*** 
(0.56) 
Addis Ababa (dummy) 0.32 
(0.84) 
0.51 
(0.97) 
Amhara (dummy) 0.28 
(1.01) 
0.25 
(0.89) 
Tigray (dummy) -0.06 
(0.97) 
-0.16 
(1.13) 
Urban (dummy)   1.18 
(0.74) 
1.07 
(0.82) 
R2 0.206 0.206 
N 153 153 
Notes: Demographic information other than gender is not available about the owner of the firm. Sectoral dummies for different 
manufacturing activities are included in the regression but not reported in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
 
                                                   
14 Because the number of newly established manufacturing firms in the textile sector is very small (only seven firms), the 
regression is done for all manufacturing firms and by including sectoral dummies. 
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3.8  Conclusions and Discussion  
 
Microenterprises in developing countries often struggle with financial constraints. The 
absence of a well-developed capital market has been listed as a key obstacle to 
industrialization in developing countries in the development literature (Bigsten et al. 2003; 
Hernández-Trillo et al., 2005; McKenzie and Woodruff 2006, 2008). In this paper, we show 
that industrial clusters, through specialization and division of labor, can ease the financial 
constraints of microenterprises even in the absence of a well-functioning capital market. By 
using data from microenterprises of the handloom sector in four regions of Ethiopia, we 
find that clustering lowers capital entry barrier by reducing the initial investment required 
to start a business. This effect is found to be significantly larger for enterprises investing in 
districts of high capital market inefficiency. The results are also robust for different 
measures of clustering.  
 
Even if financial development is crucial for industrial development, developing a well-
functioning capital market is a daunting task. Clustering could therefore be an alternative 
way to propagate industrialization when local conditions do not allow easy access to credit. 
China has achieved rapid industrialization in the past three decades despite its lack of a 
well-functioning capital market. Clustering largely explains how Chinese micro- and small-
scale enterprises were able to function in a credit-constrained environment (Huang et al. 
2008; Ruan and Zhang 2009; Long and Zhang 2011). Even if the institutional contexts in 
which clusters operate are not the same as in China, the cluster-based industrialization 
model may be applied to developing countries in Africa with similar capital endowments. 
Promotion of clusters, especially in divisible sectors, could therefore help developing 
countries engage the vast number of entrepreneurs in micro- and small-scale industries in 
production processes and make better use of limited capital.  
 
A possible caveat of this study is its reliance on cross-sectional data, which does not allow 
us to see the effects of inter-temporal changes of relative prices. That we cannot entirely 
control for possible unobservable factors that can be correlated with clustering is another 
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limitation. In addition, due to lack of detailed data on forward and backward linkages 
between different agents within clusters, we could not identify the potential mechanisms 
that could explain the cluster effects, such as the promotion of trust through repeated 
interaction, the exchange of information and promotion of cooperation, which all can 
facilitate access to finance. Despite these shortcomings, however, the results of this study 
show the role of clustering as one way of enhancing industrialization in developing 
countries by fostering entrepreneurship and by reducing capital entry barriers. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Farm households and non-farm activities 
in Ethiopia: does clustering influence entry 
and exit? 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines how clustering affects the entry and exit decisions of farm 
households into and from non-farm enterprises in rural Ethiopia. It is found that the 
existence of clusters of micro enterprises in the same district increases the likelihood of 
rural households to start a non-farm enterprise. Similarly, clustering of big manufacturing 
firms in the same zone is found to increase the likelihood of farm households to start a non-
farm enterprise. Non-farm enterprises operating in clusters are also found to have a lower 
probability of exit than those operating outside of clusters. The study further investigates 
the impact of entry and exit into and from non-farm enterprises on farm household’s well-
being by using total household income, the food security status of a household and the 
household’s ability to raise enough money in case of emergency, as indicators. Using 
propensity score matching to account for selection bias, it is found that, entry into non-farm 
enterprises significantly increases household’s income and food security status. Exit from 
non-farm enterprises, on the other hand, is found to significantly reduce household’s 
income.  
 
Keywords: non-farm enterprise, clustering, entry and exit, household’s well-being, 
Ethiopia, Africa. 
  
                                                   
 Paper by Merima Ali and Jack Peerlings, Forthcoming in  Agricultural Economics. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
Poverty and income variability remains one of the biggest challenges facing most rural 
households in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Even though agriculture is the main source of 
income for more than 85% of the rural population in the region, the dwindling size of 
agricultural land due to increasing population, low productivity and hostile agro ecological 
factors often result in extreme income variability. One of the mechanisms used by rural 
households to smooth income variability is to diversify their activities by starting non-farm 
enterprises (NFEs). Evidence suggests that close to 37% of income for rural households in 
Africa is derived from non-farm activities despite the fact that only 9-19% of the rural labor 
force is employed in such activities (Haggblade et al., 2007). NFEs are particularly 
important in generating income and employment for the poorest segment of the society, 
particularly women and unskilled labor (Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004). In addition to 
income-earning opportunities, the promotion and establishment of rural NFEs are also 
noted to play an important role in reducing food insecurity in rural Africa (Barrett et al., 
2001). 
 
Yet, rural households face various constraints when establishing and expanding NFEs such 
as lack of capital, limited market access and technical knowhow, poor information access, 
etc. Public goods like infrastructure, research and training centers and government and 
regulatory institutions are often absent in rural areas because of high cost due to lower 
population densities, having negative implications for economies of scale (Eifert and 
Ramachandran, 2004; Collier and Venables, 2008). This results in higher transaction costs 
both for establishing and expanding businesses in rural areas implying significant entry 
barriers and high exit rates in NFEs (Haggblade et al., 2007). The total closure rate among 
rural NFEs in Africa is quite high15 where the likelihood of exiting is found to be common 
among newly established ones (Liedholm and Mead, 1999; Liedholm, 2007; Loening et al., 
2008).  
                                                   
15  For example, the total closure rate of NFEs in Ethiopia is 25% (Loening et al.,  2008). 
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In recent literatures, industrial clusters are noted as one form of institution that can help to 
reduce the various transaction costs faced by enterprises both when establishing and during 
the operation of businesses (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006a; Ruan and Zhang, 2009; Ali and 
Peerlings, 2011a). Clustering, through specialization and division of labor, can lower entry 
barriers by reducing the initial capital required to start a business, even in the absence of a 
well-functioning capital market (Huang et al., 2008; Ruan and Zhang, 2009; Ali et al., 
2010). The barriers to start a business can also be lower in industrial clusters than in 
dispersed locations because specialized inputs, local market and customers are readily 
available (Porter, 2000). Established relationships and social networks with various agents 
in the same community and the presence of “successful” local firms can also reduce the 
perceived risk of entry (Porter, 2000). Even after establishment, the presence of strong 
cluster environment that fosters growth and enhances regional comparative advantage plays 
an important role for the survival of enterprises (Schmitz,1995; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; 
Ali and Peerlings, 2011a). 
 
In clusters there may also be forces that increase the entry cost and threaten the survival of 
the already established businesses by diminishing the returns to entrepreneurial activity 
(Delgado et al., 2010). This may occur from external diseconomies of scale such as air 
pollution, congestion, and fierce competition for limited markets and resources such as land 
and specialized inputs (Lall et al., 2003; Delgado et al., 2007; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006a).  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how clustering affects the entry and exit 
decisions of farm households into and from NFEs in rural parts of Ethiopia. Several studies 
have examined the determinants of household’s decisions to diversify to NFEs in 
developing countries (for example; Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Barrett et al., 2001; Owusu 
et al., 2011). Most of these studies focus on the impact of household, farm and village 
characteristics, and some exogenous factors like rainfall and price variability in affecting 
the decision of households to diversify to NFEs. However, empirical work on the possible 
impact of clustering on entry costs for establishing NFEs and hence households’ 
diversification decision is quite scarce (Huang et al., 2008; Ruan and Zhang, 2009). In 
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addition, data on firm dynamics, particularly on micro enterprises is rarely available in SSA 
making studies on the determinants of exit decisions non-existent except for larger firms 
(McPherson, 1995; Harding et al., 2004; Bigsten and Gebreeyesus, 2007; Gebreeyesus, 
2008). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical work that looks at the entry 
and exit decisions of farm households into and from rural NFEs in Africa from a clustering 
point of view.  
 
The study further investigates the impact of entry and exit into and from NFEs on 
household’s well-being by using total household income, the food security status of a 
household and the household’s ability to raise enough money in case of emergency, as 
indicators. Participation into a NFE is hardly a random process where households with 
certain characteristics might self-select themselves both in the decision of entering into and 
exiting from NFEs. Failure to address the selection-bias may therefore result in wrong 
estimates of the impact of entry and exit into and from NFEs on household’s well-being. In 
order to address this issue, we use the non-parametric statistical method of propensity score 
matching where the well-being of households that have entered and exited NFEs is 
compared with counterfactual groups of households that have not entered and have not 
exited NFEs respectively. The data for this study is from the 2006/07 Rural Investment 
Climate Survey (RICS) collected by the World Bank together with the Central Statistical 
Authority of Ethiopia.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the theoretical 
framework for the entry and exit decisions of households into and from NFEs. Section 4.3 
discusses the data and section 4.4 presents the empirical model. Section 4.5 presents the 
empirical results and section 4.6 provides a conclusion and discussion. 
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4.2  Theoretical Framework: Entry and Exit Decisions of 
Households into and from Non-farm Enterprises. 
 
A series of studies on rural non-farm activities underline the importance of profit 
maximization and risk minimization or income stabilization as the major motives for farm 
households’ decision to diversify beyond agriculture (see, for example, Haggblade et al., 
2007; Rose, 2001). The profit maximization motive is driven by “pull” factors that are 
characterized by available markets and opportunities, infrastructural facilities and 
supportive institutions, etc. Various idiosyncratic shocks such as drought, environmental 
degradation, chronic rainfall deficit etc., on the other hand, may “push” households to 
diversify beyond agriculture as a risk management strategy in order to smooth income over 
time. Although it is important to understand the broader set of households’ motives to 
diversify beyond agriculture, we base our theoretical framework on the profit maximization 
motive, because it will best serve the main objective of the study, which is to investigate the 
effect of location specific “pull’ factor of clustering on households’ diversification 
decision16.  
 
Let a farm household faces two choices; either to continue working in agriculture or to 
diversify its activity by starting a NFE. Each household will make a choice based on a 
comparison of the expected post-entry NFE profit to forgone agricultural income due to 
diversification. That is, a household will start a NFE if its expected enterprise profit is 
higher than the forgone agricultural income from diversification. Otherwise, the household 
chooses to continue its agricultural work. Next we will formalize this idea.  
 
Suppose a household has fixed endowments of labor and capital that it has to allocate 
among different activities. When household ݅	is engaged only in agriculture, the present 
value of agricultural income is given as:  
 
                                                   
16 Even if the motive of the household is profit maximization, exogenous shocks affecting agricultural 
    income may still influence its expected profit,  and hence the diversification decision.  
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ܲ ௜ܸ = ܧ௧ ∑ ߚఛି௧்ఛୀ௧ ߨ௜൫݌஺,ݓ஺,ܼ௜ ,߮௧ , ߝ௜൯, (1) 
 
where ܧ௧ is the expectation operator given the information set at time ݐ, ߚ is the subjective 
discount factor, ܶ is the number of periods and ߨ௜ is agricultural profit of household ݅. 
Agricultural profit is a function of prices of agricultural outputs (pA) and inputs (wA) and 
endowments of the fixed inputs; labor and capital (ܼ௜).	߮௧  is a vector of exogenous shocks 
that one way or the other can affect agricultural income like rainfall variability, drought, 
flooding, price shocks etc. ߝ௜ is household and farm specific unobservable characteristics 
that affect agricultural income.  
 
In the case of diversifying its activity by starting a NFE, the household will face entry 
barriers that can be affected by location specific factors like industrial clusters and the 
investment climate,17 the level of investment capital required to start the business and skill 
requirements. 
 
Upon diversification, the household will have the following present values of income from 
the agricultural (ܣ) and NFE	(ܤ).  
   
ܲ ஺ܸ,௜ = ܧ௧ ∑ ߚఛି௧்ఛୀ௧ ߨ஺,௜൫݌஺,ݓ஺,ܼ஺,௜ ,߮௧ , ߝ௜൯, (2) 
 
ܲ ஻ܸ,௜ = −ܥ௜,௧( ௟ܰ , ܫ௟ ,ܪ௜) + ܧ௧	∑ ߚఛି௧்ఛୀ௧ ߨ஻,௜൫݌஻( ௟ܰ , ܫ௟),ݓ஻( ௟ܰ , ܫ௟),ܼ஻,௜ , ߤ௜൯,                (3) 
 
ܼ௜ = ܼ஺,௜ + ܼ஻,௜    (4) 
 
Since the household is a price taker, the prices of agricultural outputs (pA) and inputs (wA) 
do not change whether the household works only in agriculture (equation 1) or diversifies 
                                                   
17 Investment climate is defined as different characteristics specific to a certain location that could act as incentives or disincentives 
for running a business like availability of financial services, infrastructure, governance, regulations, taxes, conflict resolution, etc 
(Eifert and Ramachandran, 2004).  
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with NFE (equation 2). The household has to allocate the total amount of fixed inputs of 
labor and capital across the different activities as formulated in (4).  
 
In equation 3, ܥ௜,௧  denotes the cost of entry in to a NFE. The entry cost can be affected by 
location specific characteristics like the investment climate	(ܫ௟)	that can be captured by 
factors like availability of financial services, infrastructure, government regulations and 
taxes, safety of the locations, etc., which could increase or lower the entry barrier. These 
characteristics can capture the policies, institutional arrangements and infrastructure of a 
certain location and the effect they may have on transaction costs of entering a business. 
The cost of establishing a NFE can also be affected by the existence of concentration of 
other enterprises (industrial clusters) in the same location( ௟ܰ). In addition to location 
specific variables, the minimum required skills or entrepreneurial ability to run a NFE can 
also be a barrier to enter a NFE. Although it is difficult to directly capture the inherent 
ability of individuals; the age, gender, and schooling of an entrepreneur, in this case a 
household head, can be used as an indicator and this is denoted by	ܪ௜.  
 
Post entry NFE profit in equation 3 is a function of output and input prices of the NFE 
denoted by ݌஻ and ݓ஻	respectively. Input and output prices can further be affected by 
location specific factors that can have an impact on the transaction costs of procuring inputs 
and selling outputs like reduced transportation cost stemming from proximity of input 
suppliers and output buyers as in the case of industrial clusters. Other location specific 
variables like existence of big firms and other complimentary services may also facilitate 
the transaction of inputs and outputs (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999).  
 
ߤ௜ is enterprise specific and location specific unobservable characteristics that affect NFE 
income.  
 
The household will choose to diversify by starting a NFE if and only if the present value of 
income from NFE is greater than the present value of forgone agricultural income from 
diversification (equation 6).  
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ܲ ஺ܸ,௜ + ܲ ஻ܸ,௜ > ܲ ௜ܸ   (5) 
 
ܲ ஻ܸ,௜ > ܲ ௜ܸ 	 − ܲ ஺ܸ,௜  (6) 
 
Following this, the probability	(݌ݎ݋ܾ) that household ݅ chooses to diversify its activity by 
starting a NFE is given as:  
                                                      
݌ݎ݋ܾ(஻,௜) = ݌ݎ݋ܾ ቀ−ܥ௜,௧( ௟ܰ , ܫ௟ ,ܪ௜) + ܧ௧	∑ ߚఛି௧்ఛୀ௧ ߨ஻,௜൫݌஻( ௟ܰ , ܫ௟),ݓ஻( ௟ܰ , ܫ௟),ܼ஻,௜ , ߤ௜൯ቁ >
																					݌ݎ݋ܾ ൬ܧ௧	∑ ߚ
ఛି௧்
ఛୀ௧ ቀߨ௜൫݌஺,ݓ஺,ܼ௜ ,߮௧ , ߝ௜൯ − ߨ஺,௜൫݌஺ ,ݓ஺,ܼ஺,௜ ,߮௧ , ߝ௜൯ቁ൰ (7) 
 
In the right hand side of equation (7), the price of agricultural outputs (pA) and inputs (wA) 
do not change whether the household works only in agriculture or diversifies its activity. As 
a result we do not expect them to play a role in affecting household’s choice of activities 
except that they determine the actual level of profit. What differs in the choice of the two 
activities is the amount of fixed inputs of labor and capital, hence it is expected that 
household’s labor and capital endowments do play a role in the decision to start a NFE.  
 
Let ݀(஻,௜) = 1 if household ݅	chooses to diversify its activity by starting a NFE and 0 if it 
chooses to continue agricultural production. If we assume that the stochastic components	ߤ௜ 
and ߝ௜ are independently and identically distributed, then the probability of entry into a 
NFE is given by: 
 
݌ݎ݋ܾ(஻,௜) = 	 ൜݂(ܪ௜ ,ܼ௜ , ௟ܰ , ܫ௟ ,߮௧)					݂݅	݀(஻,௜) = 1	0																																						݋ݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁    (8) 
 
After starting a NFE, an incumbent household once again faces two choices; either to 
continue its diversified activity or to exit the NFE and go back to agricultural production. In 
the case of exiting the NFE, the household may face a barrier to exit such as investments 
made in non-transferable fixed assets, regulatory burdens and other closure costs that may 
arise from contract contingencies with suppliers or buyers. These costs may in turn be a 
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function of location specific factors like the investment climate and existence of industrial 
clusters. For example, the cost of exit in industrial clusters may be lower due to a low level 
of investment in specialized activities and existence of “deeper markets for specialized 
assets” (Caves and Porter, 1977). Indicators of the investment climates like the regulatory 
burdens, the property rights and contract enforcement may also govern the transaction costs 
of liquidating a business. Furthermore, exit barriers can arise from household specific 
characteristics that can affect the bargaining power among household members in terms of 
deciding whether to terminate or continue the business. The bargaining power can be 
reflected by the social status of household members that can be captured by the age, gender 
and schooling of the main operator of the business.  
 
The present value of income from the NFE for an incumbent household will then depend on 
the trade-off between the costs that the household will incur upon exiting and the profit that 
it will earn if it continues operating the NFE. The profit that the enterprise will earn in turn 
depends on the price of outputs and inputs of the NFE which are also a function of location 
specific factors. In addition to location specific factors, enterprise specific factors can also 
affect the profitability of the enterprise like the size of the enterprise, experience gained 
during business, the type of operation, etc. Given these, the household will decide to exit 
the NFE if the present value of income from the NFE is strictly less than the extra income 
that can be earned if the household had to engage only in the agricultural activity (equation 
9).  
 
ܲ ஻ܸ,௜ா < ܲ ௜ܸா − ܲ ஺ܸ,௜ா ,  (9) 
 
where, ܸܲா  is the present value of an incumbent household.  
 
If we follow the same formulation as used for the entry decision, the probability of exiting a 
NFE will then become a function of household specific characteristics (ܪ௜), enterprise 
specific factors (ܧ௜), fixed inputs of capital and labor	(ܼ௜), location specific factors ( ௟ܰ , ܫ௟), 
and exogenous shocks affecting agricultural output (߮௧). 
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4.3 Data 
 
4.3.1 General Information 
 
Data for this study is obtained from the Rural Investment Climate Survey (RICS) 
conducted by the World Bank together with the Central Statistical Authority of Ethiopia 
during December 2006 and January 2007. The survey has two parts where the first part 
contains more general questions on 14,000 households and 3,500 enterprises in four regions 
of Ethiopia, namely Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNP. The second part of the survey 
contains a more detailed information only for Amhara. This part of the survey covers 2,900 
households, 760 enterprises and 118 communities from 4 different zones of Amhara, 
covering almost one-half of Amhara’s population of 18 million. The empirical analysis is 
based on the survey collected only for Amhara due to the availability of detailed 
information that are relevant for our analysis and because enterprise information can also be 
matched with household and community level characteristics. In the enterprise survey, 
information is collected on different forms of non-farm activities that include the 
manufacturing, trade and service sectors. In addition to the RICS, the 2002/03 
Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Industry survey and the 2002/03 Large and Medium 
Scale Manufacturing Establishments Survey, both collected by the CSAE are used to 
calculate location specific variables.  
 
Studies suggest that the benefits of clustering would best materialize in manufacturing 
sectors where a number of different specialized producers can operate along the same line 
of production (Porter, 2000; Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006b). 
However, clustering can also occur in the service and trade sectors; examples are the 
vehicle repair cluster in Ziwani, Kenya (McCormick, 1999) and the horticultural export 
cluster in Ghana (Jaeger, 2008). Trade and service sectors in rural areas of developing 
countries also offer a greater source of income and employment than manufacturing 
activities (Haggblade et al., 2007). From a policy perspective, clustering of trade and 
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service sectors therefore deserve serious attention. However, due to unavailability of data 
on the service and trade sectors of micro, medium and large scale establishments for 
calculating location specific variables such as clustering, the current study focuses on 
manufacturing activities. 
 
4.3.2 Non-farm Enterprises in Ethiopia  
 
The percentage of rural households engaged in NFEs in Ethiopia for the past 8 years has 
been close to 25%, which is lower compared to the SSA average of 42%. Figure 4.1 shows 
that there is an upward trend in households’ participation from 1998 until 2006/0718.  
 
Rural Amhara shows a lower participation of 20% compared to the country’s average. 
Looking at the sectoral composition of NFEs, on the other hand, a relative large percentage 
of households in Amhara, 43%, are engaged in manufacturing activities (Table 4.1).   
 
There is little growth in NFEs in terms of employment. Only close to 3% of the enterprises 
in Amhara have experienced positive growth, which is way below the 8% for all the NFEs 
in the country that have expanded their labor force since start-up. 1% of the enterprises in 
Amhara have shrunk in size and the rest 96% have experienced zero growth. NFEs in 
Ethiopia are predominantly small with an average employment of 1.14. A large proportion 
of NFEs, close to 10%, exit their business permanently within the first three years of their 
establishments. The total closure rate, which is the sum of the seasonal closure and 
permanent exit, on the other hand is 25% (Loening et al., 2008)19.  
 
                                                   
18 The figure is compiled using the 1998 and 2004 Welfare Monitoring Survey and the 2006/07 RICS.   
19 The closure rate varies across firms of different sizes. Using a large panel data set for firms in urban Ethiopia, Bigsten and 
Gebreeyesus, (2007) show that 59% of the medium size firms exit their business permanently within the first 5 years of their 
establishments, compared to 31% for very large firms. 
                                                                             Farm households and non-farm activities in Ethiopia  
88 
 
Figure 4.1 Households’ rural non-farm participation (1998/99-2006/07). 
Source: CSAE and World Bank, 2008 
 
Table 4.1 Participation in NFEs by region and sector (percentage of households) 
 Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP  Total 
Participation Rate      
  Households owning  NFE 22 20 23 37 25 
 
Sectoral Composition       
                     Manufacturing  30 43 35 32 36 
                     Trade 56 41 52 58 51 
                     Service 14 16 13 11 13 
Source: Loening et al., 2008. 
 
 
There are various constraints that affect NFEs both at start up and during operation. As can 
be seen in Figure 4.2, access to market both in terms of distance and difficulty of obtaining 
information is considered as the major constraint both for starting a business and during 
operation. Access to finance is considered to be the second major constraint both for 
starting and running a business. Access, quality and cost of transportation and utilities such 
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as electricity, telecommunication, water and postal services are perceived to be major 
obstacles for running a business but they are less an obstacle for starting one. 
 
Figure 4.2  Perceived main constraints for opening and running a NFE  
                      (percentage of households who responded accordingly).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors compilation using the 2006/07 RICS. 
 
Very few households perceived government related obstacles such as corruption, uncertain 
economic policy and restrictive laws and regulations and safety issues such as criminality, 
theft and lawlessness as major problems for opening and running a business. A much lower 
response is also found for constraints related to the time and cost of registration and 
obtaining permits and taxation. This is not surprising given the small size of NFEs in many 
parts of Ethiopia that are often left unregulated and operate as informal businesses. 
 
4.4  Empirical Model and Variables  
 
Determinants of Entry and Exit of Households into and from Non-farm Enterprises 
 
Following the theoretical framework in section 4.2, we look at the impact of household and 
enterprise specific characteristics, location specific factors, household’s endowment of 
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capital and labor and exogenous shocks in determining the entry and exit of households into 
and from NFEs. Because we only have cross-section data, we cannot calculate the entry and 
exit rates of enterprises over time. Instead, we use the responses in the survey in order to 
capture whether households have entered or exited a NFE in recent times. In the survey, 
households were asked whether they own a NFE and if yes, in which year they have started 
the enterprise. Similarly, those who own an enterprise were asked whether they have 
quitted a NFE. If they have quitted a NFE, they were further asked in which year they have 
done so. Based on these responses, we construct dummy variables for entry and exit. Entry 
into a NFE takes a value of one if a household has started a NFE in the past four years of 
the time of the survey and zero if the household has not started a NFE at all. Similarly, exit 
from a NFE has a value of one if the enterprise has been stopped in the past four years of 
the time of the survey and zero if the NFE is still operating at the time of the survey. 
Following this, we formulate the following probit models; one for the entry decision and 
another for the exit decision where the dependent variables are dummies for the entry and 
exit of households into and from NFEs respectively.  
 
 ݌ݎ݋ܾ(݁݊ݐݎݕ) = 	 ߠଵܪ௜ + ߠଶܼ௜ + ߠଷ ௟ܰ + ߠସܫ௟ + ߠହ ௧߮ + ߥ, (10)  
 
 ݌ݎ݋ܾ(݁ݔ݅ݐ) = 	 ߛଵܪ௜ + ߛଶܼ௜ + ߛଷܧ௜ + ߛସ ௟ܰ + ߛହܫ௟ + ߛ଺߮௧ + ߦ,   (11)  
 
where the ߠ’s and ߛ’s are the corresponding parameters to be estimated for the entry and 
exit decision models respectively.	ߥ and ߦ	are the error terms of the probit regressions of the 
entry and exit decision models respectively. 
 
We use information on the entry and exit decisions of households only for the past four 
years in order to be able to match the information with enterprise and household specific 
explanatory variables that are available for the year of the survey, 2006/07. This is done 
under the assumption that most of the enterprise and household specific characteristics did 
not show a significant change in the past four years of the time of the survey.  
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As indicators of household characteristics (ܪ௜) that can affect household’s entry and exit 
decisions, we use gender, age, schooling and immigration status of the household head. 
Labor availability and capital endowment of a household (ܼ௜) are indicated by household 
size and wealth of a household respectively. The wealth of a household is captured by a 
dummy that has a value of one if the roof of the household is made from iron sheet and zero 
otherwise. In addition to the wealth indicator, we use the percentage of household income 
from non-agricultural sources such as remittances, government transfers, wages and salaries 
from off-farm employment and pensions, insurance, etc.  
 
Enterprise specific factors (ܧ௜) used only in the exit decision model include the size of the 
enterprise, which is measured by the number of workers and experience as captured by the 
number of years since the establishment of the business. Whether the enterprise is a cottage 
industry or the operation is performed in a separate workspace outside of the entrepreneur’s 
home is also used as additional enterprise specific factor. NFEs in SSA are often seasonal 
and are performed to compensate agricultural income. Hence, we use a dummy that has a 
value of one if the operation of the NFE is seasonal and zero otherwise.  
 
As a measure of clustering ( ௟ܰ), we construct an index in order to measure the 
concentration of enterprises in a certain location (݈). The location quotient that quantifies 
how concentrated a certain sector is in a given location compared to a larger geographic 
unit, is one of the widely used measures of clustering (O’Donoghue and Gleave, 2004). The 
location quotient for a certain manufacturing sector is calculated for the most detailed 
spatial unit possible, the district, by using zone, which is the higher spatial unit next to a 
district, as a reference point.  
 
 ܮܳௗ௜ = 	(ܪௗ ܯௗ⁄ ) (ܪ௓ ܯ௓⁄⁄ ),  (12) 
 
where ܮܳௗ௜ is the location quotient of a certain manufacturing sector ݅	at district ݀; ܪௗ is 
employment of sector ݅ at district ݀; ܯௗ is total manufacturing employment at district ݀; ܪ௓ 
is employment of sector ݅ at zone ݖ and		ܯ௓ is total manufacturing employment at zone ݖ. 
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Here total manufacturing employment includes employment in micro, medium, and large-
scale manufacturing sectors. The 2002/0320 Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing survey and 
the 2002/03 Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing Establishments Survey, both collected 
by CSAE are used for calculating the location quotient at district level. 
  
The response for the entry decision of households, which is obtained from the household 
survey does not specify the type of activity that the household has decided to engage in. 
The information provided in the survey is rather general asking each household whether it 
has started any kind of NFE or not. Because of this, we are unable to construct a 
concentration index for a specific sector in the entry decision model. Rather, we construct a 
concentration index for all types of the already established micro enterprises in a certain 
district by taking zone as a reference point. For the exit decision, however, we have detailed 
information about the types of manufacturing activity that each enterprise had been 
engaged in. Hence, the concentration index for the exit decision model is calculated for 
each type of manufacturing sector at district level. Depending on the types of the 
manufacturing sector, one district may therefore have more than one concentration index 
where each enterprise in a district is then assigned an index according to the type of sector 
that it is engaged in. 
 
In addition to the concentration of micro enterprises, we also calculate the concentration of 
large manufacturing firms at zonal level using the same technique, the location quotient. 
This is in order to see if the externalities that surrounding large firms may have an effect on 
household’s entry and exit decisions into and from NFEs. Small producers may benefit 
from concentration of large firms through inter and intra industry benefits such as 
information spill-over, technological externalities, availability of a pool of skilled workers, 
and existence of common services such as research and training centres, government and 
regulatory institutions, and banking services (Krugman, 1991; Fujita and Thisse, 1996). On 
the other hand, large firms may pose a challenge for the smaller ones if they are competing 
                                                   
20 the 2002/03 survey data are used for calculating clustering in order to make the correlation inferable with the dependent 
variables that are also measured for the past four years of the time of the survey.   
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for the same market. The 2002/03 Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing Survey 
collected by CSAE is used to calculate the concentrating index for large firms.  
 
In order to capture the investment climate of a certain location (ܫ௟), we use information 
from the 2006/07 RICS to capture road access and availability of credit services in nearby 
locations, various government related policies and regulations and the safety of the 
community. To capture the road access and credit services in nearby locations, we use the 
average distance in hours to reach the nearest all-weather road and a micro finance 
institution (MFIs) respectively. The average distance is measured for each enterprise. 
Travel time in hours instead of physical distance in kilometres is used in order to capture 
the quality of the road.  
 
As further indicators of the investment climate, we use governance and safety of a 
community. In the RICS-Amhara community survey, knowledgeable community residents 
and leaders such as village headmen, religious chiefs and long-term residents were 
addressed with different indicators of governance and safety and asked if they would 
consider these indicators as being a major problem, somewhat a problem, a minor problem 
or not a problem at all for establishing and expanding a business in their community. 
Regarding governance, they were asked about corruption, uncertain economic policy and 
restrictive laws and regulations. Regarding safety, they were asked about criminality, theft 
and lawlessness in their community. Based on these responses, we construct an index for 
governance and safety for each community leader in each district. The index ranges from 0 
to 1, where an increase indicates a rise in the seriousness of governance or safety issues 
being major problems for establishing and running a business as perceived by each 
community leader. We then took the median value of the responses of the different 
community leaders to come up with one index for each district.  
 
One of the most frequently noted exogenous factors affecting agricultural income and 
hence a household’s diversification decision is rainfall variability. In order to capture 
rainfall variability (߮௧ ), we use NOAA Climate Predication Center’s African Rainfall 
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Climatology Data obtained from the World Bank. In the data, rainfall anomalies for each 
month and each district were calculated for the years 1995 to 2006. From the monthly 
anomalies, annual anomalies are generated for each district. The annual rainfall anomaly is 
defined as the deviation from the 12 year rainfall average (1995-2006) and can have both 
positive and negative values. The district level annual rainfall anomaly is then used to 
generate an absolute annual rainfall anomaly for each household one year previous to the 
start of a business and one year previous to the closure of a business for those who have 
opened and exited a NFE respectively21.  For those who have not opened and exited a NFE, 
we use the 2002 absolute rainfall anomaly22. 
 
As an additional control variable, a rural town dummy is used in both probit models in 
order to capture all kinds of externalities that towns may provide. Dummies for the 
different manufacturing activities are also included in the exit regression to indicate for 
possible sectoral variations.  
 
Impact of Entry and Exit into and from Non-farm Enterprises on Household’s Well-being  
 
Well-being of a household is measured using three different indicators. The first one is total 
household income, which is the sum of agricultural and non-agricultural income. The 
second measure of well-being is an index that captures the food security status of a 
household due to various exogenous shocks. In the household survey of the RICS, 
households were asked whether they have experienced food shortage due to various 
exogenous shocks like drought, flooding, price variability, and illness and death of a 
household member. The questions were asked for each household for four consecutive 
years from 2003 until 2006. Based on this, we construct an index of food shortage for the 
year 2006. The index ranges from zero to three, zero being no food shortage and three 
being the highest level of food shortage. The third measure is the ability of a household to 
                                                   
21 Because we don’t have information on the actual amount of rainfall in each district, we couldn’t  calculate the coefficient of 
rainfall variation for the 12 year period for which the data is available, as is commonly used in other studies.  
22 The 2002 absolute rainfall anomaly is used for households that have not opened and exited a NFE because the whole analysis of 
the paper is based on households that have entered or exited a NFE in the past four years of the time of the survey.  
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raise enough money in case of emergency, which is captured by a dummy that has a value 
of one if a household responded as being able to raise 100 birr in the case of emergency and 
zero, otherwise. 
 
To take into account the bias that may arise from self-selection of households in their 
decision to enter and exit NFEs, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to look at the 
impact on households’ well-being. PSM allows us to match households that share the same 
pre-treatment observable socio-economic characteristics with the exception of either or not 
entering and exiting a NFE (Heckman et al., 1997). 
 
The main pillars of PSM are the individuals (household), the treatment (entering into and 
exiting from a NFE) and the potential outcome of the treatment (household’s well-being). 
 
Let ܦ௜ ∈ {1,0} be an indicator whether household ݅ has received a treatment or not. The 
propensity score Ƥ(ܺ) is defined as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment 
given pre-treatment characteristics as:  
 
Ƥ(ܺ) ≡ ݌ݎ݋ܾ ቀܦ௜ = ⃒ܺቁ = ܧ ቀܦ௜⃒ܺቁ,                                                                         (13)       
                            
where ܺ denotes a vector of pre-treatment characteristics and ܧ is the expectation operator. 
The propensity score can be predicted with either a logit or probit model under the 
assumption of a normal or logistic cumulative distribution respectively. Once the 
propensity scores are generated, the treatment effect can then be calculated by selecting 
households that are ‘closest’ in terms of propensity score as a match. 
 
The most common estimate of treatment effects in the evaluation literature is the average 
treatment effect on the treated. If the potential outcome of the treatment, which is 
household well-being, is denoted by	 ௜ܻ(ܦ௜), then the average treatment effect (ܣܶܶ) is 
defined as;  
 
                                                                             Farm households and non-farm activities in Ethiopia  
96 
 
ܣܶܶ = ܧ ቀ⃒ܶܦ = 1ቁ = ܧ ቀܻ(1)⃒ܦ = 1ቁ − ܧ ቀܻ(0)⃒ܦ = 1ቁ,                                   (14) 
 
where ܧ ቀܻ(1)⃒ܦ = 1ቁ is the expected outcome for those households that have actually 
received a treatment, in this case those that have entered or exited a NFE, and 
ܧ ቀܻ(0)⃒ܦ = 1ቁ is the counterfactual for the treated, which estimates what the outcome 
would be if those households that have in fact received a treatment do not do so.  
 
An important assumption of PSM is the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which 
states that the set of pre-treatment observable characteristics that are included in the 
matching should determine both the probability of receiving a treatment (entering into and 
exiting from NFEs) and the outcome of interest (household well-being); that is ( ଴ܻ, ଵܻ) ⊥
ܦ⃒ܺ, denoting the statistical independence of ( ଴ܻ, ଵܻ), conditional on pre-treatment 
observable characteristics, ܺ (Heckman et al., 1997). 
 
Given that the CIA holds, the PSM estimate for the ATT can be written as:  
 
ܣܶ ௉ܶௌெ = 	 ܧƤ(௑⃒஽ୀଵ) ൜ܧ ൤ܻ(1)⃒ܦ = 1,Ƥ(ܺ)൨ − ൤ܻ(0)⃒ܦ = 1,Ƥ(ܺ)൨ൠ                     (15) 
 
In order to eliminate outliers that have very high and very low propensity scores, the 
matching should be restricted to the area of the Common Support in the sample, which can 
be done by dropping the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the 
control observation is the lowest (Sianesi, 2004). To be effective, matching should also 
balance observable explanatory variables across treated and non-treated groups. For this, a 
balancing test is performed after the match. This test can check the quality of the match by 
assessing the extent to which differences in the pre-treatment observable characteristics 
between treated and non-treated groups have been eliminated.  
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4.5 Empirical Results  
 
4.5.1 Determinants of Entry and Exit of Households into and 
from Non-farm Enterprises 
 
The marginal effects of the probit regression for the entry decision model are presented in 
column II and III of Table 4.2. In column II, almost all household head characteristics 
included in the model, except for the immigration status, play a role in the entry decision. 
Households with young and more educated heads are more likely to start a NFE. Female 
headed households are also more likely to start a NFE. High female participation into NFEs 
may imply the lack of alternatives for women in other domains, especially agriculture, 
while men often can exploit profitable market opportunities between complementary 
activities of non-farm works and agriculture (Loening and Mikael, 2009). 
 
With regard to labor endowment, households with a large number of household members 
are more likely to start a NFE, which may indicate the existence of ‘surplus’ labor that can 
easily be shifted from one activity to the other. In order to see which age cohort of 
household members is more important for the entry decision, we formulate four different 
age groups as indicated in column III of Table 4.2. Accordingly, it is found that households 
having more members in the age cohort of 6 to 15 years old are more likely to start a NFE. 
This may imply the importance of child labor in the entry decision where either children 
may directly work in NFEs or engage in agricultural and other house works, the latter 
allowing other household members to have more time to  allocate to NFEs.  
 
Households whose roofs are made from iron sheets are more likely to start a NFE. 
Similarly, households with a large share of income from non-agricultural sources have a 
high probability of starting a NFE. This result may imply that alternative income sources 
other than agriculture can help households to better smooth-out the uncertainty regarding 
agricultural performance, giving them more incentives to invest in NFEs. 
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As expected, the concentration of micro enterprises engaged in manufacturing activities in 
the same district increases the probability of starting a NFE. The concentration of big 
manufacturing firms in the same zone also increases the probability of starting a NFE. It is 
interesting to see that the effect of the concentration of micro enterprises in increasing the 
probability of entry is 23% higher than that of the concentration of big firms. This may 
imply that the specialization and external economies of scale arising from clustering of 
micro enterprises that are engaged in similar line of production are more important for 
households’ entry decisions than those arising from big firms. 
 
Among the various indicators of the investment climate, we find a significant effect for 
access to a road where the further away households are located from an all-weather road, 
the lower is the probability of starting a NFE. Similarly, households located outside of rural 
towns are less likely to start a NFE. These findings indicate the importance of reduction in 
remoteness through improved transportation system for market integration in rural areas 
(Rijkers and  Söderbom, 2010). The availability of micro finance institutions (MFIs) in 
nearby locations has no significant effect on the entry decision of households. This may be 
because the importance of MFIs has been substituted by the existence of industrial clusters, 
which through specialization and division of labor can reduce the required capital to start a 
business, enabling households to use their capital endowment for investment without 
necessarily being credit constrained (Huang et al., 2008; Ruan and Zhang, 2009, Ali et al., 
2010). In a similar study in rural Ethiopia, Ali and Peerlings (2011a) also find that micro- 
enterprises are more likely to cluster further away from MFIs, possibly due to the 
substitutive role played by industrial clusters in easing the financial constraints of 
entrepreneurs. High rainfall variability, as is captured by absolute annual rainfall anomaly, 
increases the likelihood of starting a NFE. This is consistent with the findings of other 
studies in Africa where high rainfall variability pushes households to diversify beyond 
agriculture often as an ex-ante income smoothing strategy (see for example Rose, 2001, 
Haggblade et al., 2007).  
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Table 4.2 Marginal effects of probit regression for the probability of entry and exit into 
and   from a NFE.  
        Probability of entry  Probability  
of exit 
    II    III  IV 
Household head characteristics     
Male (d) -0.10 (0.02)*** -0.10 (0.02 *** -0.03 (0.01 ** 
Age -0.00 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) 
Schooling  0.01 (0.00)***  0.01(0.00) *** -0.00 (0.00) 
Immigrant (d) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 
 
Household labor and capital endowment    
Household size  0.01 (0.00)***                  
Household size age≤5    0.01 (0.01)  
Household size 6≤age≤ 15   0.01 (0.00) **  
Household size 15<age≤65   0.00 (0.01)  
Household size age> 65    0.02 (0.02)  
Roof iron sheet (d)                 0.03 (0.01)**  0.03 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.02) 
Share of non-agricultural income (%)  0.09 (0.02)***  0.09 (0.02)*** -0.03 (0.05) 
 
Enterprise specific factors    
Size of the enterprise (number of worker)   -0.06 (0.02)** 
Year since establishment   -0.00 (0.00) 
Cottage industry (d)   -0.25 (0.10)** 
Activity seasonal (d)                                      0.01(0.01) 
 
Concentration     
Concentration of micro enterprises  
in the same district 
 0.30 (0.09)***  0.30 (0.09)*** 
 
-0.02 (0.01)** 
 
Concentration of big manufacturing  
firms in the same zone 
 
 0.07 (0.03)**  0.07 (0.03)** 
 
 0.02 (0.03) 
Investment Climate    
Governance   0.02 (0.05)  0.02 (0.05)  0.04 (0.05) 
Safety   0.04 (0.03)  0.04 (0.02)  0.07 (0.03)** 
Distance to nearest all-weather road 
(hours) 
-0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.01) 
Distance to nearest MFI’s (hours) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
 
Exogenous Shocks    
Annual rainfall anomaly   0.003 (0.00)*** 
 
 0.003 (0.00)***  0.002 (0.00)* 
Others    
Rural Town (d)  0.10 (0.03)*** 
 
 0.10 (0.03)*** 
 
-0.05 (0.03)** 
No of observation 
Pseudo R2 
 2437 
 0.211 
 2437 
 0.212 
 353 
 0.271 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. (d) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Sectoral dummies for different production activities are included in the exit regression but are not reported here    because none of 
them are significant.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Marginal effects of the probit regression for the exit decision model are reported in Column 
IV of Table 4.2. Although female headed households are more likely to open a NFE as 
indicated in the entry decision model, they are more likely to exit their business. The lack 
of alternatives for many female entrepreneurs in rural parts of Africa often result in them 
being engaged in less profitable activities that require little training and skills (Loening and 
Mikael, 2009), which may have resulted in high exit rates. Using the same dataset on rural 
NFEs, Rijkers and Söderbom, (2010), also find that female owned enterprises have a lower 
value added per unit of labor than their male counterparts. 
 
Other household head characteristics, both in terms of demographic factors and 
endowments,23 do not play a significant role on the exit decision. Enterprise specific 
factors, on the other hand, are rather important where we find that large enterprises and 
those operating in their homes are less likely to exit. Similar evidences on enterprise size 
and location of operation are also found for micro enterprises operating in other African 
countries of Swaziland and Zimbabwe (McPherson, 1995).  
 
Enterprises operating in districts where there is clustering of other micro enterprises that 
produce similar and closely related goods have a lower probability of exit than those 
operating in isolation. Similarly, NFEs operating in rural towns are found to have a lower 
probability of exit, which may point to the importance of market linkages and external 
economies of scale in cities for the survival of micro enterprises. Using a similar data set, 
Rijkers and Söderbom, (2010) also find that enterprises located in rural towns have a higher 
value added per unit of labor than those located in remote rural areas. 
 
With respect to the different indicators of the investment climate, lack of safety in a 
community poses a threat for the survival of NFEs. The Enterprise Survey Data compiled 
by the World Bank on 125 different countries show that a relatively large proportion of 
small firms in Ethiopia (close to 12%) identify crime, theft and disorder as a major 
constraint for their business compared to 8% of large firms. In addition, the percentage of 
                                                   
23 Household size is not included in the exit regression because it is highly correlated with the size of the enterprise, which is 
measured by number of workers.  
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small firms in Ethiopia that pay for security is rather high; 54% compared to 49% for all the 
low income countries in the world. Although we lack further evidence about the real causes 
of conflict, criminality, theft and lawlessness in rural Amhara; the results of this study 
indicate that safety could be one of the bottlenecks in the region’s, if not necessarily the 
country’s, investment climate. However, this result should be interpreted with caution 
because the measures for safety are based on subjective responses from district level 
community leaders.  
 
Just as high rainfall variability triggers entry into NFEs, is it also found to increase the 
probability of exit. This may be due to a decline in local demand for non-farm products 
following high rainfall variability, which could influence farmers’ income negatively. Since 
the main customers of non-farm products in rural areas are farmers, (Rijkers and Söderbom, 
2010); the decline in local demand could result in closure of NFEs.  
 
 
4.5.2 Impact of Entry and Exit into and from Non-farm 
Enterprises on Household’s Well-being 
 
There are different matching methods to calculate the average treatment effects in the 
evaluation literature. The one used in this study is a kernel matching method, which 
associates the outcome of the treated household with the matched outcome that is given by 
the kernel-weighted average of all the non-treated households. Since the weighted average 
of all the non-treated households is used to construct the counterfactual outcome, kernel 
matching has an advantage of lower variance because more information is used (Heckman 
et al., 1998). A kernel function can take many forms. The matching results reported in 
Table 4.3 are using the Epanechinikov kernel functional form. 
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The results of the PSM are reported in Table 4.3. Households that have started a NFE have 
on average 2554.64 birr (290.96$)24 more annual income than those who have not opened a 
NFE. Similarly, opening a NFE results in a significant reduction of food shortage.  
 
A similar analysis for exit in Table 4.3 show that, households that have exited have on 
average 935.99 birr (106.61$) less annual household income than those who have not 
exited their business. With regard to other measures of well-being, however, we do not find 
a significant result.  
 
The results of the matching quality are reported in Table 4.4. Column I and II show the 
results of the chi-square test for the joint significance of covariates used in the probit model 
before and after the match using the three measures of well-being (Sianesi, 2004). The chi 
square test after the match for the entry decision model confirms that all the covariates in 
the probit model are not jointly significant with prob>χ2 = 0.46 for the matches performed 
on all the three measures of household well-being. Another measure used to confirm the 
quality of the match is the mean bias reduction after the match (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985). As reported in column V, the absolute bias reduction of the covariates after the 
match in the probit model of the entry decision lies way below the 20% level of bias 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For the exit decision model, the chi-square 
tests after the match in Column II indicate that the covariates of the probit model are not 
jointly significant with prob>χ2 = 0.88 for all the three measures of household’s well-being. 
The mean absolute bias reduction of covariates after the match is also below the suggested 
20%. The matching quality tests for the entry and exit models suggest that the matching 
procedures have performed well in terms of avoiding systematic difference in the 
distribution of pre-treatment observable covariates included in the PSM between treated 
and non-treated groups. 
 
 
                                                   
24 The  average exchange rate for the year 2006 was 1 $ = 8.78 Birr. 
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Table 4.3  Treatment Effects : Kernel Matching 
              
Note: the standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are computed after bootstrapping 50 times.  
 
Table 4.4  Indicators of matching quality before and after the match for the three 
measures of well-being using Kernel Matching  
         I  II III IV V 
 
Treatment  
p-valuea  
(unmatched) 
p-valuea  
(matched) 
Meanb absolute 
 bias 
(unmatched) 
Mean b absolute 
bias 
(matched) 
Absolute bias 
reduction 
Entry 0.00 0.46 44.29 8.87 79.97 
Exit  0.00 0.88 33.19 18.59 43.98 
a  p-value of likelihood ration test (Pr > 2) 
b absolute bias (in percentage) is calculated as the difference of sample mean of outcome variable of the 
  treated and non-treated groups times the square root of the average of the sample variance of outcome 
  variable of the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
 
 
To check if the above results of the match are robust to different kinds of matching 
methods, a sensitivity analysis is performed by using a different matching algorithm, a 
Radius Matching25. The results of the match are presented in Table 4.5 and 4.6. The 
findings confirm that the matching results are quite robust and are not sensitive to the 
different matching algorithms used.  
 
                                                   
25 In Radius Matching each treated unit is matched with the control unit whose propensity score lies within a specified    
neighborhood (radius).  
 
 
Treatment  
 
 
Outcome indicators 
 
 
  ATT 
         Treated        Controlled 
  On 
support 
 Off 
Support 
    On 
Support 
  Off 
support 
Entry Total household income   2554.64    
(520.54)*** 
290 -  2147 - 
 
Food shortage -0.09  
(0.04)** 
290 -  2147 - 
 
Able to raise money 
in case of emergency 
 0.04  
(0.03) 
290 -  2147 - 
 
Exit  
 
Total household income  
 
-935.99  
(472.11)** 
 
30 
 
1 
  
322 
 
- 
 
Food shortage  0.18  
(0.16) 
30 1  322 - 
 
Able to raise money  
in case of emergency 
-0.10  
(0.10) 
30 1  322 - 
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Table 4.5  Sensitivity of matching algorithms: Radius matching 
   Note: the standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are computed after bootstrapping 50 times. 
 
Table 4.6  Indicators of matching quality before and after the match for the three 
measures of well-being using Radius Matching. 
 
 
Treatment  
p-valuea  
(unmatched) 
p-valuea 
 (matched) 
Meanb absolute 
bias 
(unmatched) 
Mean b 
absolute bias 
(matched) 
Absolute 
bias 
reduction 
Entry 0.000 0.11 44.29 12.12 72.63 
Exit  0.000 0.56 33.18 22.89 31.01 
a  p-value of likelihood ration test (Pr > 2) 
b absolute bias (in percentage) is calculated as the difference of sample mean of outcome  
  variable of the treated and non-treated groups times the square root of the average of the   sample variance of outcome variable of 
   the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
 
 
Although the above results of the PSM indicate that biases that may arise from observables 
are controlled for, it might be difficult to infer a causal relationship between diversification 
and well-being as there could still be some unobservable factors that exert certain effects 
both on NFE participation and household’s well-being. For example, it is possible that both 
well-being and NFE participation is driven by another external force such as “migration 
patterns and technological change in agriculture” (Lanjouw, 2007, pp 56). In addition, farm 
and non-farm earnings can reinforce each other, which could then influence household’s 
 
 
Treatment  
 
 
Outcome indicators 
 
 
  ATT 
         Treated        Control  
  On 
support 
    Off 
Support 
    On 
support 
  Off 
support 
 
Entry Total household income  2717.14  
(558.78)*** 
290 -  2147 - 
Food shortage -0.10  
(0.04)** 
290 -  2147 - 
Able to raise money 
in case of emergency 
 0.04  
(0.03) 
290 -  2147 - 
 
Exit  
 
Total household income  
 
-946.12  
(440.01)** 
 
30 
 
1 
  
322 
 
- 
Food shortage 0.19  
(0.14) 
30 1  322 - 
Able to raise money  
in case of emergency 
-0.09  
(0.09) 
30 1  322 - 
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well-being through indirect channels such as tightening of the agricultural labor market or 
raising demand for agricultural products, etc. (Janvry, 1994; Loening and Mikael, 2009). 
 
4.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
 
Agricultural income of households, which is part of the total household income used as one 
of the well-being indicators in this study is based on mainly marketed agricultural products. 
There could also be non-marketed agricultural products that households can use for own 
consumption. Total household income should therefore include the imputed values of non-
marketed agricultural products. Failure to do so can understate total household income, 
especially for those households who have not opened NFEs and rely on agricultural income 
as their main income source.  
 
In the RICS we do not have separate information on non-marketed agricultural products 
and their values. Therefore, we cannot directly correct for non-marketed agricultural 
products in our measure of total household income. Instead, we have information on values 
of food items that have been consumed by each household. These food items can either be 
produced by the household or purchased from the market. Based on this information, we 
perform a sensitivity analysis where we investigate the impact of entry and exit decisions 
on the value of food items consumed by each household in the past 12 months of the time 
of the survey. Food items cover the largest share of total household expenditure in rural 
households in SSA and most of the non-marketed agricultural products are used for 
consumption purposes (Delgado et al., 1998). The sensitivity analysis on values of food 
items will therefore allow us to capture the effect on household income that is not affected 
by the exclusion of non-marketed agricultural products. The results of the PSM are 
presented in Table 4.7 and 4.8. We find a significant increase and decrease of the value of 
food items consumed due to entry and exit respectively.  
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Table 4.7  Treatment effects using values of food items consumed as an outcome 
variable:   Kernel Matching 
   Note: the standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are computed after bootstrapping 50 times. 
 
Table 4.8  Indicators of matching quality before and after the match using values of 
food items consumed as an outcome variable: Kernel Matching  
         I  II III IV V 
 
 
Treatment  
p-valuea  
(unmatched) 
p-valuea  
(matched) 
Meanb  
absolute  
bias 
(unmatched) 
Meanb  
absolute  
bias 
(matched) 
Absolute  
bias  
reduction 
Entry 0.00 0.46 44.28 8.86 79.80 
Exit  0.00 0.88 33.18 18.59 43.97 
a  p-value of likelihood ration test (Pr > 2) 
b absolute bias (in percentage) is calculated as the difference of sample mean of outcome variable of the 
  treated and non-treated groups times the square root of the average of the sample variance of outcome 
  variable of the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
 
 
4.6 Conclusions and Discussion  
 
This paper examines how clustering affects the entry and exit decisions of farm households 
into and from NFEs in rural Ethiopia. It is found that the existence of clusters of micro 
enterprises operating in the same district increases the likelihood of farm households to 
start a NFE. Similarly, clustering of big manufacturing firms in the same zone is found to 
increase the likelihood that farm households start a NFE, although its effect is less than that 
of clustering of micro enterprises. This may imply that specialization and external 
economies of scale arising from clustering of micro enterprises are more important for 
households’ entry decisions than those arising from big firms. NFEs operating in clusters 
are also found to have a lower probability of exit than those operating outside of clusters. 
 
 
Treatment  
 
Outcome  
indicators 
 
 
  ATT 
         Treated       Control  
  On 
support 
 Off 
support 
   On 
support 
  Off 
support 
Entry Total value of food 
 items consumed  
301.52  
(125.14)** 
290 -  2147     - 
 
Exit  
 
Total value of food  
items consumed  
 
-630.81 
(233.28)*** 
 
30 
 
1 
 
 322 
 
    - 
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The study further investigates the impact of entry and exit into and from NFEs on 
household’s well-being by using total household income, the food security status of a 
household and its ability to raise enough money in case of an emergency, as indicators. 
Using propensity score matching to account for selection bias on observables, it is found 
that, entry into NFEs significantly increases household income and their food security 
status. Exit from NFEs, on the other hand, is found to significantly reduce households’ 
income. The results of the PSM are also found to be robust for different matching 
algorithms used.  
 
The findings of this study indicate that the growing interest of policy makers to promote 
NFEs in rural areas of Africa should take into account the importance of industrial clusters 
that could help to reduce the various transaction costs that entrepreneurs may face both 
when establishing and expanding their businesses. While the constraints faced by rural 
NFEs in Africa are heterogeneous, lack of market integration remains to be the most 
important one (Loening and Mikael, 2009). The results of this study show that clustering 
could be one way where market integrations can be enhanced by helping increase 
competition and smoothing out market failures such as in credit markets. Policies seeking 
to address poverty in Africa should also consider the potential contributions of rural NFEs 
on households’ well-being. Although we find that participating in NFEs and well-being are 
positively correlated, we are unable to disentangle the causality, and hence cannot conclude 
that rural NFEs necessarily lift the poor out of poverty.  
 
A caveat of this study is the lack of panel data, which restricts the possibility of looking at 
the dynamic impact of clustering on starting-up businesses. Furthermore, the lack of 
detailed data on other regions of Ethiopia has made the analysis to focus mainly on 
Amhara, which has a relatively lower NFE participation rate. Lack of location specific 
information on trade and service sectors has also limited the study to only the 
manufacturing sector. Despite these shortcomings, the results of this study show the role of 
clustering as one way of enhancing rural development by fostering entrepreneurship. 
  
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Ethnic Ties in Trade Relationships and the 
Impact on Economic Performance: The 
Case of Small-Scale Producers in the 
Handloom Sector in Ethiopia 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the importance of ethnic ties in trade relationships of small-
scale producers in the handloom sector in Ethiopia using both a non-parametric and a 
parametric statistical method. It is shown how various socio-economic characteristics of 
producers lead to ethnic ties with traders. It is also shown that ethnic ties affect the 
performance of producers negatively. Apparently the positive effect of ethnic ties, through 
the reduction of transaction costs arising from market imperfections, does not outweigh the 
negative effect of closed social networks.  
Keywords: ethnic ties, trade, transaction cost, small-scale producers, Ethiopia. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 Paper by Merima Ali and Jack Peerlings, Journal of Development Studies (2011), 47(8): 1241-1260. 
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5.1 Introduction  
 
In the presence of transaction costs associated with market imperfections and in the absence 
of an effective legal system, trade relationships of small-scale producers in developing 
countries are often based on trust that in turn is based on local group cohesion and common 
identity such as ethnic ties (Annen, 2001; Fafchamps, 2002; Bowles and Gintis, 2004). 
Such bonding social capital manifested through ascribed trust to members of one’s own 
ethnic group helps to reduce the costs of producers in searching and reaching traders, and 
facilitates contractual enforcement due to the availability of low-cost information about 
one’s trading partner (Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Knorringa 
and van Staveren, 2006). Ethnic ties can also help traders to screen potential business 
partners and grant credit for producers, especially in the initial phase of their business 
(Fafchamps, 2000; Fisman, 2001). 
 
In addition to reducing transaction costs, ethnic ties may also play an important role in 
providing social protection. Social networks based on a common identity may give a sense 
of security to vulnerable producers who tie themselves to traders that offer short-term 
stability through a ‘patron-client’ relationship (Wood, 2003). This kind of relationship 
might prevail on survival-oriented and risk-averse producers with limited alternatives other 
than subordinate transaction with traders. 
 
While ethnic homogeneity can positively impact business outcomes by reducing transaction 
costs, and is important for survival and access to various resources, it may also hinder 
economic performance by limiting access to a wider range of business-related ideas and 
constrain the ability of producers to respond to ‘exogenous developments’ (Nadvi, 1999; 
Annen, 2001; Annen, 2003; Knorringa and van Staveren, 2006; Nooteboom, 2007). 
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Furthermore, an exclusive social network can restrict the business relationship to only a few 
agents, who can change the power structure and easily manipulate the exchange process 
depending on their control over ‘power resources’ such as information about prices, 
markets, capital and credit (Nadvi, 1999; Lyon, 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). In 
general, inward-looking social networks can ‘insidiously turn from ties that bind to ties that 
blind’ (Grabher, 1993: 24).  
 
Using a rich dataset of small-scale handloom producers operating in clusters in Ethiopia, 
the purpose of this study is to identify socio-economic factors that determine ethnic ties in 
contacts between producers and traders. In addition, it analyzes whether ethnic ties 
positively or negatively affect the performance of producers, in other words whether the 
benefits of ethnic ties are higher or lower than the costs of having closed social networks.  
 
By unraveling various factors leading to ethnic ties in trade relationships and analyzing the 
effect on economic performance, this study adds to the growing literature that is exploring 
the role and impact of social networks on small-scale producers in developing countries 
(Moore, 1997; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Nadvi, 1999; Schmitz, 1999; Lyon, 2000; 
Nooteboom, 2007). 
 
In Ethiopia, where there are more than eighty languages and as many ethno-linguistic 
groups, ethnic ties play an important role both in the day-to-day lives of people and in trade 
relationships. This may particularly be true for the handloom sector, which is characterized 
by naturally emerged clusters that are dominated by certain ethnic groups with their own 
language and distinct cultural and social norms. Based on the cultural background of 
weavers, handloom products also have specific designs distinct to each ethnic group. 
 
Although the sector supports the lives of more than 220,000 people (CSAE, 2003), 
enterprises are often small in size and most operate in their dwellings using family labor. 
Those operating in their dwellings are more likely to be isolated from outside markets with 
limited information about prices and the organization of the market. Given this situation, 
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they have to rely more on localized group cohesion originating, for example, from ethnic 
ties as a buffer for market imperfections. In addition, enterprises in the sector face financial 
constraints both when starting up their business and during operation (CSAE, 2003). This 
has led a large proportion of producers to rely on informal sources of finance such as 
borrowing from friends and relatives and trade credit (Ayele et al., 2009). Most traders in 
the sector used to be weavers themselves and often have their close relatives working in the 
sector, which might further strengthen the social bond and personalized trust between 
producers and traders. In general, handloom clusters in Ethiopia are not only business 
agglomerations but also socio-cultural entities where people interact on a personal basis, 
which could also be reflected in trade relationships.  
 
Such strong social bonds may positively impact business outcomes of handloom producers 
through, for example, easing credit constraints both when starting up a business and during 
operation and provision of business related information. Trade credit between producers 
and traders is found to be widespread in handloom clusters in Ethiopia and help to ease 
working capital constraints (Ayele et al., 2009). Furthermore, traders in handloom clusters 
are found to be the main source of information about prices and new techniques of 
production (Ayele et al., 2009). However, trade relationships based on ethnic ties may also 
impact the performance of producers negatively either through limited flows of new 
business related ideas or manipulative power structure on the side of traders who can take 
advantage of  their control over market information.  
 
In this study, we find that recent immigrants and less experienced producers are more likely 
to be ethnically tied. Ethnic ties are also found to be important for producers operating in 
remote areas. On the other hand, producers with a wide network of business-related 
contacts with different traders such as those operating in producers’ cooperatives are less 
likely to be ethnically tied. Ethnic ties in credit provision are also found to lock producers 
into trade relationships. The impact of ethnic ties on economic performance of producers 
further reveals that ethnic ties result in lower profits. And the loss in profit due to ethnic ties 
is found to be higher for immigrant producers.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief review of 
the data while section 5.3 presents the empirical model. Section 5.4 describes the results 
and the conclusions are outlined in section 5.5. 
 
5.2 Data 
 
5.2.1 Data Collection 
 
The study uses data collected on handloom producers by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration with the Ethiopian Development Research 
Institute (EDRI) from March until May 2008. The survey covered 486 handloom producers 
in nine clusters, three of which are found in the capital city, Addis Ababa, and the rest in 
the Gamo zone in the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) region. These 
two regions have been selected because of their large concentration of handloom 
establishments in proportion to other manufacturing activities (Ayele et al., 2009). Sample 
units were selected based on the proportion of the handloom establishments in the different 
clusters (Ayele et al., 2009). Of the total handloom producers covered in the survey, 40 
percent are from urban areas and 60 percent from rural areas. In the survey, producer-
specific information like education level, gender and experience are included. These are 
supplemented by information regarding horizontal and vertical networks through 
cooperation among producers and between producers and traders respectively. Detailed 
information regarding the ethnicity of producers and traders and the number of traders with 
which producers have regular contact, and for how many years, is also included. 
Furthermore, information regarding whether a producer is an immigrant or not and when a 
producer has migrated to a cluster are included. After discarding observations including 
incomplete and inconsistent information, this study uses data from 473 handloom 
producers.  
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5.2.2 A Characterization of Handloom Producers 
 
This section provides a brief discussion about producers and their ethnic ties with traders 
based on the surveyed data. In this paper we define the level of ethnic tie as the proportion 
of traders that are of the same ethnic group as the producer. This is calculated by dividing 
the number of traders that are of the same ethnic group as the producer by the total number 
of traders regularly contacted by the producer in the past 12 months of the time of the 
survey. From this, we classify a producer as being ethnically tied if more than half of the 
traders that he/she has transacted with on a regular basis are of the same ethnic group as the 
producer. Otherwise, they are classified as non-ethnically tied. Among the 473 producers, 
69.3 percent are ethnically tied and the remaining 30.7 percent are not ethnically tied. 
 
Producers in the survey belong to five ethnic groups. The majority of producers (79.3%) 
belong to the Gamo ethnic group followed by the Amhara ethnic group (18.0%), (Table 
5.1). Compared to other ethnic groups in Ethiopia, weaving is a predominantly common 
practice in these two ethnic groups and is a tradition where the distinct designs and 
knowledge of weaving have been passed from generation to generation. Among the Gamo 
ethnic group, 79.2 percent of the weavers are ethnically tied compared with 32.9 percent in 
the case of the Amharas. The majority of the Oromos and Gurages included in the survey 
are not ethnically tied with traders (Table 5.1).  
 
Of the 473 surveyed handloom producers, 217 are immigrants from other towns and 
regions (Table 5.1). Among the immigrant producers, 57.1 percent are ethnically tied, 
(Table 5.1). A large proportion, 79.7 percent, of the non-immigrant producers are also 
ethnically tied, which might be because almost 60 percent of producers in the survey 
operate in rural areas while the majority of migration occurs in the direction of urban 
clusters. 
 
There are various marketing channels used by producers to sell their output to traders. 
Producers were asked to state the first most important marketing channel they use to sell 
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their products. 83.5 percent of producers responded that they sell their products in open 
markets where they transact with mobile traders who usually travel to the marketplace on 
certain days of a week to collect finished products in bulk from various producers (Table 
5.1). This marketing mechanism is common in rural markets where traders travel from 
Addis Ababa and other urban towns and collect products which they then channel to 
consumers in towns like Addis Ababa (Ayele et al., 2009). These urban traders were mostly 
born and raised in rural areas and have strong social networks and family ties that can 
enhance trust-based transactions. Of the 395 producers selling their output to traders in the 
open market, 73.9 percent are ethnically tied (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Producers’ characteristics  
  
Total 
Ethnically tied 
producers 
Non-ethnically  
tied producers 
  
Freq. 
 
% 
 
Freq. 
 
% 
 
Freq. 
 
% 
Ethnic Groups 
Oromo 8 1.69 1 12.50 7 87.50 
Gurage 3 0.63 1 33.33 2 66.67 
Amhara 85 17.97 28 32.94 57 67.06 
Gamo 375 79.28 297 79.20 78 20.80 
Others 2 0.42 1 50.00 1 50.00 
Migration status 
Immigrant 217 45.88 124 57.14 93 42.86 
Non-immigrant 256 54.12 204 79.69 52 20.31 
Marketing channel 
Open market 395 83.51 292 73.92 103 26.08 
Contractual-based transaction 37 7.82 20 54.05 17 45.95 
Street stand shops 24 5.07 9 37.50 15 62.50 
‘door-to-door’ traders 17 3.59 7 41.18 10 58.82 
Receiving trade credit from traders 
Yes 197 41.65 146 74.11 51 25.89 
No 276 58.35 182 65.94 94 34.06 
 
Selling on a contractual basis is another form of marketing channel. 7.8 percent of the 
producers sell their output to traders that act as intermediaries for ordering companies, 
usually exporters (Table 5.1). Since traders act as an important agent in linking producers 
with contracting companies, the business of producers may depend on the kind of networks 
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they have with traders. According to the survey, almost 54.1 percent of those selling on a 
contractual basis are ethnically tied.  
 
8.7 percent of producers sell to traders operating in street-stand shops and ‘door-to-door’ 
traders that tour enterprises to collect products (Table 5.1).  
 
When we look at the credit relationship between producers and traders, about 41.7 percent 
of producers have received credit from traders in the past 12 months of the time of the 
survey (Table 5.1). Credit provision by traders is bound to several conditions; previous 
successful business with a trader and being a relative of a trader are the major ones 
according to the survey. Among producers who have received trade credit, 74.1 percent are 
ethnically tied (Table 5.1). 
 
5.3 Empirical Model and Estimation 
 
5.3.1 Effects of Ethnic Ties on Profitability of Producers 
 
In order to capture the effect of ethnic ties on the economic performance of handloom 
producers, we use profit26 as an indicator of performance and compare the average monthly 
profit of ethnically tied and non-ethnically tied producers. However, simply comparing the 
profit of ethnically tied and non-ethnically tied producers may result in selection bias since 
transacting with traders is not a random process. This means that producers with certain 
socio-economic characteristics might self-select themselves to transact with a member of 
their own ethnic group. These socio-economic characteristics in turn can affect the 
profitability of producers. 
 
                                                   
26 Profit is defined as value of production minus value of raw materials, operational costs and wage and salaries for paid 
apprentices,  seasonal and temporary workers and paid permanent workers. Opportunity cost of family labor is not included 
because family labor is assumed to be a fixed input in the short run.  
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To take into account the bias that can arise from self-selection of producers in transacting 
with traders from the same ethnic group, we match producers that share the same socio-
economic characteristics with the exception of being ethnically tied or not. For this we use 
a non-parametric statistical method known as propensity score matching (PSM) (Heckman 
et al., 1997). 
 
The main pillars of PSM are individuals (handloom producers), the treatment (being 
ethnically tied) and potential outcome of the treatment (profit). Unlike parametric 
techniques such as OLS, PSM requires no assumption about the functional form between 
outcomes and covariates. Parametric techniques requiring a functional form may result in 
biased estimates if the covariate distribution differs substantially between treated and non-
treated groups (Eren, 2007). Unlike OLS, PSM also eliminates outliers and helps to achieve 
a more precise estimation of the treatment effect (Sianesi, 2004). In addition, PSM allows a 
comparison of the treatment effect before and after the bias that arises from self-selection 
has been controlled for. However, PSM is only concerned with calculating the treatment 
effect, and thus omits any information about how other factors might also affect the 
outcome. OLS, on the other hand, gives additional insight into the effect of covariates other 
than the treatment. Hence we also estimate the effect of ethnic ties on the profitability of 
producers by using OLS, and we compare the results with PSM accordingly. 
 
Propensity score matching 
 
Let ܦ௝߳	(1,0)	be an indicator of whether producer ݆ is ethnically tied or not. The potential 
outcome of ethnic ties is the monthly profit for producer ݆, which is defined as ߨ௝(ܦ௝). The 
effect of ethnic ties on individual producer ݆  can then be written as:  
 
௝ܶ = ߨ௝(1) − ߨ௝(0) (1) 
 
With this specification, however, one cannot observe the counterfactual, that is, the 
profitability of producer ݆ had he/she not been ethnically tied with traders. To deal with this 
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problem, other producers that share similar observable characteristics, but who are not 
ethnically tied with traders, will be identified and the average effect on monthly profit, 
instead of the individual effect, will be computed.  
 
Although there are different ways to estimate the average treatment effect, the one that has 
received most attention in the evaluation literature is the average treatment effect on the 
treated, which is defined as:  
 
ܣܶܶ = ܧ(ܶ⎸ܦ = 1) = ܧ[ߨ(1)⎸ܦ = 1] −ܧ[ߨ(0)⎸ܦ = 1] (2) 
 
where ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated and ܧ[ߨ(1)⎸ܦ = 1] is the 
expected outcome for those producers actually selling to traders of their own ethnic group 
or that received a treatment, and ܧ[ߨ(0)⎸ܦ = 1] is the counterfactual for the treated, which 
estimates what the outcome would be if those producers that are in fact selling to traders of 
their own ethnic group do not do so. Since the counterfactual cannot be observed, it should 
be constructed using producers that do not sell to traders of their own ethnic group but 
share similar observable characteristics, except for being ethnically tied.  
 
An important assumption of this method is the conditional independence assumption (CIA) 
which states that the set of observable characteristics that are included in the matching 
should determine both the probability of being ethnically tied and the outcome of interest 
(profit); that is  (ߨ଴,ߨଵ)⏊ܦ⎸ݒ, denoting the statistical independence of (ߨ଴,ߨଵ) conditional 
on observable characteristics, ݒ (Heckman et al., 1997).  
 
If all the variables influencing both the probability of being ethnically tied and profitably of 
producers are not incorporated, then CIA is violated since the impact of ethnic ties will be 
accounted for by information that is not included in the estimation of the predicted 
probabilities (propensity scores) (Smith and Todd, 2005).  
 
Given that the CIA holds, the PSM estimate for ATT can be written as:  
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ܣܶ ௉ܶௌெ = ܧ௉(௩)⎸஽ୀଵ){ܧ[ߨ(1)⎸ܦ = 1,ܲ(ݒ)] −ܧ[ߨ(0)⎸ܦ = 1,ܲ(ݒ)]} (3) 
 
where ܲ(ݒ) is the probability of being ethnically tied based on observable socio-economic 
characteristics, ݒ. 
 
Once the propensity scores are generated using a probit regression, a producer that is not 
ethnically tied with traders but is ‘closest’ in terms of propensity score has to be selected as 
a match. This is done using the Kernel matching method that associates the outcome of an 
ethnically tied producer ݆ with the matched outcome that is given by a kernel-weighted 
average of all the non-ethnically tied producers. Since the weighted averages of all 
producers that are not ethnically tied are used to construct the counterfactual outcome, 
kernel matching has an advantage of lower variance since more information is used 
(Heckman et al., 1998). The weight given to non-ethnically tied  producer i  is in proportion 
to the closeness between  i and the ethnically ties producer j. 
  
In order to eliminate outliers that have very high and very low propensity scores, the 
matching is restricted to the area of Common Support in the sample, which is defined by 
dropping the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the control 
observation is the lowest (Sianesi; 2004). To be effective, matching should balance 
observable explanatory variables across ethnically tied and non-ethnically tied producers. 
For this, a balancing test is performed after the match. This test is primarily concerned with 
the extent to which the difference in the observable characteristics between ethnically tied 
and non-ethnically tied producers has been eliminated.  
 
OLS regression  
 
We estimate the following OLS regression to look at the impact of ethnic ties on the 
profitability of producers. 
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݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ = 	 ߙ଴ + ߙଵܧݐℎ݊݅ܿܶ݅݁ + ∑ ߙ௜௡௜ୀଶ ݔ௜ + ߝ,  (4) 
 
where the dependent variable is the monthly profit of producers, ܧݐℎ݊݅ܿܶ݅݁ is a dummy 
that has a value of 1 if more than half of the traders that a producer has transacted with on a 
regular basis are of the same ethnic group as the producer, and 0 otherwise; ߙ଴ is a 
constant,	ߙ௜ 	are unknown parameters to be estimated; ݔ௜ are control variables that affect the 
profitability of a producer besides ethnic ties; and ߝ is a random term. 
 
5.3.2 Variables and Hypothesis  
 
In order to capture the impact of ethnic ties on the performance of producers using PSM, 
observable factors affecting both the probability of receiving a treatment (being ethnically 
tied) and the outcome of the treatment (profitability) should be controlled for. Following 
the arguments in section 5.3.1, we estimate the following probit model, which is used to 
generate propensity scores to match producers. 
 
ܧݐℎ݊݅ܿܶ݅݁ = ∑ ߙ௜ݔ௜௡௜ୀଵ + ߝ (5) 
 
where ܧݐℎ݊݅ܿܶ݅݁ is a dummy that has a value of 1 if more than half of the traders that a 
producer has transacted with on a regular basis are of the same ethnic group as the 
producer, and 0 otherwise	ߙ௜	are unknown parameters to be estimated; ݔ௜ are explanatory 
variables; and ߝ is a random term. 
 
The explanatory variables included in the model are various socio-economic characteristics 
of producers. We include variables like experience that is measured as number of years in 
which the owner has been in the handloom business and a dummy that captures whether the 
producer has migrated from another region to join a cluster or not. We would expect ethnic 
ties to be more important for less experienced and immigrant producers. Among immigrant 
producers, we also want to investigate if there is a difference in the importance of ethnic 
ties between recent and earlier immigrants. For this, we estimate another model for 
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immigrant producers only by using a variable that captures the number of years since the 
producer migrated to a cluster. We would expect ethnic ties to be more important for recent 
immigrants and to diminish in importance for earlier immigrants that might have started to 
earn trust through long-term business relationships. 
 
Ethnic ties become important during trade relationships in the provision of credit. Ethnicity 
and family linkages can help traders to screen potential business partners and provide 
capital to producers, especially in the initial phase of their business (Fafchamps, 2000; 
Fisman, 2001). Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a common phenomenon in 
handloom clusters in Ethiopia, where the more successful traders act as guardians to bring 
their kin members and close relatives from rural areas to work in rural towns and big cities. 
Not only do these traders provide the newcomers with a place to stay, but they also grant 
them capital to start their own businesses on the condition that they will pay them back. 
This condition may oblige handloom producers to continue to trade with their own ethnic 
group who are not only business partners but also close relatives. But once producers have 
established more contacts, the credit tie may diminish and family and ethnic linkages may 
lose their importance. Because we do not have separate information on the amount of 
starting capital borrowed from traders, we use the total percentage of starting capital 
borrowed from relatives of handloom producers as a proxy. We expect producers with a 
large share of starting capital borrowed from relatives to be ethnically tied. 
 
Related to this, we include the value of machinery and equipment as an explanatory 
variable. On the one hand, if ethnicity and family linkages are important in the provision of 
credit, especially at the start of the business, producers may have used the trust developed 
through ethnic networks to borrow more money and invest it in machinery and equipment. 
Given that there could be a credit tie, these producers might continue to transact with 
traders of their own ethnic group. On the other hand, those with more machinery and 
equipment might be producers that already had better alternatives for obtaining credit from 
other sources such as formal banks or they may even have raised the money from their own 
savings, which may diminish the importance of ethnic ties.  
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The wealth of a producer might also be another factor in determining whether he/she 
attaches more importance to ethnic ties or not. We would expect wealthier producers to 
have better alternatives than poorer producers when it comes to choosing with whom to 
trade. For example, wealthier producers may have enough collateral for borrowing money 
for their business and they can easily go to formal banks instead of relying on ethnic ties. In 
addition, wealthier producers could invest more in their business and take more risky 
business decisions that would allow them to have wider networks with various traders. On 
the other hand, poorer producers might choose ethnic ties as a survival strategy that would 
help them manage risks by securing small but less variant income (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1990; Wood, 2003). As an indication of wealth, we use a dummy that captures whether a 
producer owns a workshop (building) or not.  
 
Besides economic gains when trading with one’s own ethnic group, there is also a social 
component present where producers might simply inherit the business networks of their 
parents. To capture this effect, we use a dummy if producers are of the second generation or 
not, in other words whether their parents were in the handloom business before them or not. 
We would expect second-generation producers to have relatively better information about 
the business in general and markets in particular as they could have shared the experience 
of their parents. Hence, second-generation producers might be less likely to be ethnically 
tied. 
 
In addition to social and economic factors, the size of the enterprise might be important in 
determining whether a producer attaches great importance to ethnic ties or not. The smaller 
the enterprise, the smaller the network that the producer might have, and hence, the more 
likely to sell his/her products to the few traders that the producer is familiar with through 
ethnic ties. The larger the enterprise, however, the more likely it is that the producer has 
already established a wide and intensive network with various traders, diminishing the 
importance of ethnic ties. We use the number of people who are actively working in the 
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enterprise as an indicator of size, and we expect smaller enterprises to be more likely to be 
ethnically tied.  
Another variable used in the probit regression is a dummy that captures whether a producer 
is a member of a producers’ cooperative or not. We would expect producers that are 
members of a cooperative to have a large network with traders and to have better 
bargaining power, thereby diminishing the importance of ethnic ties.  
 
Since producers from the Gamo ethnic group are a majority in our survey, it is more likely 
for Gamos to be ethnically tied than producers from other ethnic groups. For this we use a 
dummy that captures whether a producer belongs to the ethnic majority, Gamo, or not. In 
addition, we also include dummies for the various marketing channels used by producers. 
We would expect producers transacting with traders in open markets to be more ethnically 
tied than producers using other marketing channels since open markets are more common 
in rural and remote areas (Ayele et al., 2009), thus increasing the importance of trust-based 
transactions with mobile traders.  
 
Instead of using a dummy for urban and rural areas in order to capture regional variation, 
we use a dummy that depicts the infrastructural facilities available in the various clusters. 
This is because there is a strong correlation between the regional dummy and the dummy 
for being a member of a producers’ cooperative since most producers operating in 
cooperatives are found in the capital city, Addis Ababa. As an indicator of infrastructural 
facility, we use a dummy that indicates whether there is access to electricity or not. There is 
a strong correlation between the infrastructural dummy and the regional dummy; hence we 
believe that the infrastructural dummy is a good proxy to capture regional variation. 
Gender, schooling and age of the producer are also used as control variables.  
 
A shortcoming of PSM is that it only eliminates biases arising from observable variables 
and it does not control for possible biases that may arise from unobservables, which can 
simultaneously affect the assignment to treatment and the outcome variable (violation of 
conditional independence assumption). For example, ethnically tied producers may be less 
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talented than non-ethnically tied producers, which in turn can affect their profitability. 
There may also be certain cultural beliefs specific to certain ethnic groups that can promote 
for example capital accumulation through ‘self-denial’ (Moor, 1997). Such beliefs may 
affect the kind of relationships that producers choose in trade exchanges, which in turn 
affect their success and profitability. Producers might also be risk-averse as in the case of 
survival-oriented firms that may rely more on ethnic ties and less upon transactions with 
‘intimate others’ (Wood, 2003). This kind of producer may forgo long-term growth and 
profitability for short-term security by committing to ‘patron-client relationships’ (ibid). In 
this research we do not have a good measure of risk aversion although wealth of producers, 
measured in this research by ownership of the workshop, might give some indication. Due 
to a lack of valid instruments, we could not check if such biases from unobservables exist 
and thus were unable to control for them.  
 
5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1    Determinants of Importance of Ethnic Ties in Trade 
            Relationships  
 
Table 5.2 shows the marginal effects of two probit regression models; one for all producers 
in the survey and the second for immigrant producers only. In the model estimated for 
immigrant producers, there is high correlation between the variables, experience and year 
since immigration. This is to be expected, since most producers could have migrated to start 
a business. To avoid multicolliniarity, the variable ‘experience’ is discarded in the second 
model. In addition, the dummies for access to electricity and owning a workshop/building 
are discarded in the second model because these variables perfectly predicted the binary 
dependent variable, ethnic ties.  
 
Less experienced producers are more likely to be ethnically tied in the first model, 
indicating the importance of ethnic linkages in the provision of information at the start of a 
business. A similar finding was seen in the surgical instrument cluster in Pakistan, where 
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ethnic ties and family relationships are important for providing information and a material 
basis at the start of the business (Nadiv, 1999).  
In contrast to what is expected, immigrants in general are less likely to be ethnically tied. 
This could be because those who chose to migrate are already the more ‘able’ part of the 
society with wider ambitions and endurance than non-immigrants (Moore, 1997), probably 
with less preference for ethnic ties. However, in the second model estimated for immigrant 
producers only, ethnic ties are found to play an important role for recent immigrants, and 
diminish in importance for earlier immigrants. 
 
In both models, producers with a large percentage of starting capital borrowed from 
relatives are more likely to be ethnically tied, which might be due to credit ties where 
producers who cannot pay back are forced to continue to trade with those who have 
provided them with credit. Such credit ties might result in power asymmetry, where the 
trade relationship that was once based on ascribed trust will shift to an unequal interaction, 
with the powerful party having more say in the exchange (Lyon, 2000). This is consistent 
with the finding that producers possessing a larger value in machinery and equipment are 
more likely to be ethnically tied. This could be because producers who have once used the 
trust developed through ethnic networks to borrow more money and invest it in their 
businesses are now tied in trade relationships due to credit ties. 
 
As expected, those working under cooperatives are less likely to be ethnically tied in both 
models, possibly due to information and networking facilities generated while working 
through cooperatives that might diminish the importance of ethnic ties. On the other hand, 
producers operating in areas where there is no access to electricity are more likely to be 
ethnically tied. This could be an indication of the remoteness of the cluster so that ethnic 
ties with traders may become important in reducing risks that are associated with 
marketing, and facilitate trust in long-distance trades (Ali and Peerlings, 2011a). 
 
Producers that belong to the majority ethnic group (Gamo) are more likely to be ethnically 
tied than minority ethnic groups like Amharas, Gurages and Oroms. In addition, those 
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producers selling their product in the open markets are more likely to be ethnically tied as 
expected. In the first model, those transacting on a contractual basis are also more likely to 
be ethnically tied, although the probability is much lower compared to those selling in open 
markets. 
 
Table 5.2 Marginal effects¤ from probit regression (standard errors are given in 
parentheses). 
                     Marginal effects 
Variables Whole sample Immigrants only 
Maled  0.03 (0.19)         -0.25 (0.22)         
Age   0.01 (0.01)         0.01 (0.02)          
Age squared -0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
Schooling  0.00 (0.00)          -0.00 (0.01)       
Experience -0.01 (0.00)***                 -- 
Second generationd  -0.07  (0.05)        -0.01 (0.08)      
Immigrantd  -0.11 (0.05)**                  -- 
Year since immigrated          -- -0.01 (0.00)**       
Ethnic majorityd   0.33 (0.08)***         0.43 (0.09)***         
Member of producers’  
cooperatived  
-0.29 (0.08)***        -0.35 (0.11)***      
Starting capital borrowed 
from relatives (%) 
 0.001 (0.00)***      0.001 (0.00)*         
Open marketd   0.18 (0.09)*        0.35 (0.13)***       
Contractd   0.12 (0.07)*          0.21 (0.13)         
Number of persons 
working in the enterprise 
 0.01 (0.02)       0.01 (0.03)          
Current value of 
machinery and equipment 
 0.01 (0.00)**       0.01 (0.01)***         
Ownership of workshopd  -0.12 (0.18)                 -- 
Access to electricityd -0.21 (0.05)***               -- 
Number of observations  473  217 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R2           0.29  0.30 
  Notes: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. d stands for dummy variable. 
  ¤ Marginal effects are estimated at the sample mean except for the dummy variables.  
 
 
 
In contrast to what was expected, being a second-generation producer, the size of the 
enterprise, and the wealth of a producer do not explain being ethnically tied. 
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5.4.2 Effect of Ethnic Ties on Performance of Producers 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
Using the same explanatory variables as in the probit regression, a propensity score 
matching is done between ethnically tied and non-ethnically tied producers using kernel 
matching27 in order to check whether ethnic ties have a positive or negative impact on 
performance of producers. The results of the match are presented in Table 5.3 both for the 
whole sample and immigrant producers only.  
 
The figures presented in Table 5.3 are based on the matching results made on the logarithm 
of profit, but are converted back into levels in order to make the results easier to interpret. 
Logarithm of profit is used in PSM in order to be consistent with the OLS regression. The 
reasons for the use of the log linear specification in the OLS regression are given in 
footnote 30. 
 
The matching is done between producers from the treated (ethnically tied) and non-treated 
(non-ethnically tied) groups that are on the Common Support. As shown in Table 5.3, 
ethnically tied producers have a monthly average profit of 50.31 birr (5.24 US$)28 less than 
that of matched producers that are not ethnically tied. The loss in profit is even higher for 
immigrant producers, where the average monthly profit for ethnically tied producers is 
82.01 birr (8.54 US$) less than that of the matched counterparts. This is equivalent to a 24.3 
pecent29 and 29.1 percent decrease in average monthly profit due to ethnic ties for all 
producers and immigrant producers respectively. This finding shows that the negative 
effects of ethnic ties have offset the positive effects. 
 
                                                   
27 STATA software on PSMATCH2 developed by Edwin Leuven and Barbra Sianesi is used. 
28 The 2008 exchange rate was 9.6 birr : 1 US$ 
29 The percentage increase in monthly average profit is calculated as the difference in average profit between matched ethnically 
tied and   non-ethnically tied producers divided by the average profit of matched non-ethnically tied producers. 
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Table 5.3 Average monthly profit in birr for ethnically tied and non-ethnically tied    
producers¤.  
 Ethnically tied  
producers 
(Treated) 
Non-ethnically tied  
producers 
(Non-treated) 
Difference 
Whole Sample 
Unmatched 156.65 343.44   -186.79 
Matched (ATT) 156.34 206.65 -50.31 (0.15)** 
Immigrants Only 
Unmatched 185.30 359.60    -174.29 
Matched (ATT) 199.74 281.74 -82.01 (0.21)* 
 Notes: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
¤The standard error for the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT) are in parentheses and is estimated after bootstrapping 
100 times. 
  
To check how the matching has performed in terms of eliminating differences in observable 
explanatory variables between the matched ethnically tied and non-ethnically tied 
producers, balancing tests are performed. Following Sianesi (2004) and Smith and Todd 
(2005), we use a chi square test for the joint significance of variables used in the probit 
model before and after the match. The chi square test after the match confirms that all the 
variables in the probit model are not jointly significant with prob>χ2 = 0.45 and prob>χ2= 
0.99 for the whole sample and immigrant producers respectively (Table 5.I.2 in  Appendix 
5.I). This implies that there is no systematic difference in the distribution of observable 
covariates included in the PSM between the matched ethnically tied and non-ethnically tied 
producers. This shows that the matching procedure has performed well. 
 
 
OLS regression  
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the results of the OLS regression using the logarithm of monthly 
profit30 as dependent variable and the ethnic tie dummy and other controls used in the PSM 
                                                   
30 A log linear specification is chosen because the skewness/kurtosis normality test shows that the residuals of the OLS regression 
using the level-dependent variable, monthly profit, are not normally distributed while the residuals from the logarithm of 
monthly profit are normally distributed. 
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as explanatory variables both for the whole sample and immigrant producers31. In using 
logarithm of profit, we lose six observations that had negative profits. In addition to using a 
dummy for ethnic ties in the regression, we also use a continuous variable that measures the 
proportion of traders that are of the same ethnic group as a producer as defined in section 
5.2.2. The estimation is done both on the unmatched sample and the matched sample from 
the PSM. 
 
For producers in the whole sample, (ceteris paribus), being ethnically tied measured using 
the dummy, reduces profit significantly by about 20.0 and 29.0 percent for the unmatched 
and matched samples respectively (Table 5.4). The percentage reduction in profitability due 
to ethnic ties found using the OLS estimation on the matched sample (29.0 percent) is 
higher than the percentage reduction of 24.3 percent found in the PSM. For producers in the 
whole sample, (ceteris paribus), ethnic ties measured using the continuous variable, reduces 
profit significantly by 22.0 and 25.0 percent for the unmatched and matched samples 
respectively (Table 5.4). The result for the matched sample (25.0 percent) is close to what 
we find in the PSM (24.3 percent). 
 
For immigrant producers there is no significant result for both measures of ethnic ties for 
the unmatched sample (Table 5.5). For the matched sample, however, a significant result is 
found with a reduction in profitability of 27.0 percent using both the dummy and 
continuous measures of ethnic ties. The reason why no significant results were found for 
the unmatched sample could be due to outliers that may have increased the variance, 
preventing more efficient estimates in OLS.  
 
In all models for the whole sample (Table 5.4), more units of labor and machinery, owning 
a workshop and having more years of experience increase profit significantly. Producers 
belonging to the majority ethnic group (Gamo) and those selling their output in open 
markets have a significantly lower profit. For the unmatched producers of the whole 
                                                   
31 A chow test between the whole sample and the subsample for immigrants shows a significant difference in coefficients across 
the two, justifying the need to have two separate OLS regressions.  
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sample, a significantly higher profit is found for immigrant producers, producers that are 
members of producers’ cooperatives and producers with more years of schooling. 
 
Table 5.4 OLS regression for the whole sample (dependent variable: log monthly 
profit) ¤ 
             Unmatched sample             Matched sample 
Ethnic tiesd  -0.20 (0.10)*        - -0.29 (0.14)*          - 
Ethnic tiesc         - -0.22 (0.11)**         -   -0.25 (0.15)* 
Maled   0.09 (0.38)  0.09 (0.38)  0.19 (0.16)  0.18 (0.16) 
Age -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) 
Age squared  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
Schooling  0.03 (0.01)**  0.03 (0.01)**  0.02 (0.02)  0.02 (0.02) 
Experience  0.01 (0.01)**  0.01 (0.01)**  0.02 (0.01)***  0.02 (0.01)*** 
Second generationd   0.07 (0.10)  0.07 (0.10)  0.07 (0.15)  0.06 (0.15) 
Immigrantd   0.21 (0.10)**  0.21 (0.10)**  0.15 (0.13)  0.14 (0.14) 
Ethnic majorityd  -0.44 (0.12)*** -0.44 (0.12)*** -0.36 (0.19)* -0.36 (0.20)* 
Member of 
   producers’  
  cooperatived  
 0.23 (0.13)*  0.22 (0.13)*  0.04 (0.17)  0.02 (0.17) 
Starting capital  
  borrowed from  
  relatives (%) 
-0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
Open marketd  -0.65 (0.13)*** -0.64 (0.12)*** -0.58 (0.15)*** -0.56 (0.15)*** 
Contractd   0.15 (0.17)  0.15 (0.17)  0.33 (0.24)  0.35 (0.24) 
Number of  
  persons working  
  in the enterprise 
 0.15 (0.05)***  0.15 (0.05)***  0.17 (0.06)***  0.17 (0.06)*** 
Current value of 
  machinery & 
  equipment 
 0.01 (0.01)*  0.01 (0.01)**  0.02 (0.01)**  0.02 (0.01)** 
Ownership of  
  workshopd  
 1.53 (0.50)***  1.54 (0.49)***  1.08 (0.54)**  1.06 (0.55)** 
Access to  
  electricityd  
 0.05 (0.12)  0.04 (0.12)  0.16 (0.18)  0.15 (0.18) 
Constant  6.01 (0.56)***  6.04 (0.57)***  6.57 (0.65)***  6.62 (0.64)*** 
R2  0.33  0.33  0.29  0.28 
Number of  
observations 
 
 467 
 
 467 
 
 463 
  
463 
Notes: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. d stands for dummy variable and c stands for continuous 
variable. ¤  robust standard errors corrected for any form of arbitrary heteroskedasticity  are reported in parenthesis.  
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Table 5.5 OLS regression for immigrant producers (dependent variable: log monthly 
profit) ¤  
              Unmatched sample                Matched sample 
Ethnic tiesd  -0.16 (0.14)        - -0.27 (0.15)*        - 
Ethnic tiesc           - -0.19 (0.13)        - -0.27 (0.15) 
Maled   0.75 (0.72)  0.75 (0.73)  0.47 (0.83)  0.47 (0.83) 
Age -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03)** -0.07 (0.03)** 
Age squared  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)*  0.00 (0.00)* 
Schooling -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) 
Second  
  generationd  
 0.21 (0.15)  0.21 (0.15)  0.10 (0.17)  0.10 (0.17) 
Year since  
  immigrated 
 0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01) 
Ethnic majorityd  -0.44 (0.18)** -0.45 (0.18)** -0.56 (0.22)** -0.57 (0.22)** 
Member of  
  producers’  
  cooperatived  
 0.41 (0.19)**  0.40 (0.18)**  0.46 (0.23)**  0.44 (0.23)** 
Starting capital  
  borrowed from  
  relatives (%) 
-0.00 (0.00)* -0.00 (0.00)* -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Open marketd  -0.80 (0.17)*** -0.80 (0.16)*** -0.78 (0.19)*** -0.77 (0.19)*** 
Contractd   0.21 (0.23)  0.21 (0.22) -0.00 (0.29)  0.01 (0.28) 
Number of  
  persons working  
  in the enterprise 
 0.25 (0.06)***  0.24 (0.06)***  0.22 (0.07)***  0.22 (0.07)*** 
Current value  
  of machinery &  
  equipment 
 0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01) 
Constant  6.01 (0.56)***  6.05 (0.94)**  7.25 (1.05)***  7.33 (1.06)** 
R2  0.37  0.37  0.31  0.30 
Number of        
observations 
 215  215  204  204 
Notes: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. d stands for dummy variable and c stands for continuous 
variable. ¤  robust standard errors corrected for any form of arbitrary heteroskedasticity  are reported in parenthesis.  
 
In all models for immigrant producers only (Table 5.5), more units of labor have a 
significant positive effect on profit. Compared to the models of the whole sample, 
machinery and equipment are not any more significant. Similar to the whole sample, 
producers that are members of the majority ethnic group (Gamo) and producers that sell 
their output in open markets have a significantly lower profit. On the other hand, producers 
that are members of producers’ cooperatives have significantly higher profits (Table 5.5). 
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5.5 Conclusions and Discussion  
 
This paper analyzes various socio-economic factors leading to ethnic ties in trade 
relationships and investigates the effect on economic performance by taking small-scale 
producers of the handloom sector in Ethiopia as a case study and using a parametric and a 
non-parametric statistical method. 
 
Recent immigrants and less experienced producers are more likely to be ethnically tied. 
This may be caused by the lack of time and resources at hand to establish a wide network of 
business-related contacts with traders. Ethnic ties are also found to be important for 
producers operating in remote areas. Ethnic ties in remote areas may help to reduce risks 
associated with marketing and facilitate trust in long-distance trades. On the other hand, 
producers with a wide network of business-related contacts with different traders such as 
those operating in producers’ cooperatives are less likely to be ethnically tied. Ethnic ties in 
credit provision are also found to lock producers into trade relationships by increasing the 
cost of credit and decreasing the probability of trading with ‘outsiders’ (Portes, 1995a). 
 
Although ethnic ties can positively impact business outcomes by reducing transaction costs 
and facilitating access to various resources, the non-parametric estimate of the PSM reveals 
that ethnic ties result in lower profit. This could be due to forgone economies of scale from 
having limited flows of new business-related ideas in closed social networks that can offset 
the benefits of ethnic ties. An exclusive social network can also restrict the extent of 
business relationships to a limited number of agents who can change the power structure 
and manipulate the exchange process depending on their control over ‘power resources’ 
such as information about prices, markets, capital and credit (Nadvi, 1999; Lyon, 2000; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). The loss in profit due to ethnic ties is found to be even 
higher for immigrant producers. This is probably due to the tendency to have more 
‘immigrant-solidarity’ that arises from a common cultural background, which often results 
in a greater density of social networks, thereby lowering the probability of assimilating with 
‘outsiders’ (Portes, 1995b). After controlling for the same observable covariates as in the 
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non-parametric matching method, the OLS regressions further confirm that both the binary 
and continuous measures of ethnic ties result in lower profits.  
 
In general, producers will continue to transact with traders from the same ethnic group, 
even with low returns, as long as the losses incurred by having closed social networks are 
offset by the problem-solving capacity of ethnic ties when there are market imperfections 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2004). The losses in profit from ethnic ties can be considered as a 
shadow price of transacting with ‘outsiders’, which might indicate the cost of intervention 
needed in order to reduce the various market imperfections faced by producers. Such an 
intervention can be made for example by providing access to business development 
services such as training, marketing assistance, information, credit, business linkages and 
promotion that can be provided by individuals, private for-profit firms, non-government 
organizations, and government agencies.  
 
The main limitation of this study is its inability to control for unobservable factors like the 
talent, beliefs and risk behavior of producers that can affect both the likelihood of being 
ethnically tied and their profitability. Despite this limitation the study adds to the growing 
literature that is exploring the role and impact of social networks on small-scale producers 
in developing countries.
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Appendix 5.I   
 
Table 5.I.1 Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Notes: Figures in columns ‘a’ are for the whole sample and figures in columns ‘b’ are for  immigrants. d stands for dummy 
variable. 
Variables         Mean        Std.Dev      Min      Max 
    a    b    a    b a b a b 
Maled  0.99 0.99 0.12 0.09 0 0 1 1 
Age 36.74 38.24 13.58 13.91 15 16 75 75 
 
Schooling 4.82 4.13 3.65 3.42 0 0 14 12 
 
Experience 16.73 16.72 13.24 14.05 0 0 72 57 
 
Second 
generationd  
0.67 0.68 0.47 0.47 0 0 1 1 
 
 
Immigrantd  0.46 -- 0.49 -- 0 -- 1 -- 
 
Year since  
  Immigrated 
 
-- 18.66 -- 13.43 -- 0 -- 60 
 
Ethnic majorityd  
 
0.79 0.74 0.41 0.44 0 0 1 1 
 
Member of 
  producers’  
  cooperatived  
 
0.19 0.27 0.39 0.44 0 0 1 1 
Starting capital  
  borrowed from  
  relatives (%) 
 
34.36 31.13 45.83 45.49 0 0 100 100 
Open marketd  0.84 0.75 0.37 0.44 0 0 1 1 
 
Contractd  0.08 0.12 0.27 0.33 0 0 1 1 
 
Number of  
  persons working 
  in the enterprise 
 
1.62 1.59 1.10 1.26 1 1 8 8 
Current value of 
  machinery &  
  equipment(birr) 
 
326.49 447.84 777.34 1029.55 6 15 7120 7120 
 
Ownership of  
  workshopd  
 
0.01 0.009 0.12 0.09 0 0 1 1 
 
Access to  
  electricityd  
 
0.70 0.90 0.46 0.30 0 0 1 1 
 
Monthly profit 
  (birr)  
374.73 435.90 799.72 517.57  -816.67 0 14330.83 3041.67 
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Table 5.I.2 Chi square test for the joint significance of variables 
 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
Whole Sample 
Unmatched 0.31 183.04 0.00 
Matched 0.02 16.07 0.45 
Immigrants Only 
Unmatched 0.22 65.95 0.00 
Matched 0.01 3.76 0.99 
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CHAPTER 6
 
 
Conclusions and Discussion  
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Summary of Main Findings 
 
This study empirically investigates how clustering and social networks affect the 
performance of MSEs in Africa by looking at the evidence from the handloom sector in 
Ethiopia. Using more than 4000 micro enterprises from the 2002/03 survey on 
Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Industry conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of 
Ethiopia, Chapter 2 presents a detailed counterfactual investigation where the performance 
of micro enterprises, in terms of profit, is compared with that of dispersed ones in four 
regions of Ethiopia both in urban and rural areas. To take into account for the problem of 
selection bias that may arise from entrepreneurs decision to locate their business in a certain 
location, clustered micro enterprises are matched with dispersed ones that have the same 
observable characteristics except for being clustered using the non-parametrical statistical 
method of propensity score matching (PSM)32. These characteristics are classified into 
enterprise and regional specific factors where it is further investigated how they determine 
the clustering of micro enterprises in rural and urban areas.  
 
                                                   
32 PSM only eliminates biases that arise from observables. Hence, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that clustered and 
dispersed enterprises might still differ based on some unobservable characteristics.  
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Enterprise and regional specific factors are found to determine clustering of micro 
enterprises in rural and urban areas differently. While micro enterprises that are run by 
female and younger operators are more likely to cluster in rural areas, this is not the case in 
urban areas. Loening et al., (2008) also found that young females are the main operators of 
non-farm enterprises in rural Ethiopia, highlighting the existence of more female operators 
in rural than urban areas. On the other hand, enterprises that are run by more educated 
entrepreneurs are more likely to cluster both in rural and urban areas. This result is in 
accordance with Freedman, (2008) and Combes et al., (2008) who noted that industrial 
clusters tend to attract more educated workers or operators with better skills because they 
are capable of “capitalizing on agglomeration benefits” through their superior information 
processing ability and search techniques compared to less educated workers. Besides, the 
high mobility and entrepreneurial tendencies of young and educated adults could also 
attract them to areas with better access to markets and information (Wheeler, 2006).  
 
Micro enterprises are more likely to cluster around big textile factories both in urban and 
rural areas. Similar with this finding, Fujita and Thisse (1996) and Lall et al., (2003) 
illustrated that producers benefit from the existence of big firms from the same industry due 
to various inter-industry externalities. With regard to banking services, micro enterprises in 
urban areas are found to cluster further away from Micro Finance Institutes (MFIs), while 
no significant effect is found for rural areas. The importance of informal finances like 
borrowing from friends and families and trade credits within clusters (Steel et al., 1997; 
Buckley, 1997), could have substituted the role of MFI services in urban areas by easing 
the constraint on working capital. Ruan and Zhang (2009) also showed that industrial 
clusters, through intensive division of labor, can help micro enterprises overcome financial 
constraints by allowing them specialize according to their capital portfolio.  
 
Micro enterprises in urban areas are more likely to cluster around markets and closer to an 
all-weather road while micro enterprises in rural areas cluster in remote areas further away 
from markets. The latter could indicate that there is more need to cluster in rural areas to 
compensate for remoteness. This is in line with the finding by Weijland (1999) who noted 
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that industrial clusters in remote areas are important to attract traders that help to link 
cottage industries with distant markets. Traders are usually attracted to such clusters 
because the “trading cost per transaction” is lower when producers are concentrated in one 
area (ibid). Micro enterprises in general are more likely to cluster in the capital city Addis 
Ababa than in other urban areas and cluster more in rural towns.  
 
The results of the matching procedure confirms that clustering results in higher profit 
compared to dispersed locations after controlling for selection bias. The increase in profit is 
found to be higher in urban than rural areas, which implies that urban cluster provide more 
location economies than rural clusters possibly due to increased cooperation and joint 
action among producers in order to meet the requirements of large markets in urban areas.  
 
Chapter 3 further investigates the advantages of clustering by emphasizing on the role of 
easing the financial constraints of micro enterprises in the absence of a well-functioning 
capital market. Using the same data set as in Chapter 2, the effect of clustering on starting 
capital of micro enterprises is investigated after controlling for capital market inefficiency, 
among other factors. Clustering is found to ease the financial constraints of micro 
enterprises by lowering the capital entry barrier through the reduction of the initial 
investment required to start a business. This effect is found to be significantly larger for 
enterprises investing in districts of high capital market inefficiency. The results are also 
found to be robust for different measures of clustering. This finding is in line with a number 
of studies conducted in China, where clustering through specialization and division of labor 
is found to enable large number of small entrepreneurs to enter the industry by helping 
them overcome the financial constraints in the early stage of industrialization (Huang et al., 
2008; Ruan and Zhang, 2009; Long and Zhang, 2011). 
 
Using more than 2000 rural households from the 2006/07 Rural Investment Climate Survey 
conducted by the World Bank and the CSAE, Chapter 4 investigates how clustering affects 
a farm household’s decision to enter into and exit from non-farm enterprises. After 
controlling for household characteristics, various indicators of the investment climate and 
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exogenous shocks of rainfall variability, the existence of clusters of micro enterprises 
operating in the same district increases the likelihood of farm households to start a non-
farm enterprise. With a similar positive effect but of less magnitude, the concentration of 
big manufacturing activities is also found to increase the likelihood of farm households to 
start a non-farm enterprise. Non-farm enterprises operating in clusters are found to be less 
likely to exit their business than those operating outside of clusters. Rural towns are also 
found to promote entry into non-farm enterprises and lower their exit. Similarly, access to 
an all-weather road is found to increase the likelihood of entry into non-farm enterprises. 
The impact of entry and exit into and from non-farm enterprises on household’s well-being 
is further investigated by using total household income, the food security status of a 
household and its ability to raise enough money in case of an emergency, as indicators. 
Using propensity score matching to account for selection bias on observables, it is found 
that, entry into non-farm enterprises significantly increases household income and boosts 
their food security status. Exit from non-farm enterprises, on the other hand, is found to 
significantly reduce households’ income. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates various socio-economic factors leading to ethnic ties in trade 
relationships and examines the effect on economic performance by taking small-scale 
producers of the handloom sector in Ethiopia as a case study. To look at the impact of 
ethnic ties on performance, the chapter uses both the (parametric) OLS regression and the 
non-parametric statistical method of propensity score matching and the results are 
compared accordingly. The data used in this chapter is a cross section survey on 486 
producers in nine different clusters of rural and urban areas, collected by IFPRI and EDRI 
in 2008. 
 
Recent immigrants and less experienced producers that may lack the time and resource to 
establish a wide network of business-related contacts with traders, are found to have a 
higher likelihood of being ethnically tied. A similar finding was seen in the surgical 
instrument cluster in Pakistan, where ethnic ties and family relationships are important for 
providing information and a material basis at the start of the business (Nadiv, 1999). Ethnic 
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ties are also found to be important for producers operating in remote areas as a means to 
reduce risks associated with marketing and facilitate trust in long-distance trades. On the 
other hand, producers with a wide network of business-related contacts with different 
traders such as those operating in producers’ cooperatives are less likely to be ethnically 
tied. Ethnic ties in credit provision are also found to lock producers into trade relationships. 
Fafchamps (2000) and Fisman (2001) noted that ethnicity and family linkages are often 
used by traders in developing countries to screen potential business partners and provide 
capital to producers, especially in the initial phase of their business.  
 
Although ethnic ties can positively impact business outcomes by reducing transaction costs 
and facilitate access to various resources, the non-parametric estimate of the propensity 
score matching reveals that ethnic ties result in lower profit. A similar negative effect on 
performance of small firms in India and Pakistan is also found by Annen (2001), where 
exclusive social networks based on common identity result in forgone economies of scale 
due to limited flow of new business related ideas. The loss in profit due to ethnic ties is 
found to be even higher for immigrant producers. Portes (1995b) noted that immigrants 
tend to have more solidarity due to their common cultural background, which often results 
in a greater density of social networks, thereby lowering the probability of assimilating with 
‘outsiders’. After controlling for the same observable covariates as in the non-parametric 
matching method, the OLS regressions further confirm that ethnic ties result in lower 
profits.  
 
6.2 Discussion and Policy Implications  
 
Naturally emerged clusters of MSEs are predominantly common in Ethiopia in traditional 
and labor intensive sectors in rural and poor urban areas. This has attracted the interest of 
policy makers and development agencies like World Bank, UNIDO and ILO to promote 
such clusters because of the direct impact they have on poverty. A cluster based 
development for MSEs has also been given a top priority in the country’s current 5 years 
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Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). Owing to the existing policy enthusiasm, the 
findings of this study will provide an additional perspective to assist the ongoing efforts by 
the government and different agencies and highlight potential avenues for intervention and 
investment targeting. 
 
Rural Towns and Cluster Formation 
Findings of this study disclose that large cities and rural towns increase the probability of 
clustering. Rural towns are also found to promote entry and enhance the survival of rural 
firms. This points to the importance of urbanization economies on top of location 
economies to improve the performance of MSEs and enhance market integration. Even if 
there may not be any direct contractual relationships or buyer-supplier linkages between 
large firms and MSEs operating in bigger towns, MSEs can still benefit from other forms of 
externalities such as information and technological spillovers, availability of a pool of 
skilled workers, and existence of common services such as research and training centers, 
government and regulatory institutions, etc. In a study compiled by the World Bank on 11 
different MSEs clusters in Africa, proximity to major local markets and roads are also 
found to play an important role for clusters to emerge (Zeng, 2008). Assisting rural towns 
by providing basic infrastructure like road and electricity access, supporting institutions and 
building a conducive business environment could therefore be one way to help facilitating 
the formation and growth of MSEs clusters. In their comparison between rural and urban 
manufacturing enterprises in Ethiopia, Rijkers et al., (2010) suggested that promoting rural 
towns could play an important role to have a more geographically focused intervention to 
improve the performance of rural firms. The development of rural towns could also have a 
trickle-down effect to surrounding and remote rural areas by increasing the demands for 
local agricultural products (Haggblade et al., 2007). 
 
The findings of this study also indicate that regional specific factors that determine 
clustering of micro enterprises differ between rural and urban areas. This highlights the 
need to focus on the existing local circumstances when formulating policies that can 
promote clustering. Apart from location specific factors, the benefits of clustering and 
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hence factors that attract entrepreneurs towards clusters could be sector specific (Weijland, 
1999). Policies should therefore be revisited and adapted to changing circumstances and the 
competitive positions of specific sectors located in specific locations. 
 
Clustering and Capital Market Imperfections 
Lack of access to finance remains to be a major obstacle to the expansion and growth of 
MSEs in Africa (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Rajan and Zingales 1998; 
Ayyagari et al., 2008). Even if financial development is crucial for industrial development, 
developing a well-functioning capital market is a daunting task in many developing 
countries. Under such circumstances, it is important to look for alternative approaches to 
propagate industrialization when local conditions do not allow easy access to credit. The 
findings in Chapter 3 indicate that industrial clusters could be one way to promote 
industrialization even in the absence of a well-functioning capital market. The findings are 
not suggesting that industrial clusters could make the capital market work efficiently, rather 
industrial clusters could serve as a get way to promote entrepreneurship and help MSEs 
circumvent the constraints they face. Through a reduced capital entry barrier, industrial 
clusters can also allow entrepreneurs with limited capital to engage in productive activities 
and hence add to the overall household income (Zhang, 2011). Promoting industrial 
clusters, especially in divisible sectors could therefore help “tap the entrepreneurial talents” 
and make “better use of limited capital” in MSEs (Ruan and Zhang, 2008). 
 
Innovation and Cluster Growth 
Taken together, the findings in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 indicate that clustering makes MSEs 
more profitable, eases entry barriers and enhances their survival. However, these findings 
are based on cross-sectional data and hence there should be caution when formulating 
policies that promote clustering in the long run. This is because, although location 
economies within clusters could make MSEs more profitable, the increased clustering, 
following ease of entry, could result in the expansion of the supply of products, which in 
turn can have a downward pressure on price and profit margins. The continued entry of 
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enterprises could also result in congestion having an upward pressure on rental prices and 
reducing operational efficiency (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006a). 
 
Several case studies of MSEs cluster in East Asia and Latin America have demonstrated the 
importance of innovation, which is manifested by differentiated products through improved 
product quality and altered marketing channels as a way to maintain profitability and foster 
sustained growth within clusters (Altenburg and Mayer-Stamer, 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka, 
2006a). However, most MSEs cluster in Africa are categorized as “survival” where the 
business culture is dominated by imitation, often lacking the capacity both in terms of the 
appropriate skill and capital to invest and innovate (Banji and McCormick, 2007; Zeng, 
2008; Yoshino, 2011). From a policy perspective, it is therefore important to understand 
how to create an environment that stimulates innovation and constant upgrading in order to 
have a continued growth of clusters that have already emerged. 
 
However, upgrading efforts should also take into account the possible heterogeneity in 
firm’s performance, innovative capabilities and production history. Applying a uniform 
polices of MSEs cluster development might be a wrong approach as enterprises are diverse 
in their potentials. A recently conducted need-based intervention in two MSEs clusters in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Kumasi, Ghana by the Foundation for Advanced Studies in 
International Development (FASID) from 2007-2009 could be good examples (cited in 
Yoshino, 2011). After identifying lack of entrepreneurial skills and knowledge as the major 
constraints from survey responses of clustered producers, a series of scientifically designed 
field experiments were conducted that provided a managerial training programme. It was 
found that entrepreneurs who received formal managerial training achieved better business 
results in terms of larger growth in sales and gross profit than those who had not received 
any formal training. The managerial training program is also found to be correlated with 
improved physical efficiency in production. 
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Social Networks and Market Imperfections 
Chapter 5 gives another perspective of how market integration can be enhanced despite the 
absence of physical proximity. The findings indicate that ethnic ties continue to play an 
important role in MSE’s trade relationships especially for less experienced producers and 
new beginners, even with low returns, as long as the losses incurred by having closed social 
networks are offset by the problem-solving capacity of ethnic ties when there are market 
imperfections. The losses in profit from ethnic ties can be considered as a shadow price of 
transacting with ‘outsiders’, which might indicate the cost of intervention needed in order 
to reduce the various market imperfections faced by producers. Such an intervention can be 
made for example by providing access to business development services such as training, 
marketing assistance, information, credit, business linkages and promotion. Such services 
can be provided by individuals, private for-profit firms, non-government organizations, and 
government agencies. By opening the possibility to transact and communicate with 
“outsiders”, such kind of interventions will help producers acquire necessary technical and 
business related know-how, which are necessary to remain competitive. 
 
Final Remarks 
A caveat of this study is its reliance on cross-sectional data that makes it impossible to look 
at the dynamic aspects of cluster development and performance. Limited data availability 
has also contained the study from investigating the impact of relative output and input 
prices in clustered and dispersed locations on performance. In addition, the lack of cross-
sectoral and cross-country analysis due to limited data availability restricts drawing more 
generalized conclusions about the prospects and challenges of MSEs clusters in Africa. The 
fact that there was no spatial data available has also limited the study to use political 
boundaries in order to define industrial clusters. This has restricted the study from capturing 
the actual effect of neighbourhood dynamics and spill-overs on entrepreneurs location 
decisions and hence the impact on their performance. Moreover, lack of valid instrumental 
variable to capture the endogeniety that may arise from clustering has restricted the study 
from inferring causal linkages between clustering and MSEs performance. Despite these 
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limitations, the study provides a flexible way to better understand the advantages of 
clustering through a detailed counter factual investigation that accounts for selection bias 
arising from observable factors. More generally, this study helps narrow the gap in the 
literature on cluster based development in primarily agricultural economies in Africa that 
are at an early stage of industrialization, and currently with low levels of non-farm activi
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SUMMARY  
 
The private sector is often listed as a key driving force for industrialization in Africa in the 
development literature. A critically important role is played by micro- and small-scale 
enterprises (MSEs), which constitute the lion’s share of the private sector in Africa. MSEs 
account for more than 90% of all firms outside of the agricultural sector and 50-60% of the 
off-farm employment in Africa. With this regard, promoting entrepreneurship in MSEs and 
stimulating their growth is viewed as a key instrument in poverty reduction efforts both by 
development agencies and policymakers. 
 
Despite their large employment contribution, MSEs are characterized by low productivity 
and constitute an insignificant share of the commercial output in most African economies. 
Lack of market integration is often mentioned as one of the reasons as to why the 
performance of MSEs has remained poor in many African countries. Lack of market 
integration due to low firm density and long distances to markets results in loss of external 
economies of scale and high transaction costs, which could undermine MSEs’ capacity to 
take advantage of trade and investment opportunities. The major challenge for MSEs is 
therefore, to increase their performance by means of improved market integration.  
 
In recent literatures, industrial clusters (the geographic concentration of economic 
activities) and social networks are noted as having the potential to enhance market 
integration and reduce the transaction costs of doing business among firms. Although 
considerable attention has been given in the literature to the advantages of industrial 
clusters for business activities, much of previous researches have evolved around large-
scale enterprises operating in large metropolitan regions where markets are relatively well 
integrated, competitive and technologically advanced. The potential advantages of 
industrial clusters for MSEs that operate in fragmented and uncompetitive markets such as 
in Africa is little studied. The few studies available in Africa also focus on case studies, 
often lacking a comparative analysis. Moreover, an empirical investigation on the role and 
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impact of social networks on MSEs in Africa was long constrained by the lack of adequate 
data on detailed social relationships among different agents. 
 
The general objective of this study is to empirically investigate how clustering and social 
networks affect the performance of MSEs in Africa by looking at the evidence from the 
handloom sector in Ethiopia. Ethiopia provides a relevant context to address this objective 
due to the co-existence of clustered and non-clustered or dispersed MSEs both in urban and 
rural areas. Besides, the availability of large scale cross-sectional surveys on MSEs allow 
us to implement a detailed counter factual investigation between clustered and dispersed 
MSEs and look at the impact of clustering and social-networks on their performance. From 
this general objective, the following four specific objectives are defined and analysed in 
separate chapters. 1). To investigate clustering advantages by contrasting the performance 
of clustered micro enterprises, in terms of profit, with that of control groups of dispersed 
ones both in urban and rural areas. The study also aims to identify factors determining 
clustering of micro enterprises in urban and rural areas. 2) To examine the advantage of 
clustering in easing the financial constraints of microenterprises. 3) To investigate how 
clustering affects the entry and exit decisions of farm households into and from non-farm 
enterprises in rural parts of Ethiopia and examine the impact of entry into and exit from 
non-farm enterprises on household’s wellbeing, and 4) To identify various socio-economic 
factors that determine ethnic ties between producers and traders and analyse how these 
ethnic ties affect the performance of producers. 
 
Using more than 4000 micro enterprises from the 2002/03 survey on Cottage/Handicraft 
Manufacturing Industry conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSAE), 
Chapter 2 addresses the first objective of the study and presents a detailed counterfactual 
investigation where the performance of micro enterprises, in terms of profit, is compared 
with that of dispersed ones in four regions of Ethiopia both in urban and rural areas. To take 
into account for the problem of selection bias that may arise from entrepreneurs decision to 
locate their business in a certain location, clustered micro enterprises are matched with 
dispersed ones that have the same observable characteristics except for being clustered 
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using the non-parametrical statistical method of propensity score matching. In addition, this 
chapter examines various enterprise and regional specific factors that determine the 
clustering of micro enterprises in rural and urban areas. Clustering is found to result in 
higher profit compared to dispersed locations. The increase in profit from clustering is 
found to be higher in urban than rural areas. It is also found that regional specific factors 
determining clustering of micro enterprises are different in urban and rural areas. 
 
In addressing the second objective, Chapter 3 further investigates the advantage of 
clustering by emphasizing on the role to ease the financial constraints of micro enterprises 
in the absence of a well-functioning capital market. Using the same data set as in Chapter 2, 
the effect of clustering on starting capital of micro enterprises is investigated after 
controlling for capital market inefficiency, among other factors. Clustering is found to ease 
the financial constraints of micro enterprises by lowering the capital entry barrier through 
the reduction of the initial investment required to start a business. This effect is found to be 
significantly larger for enterprises investing in districts with a high level of capital market 
inefficiency. 
 
Using more than 2000 rural households from the 2006/07 Rural Investment Climate Survey 
conducted by the World Bank and the CSAE, Chapter 4 investigates how clustering affects 
farm household’s decision to enter into and exit from non-farm enterprises. After 
controlling for household characteristics, various indicators of the investment climate and 
exogenous shocks of rainfall variability, it is found that the existence of clusters of micro 
enterprises operating in the same district increases the likelihood of farm households to 
start a non-farm enterprise. Non-farm enterprises operating in clusters are also found to be 
less likely to exit their business than those operating outside of clusters. The study further 
investigates the impact of entry and exit into and from non-farm enterprises on farm 
household’s well-being by using total household income, the food security status of a 
household and the household’s ability to raise enough money in case of emergency, as 
indicators. Using propensity score matching to account for selection bias, it is found that, 
entry into non-farm enterprises significantly increases household’s income and food 
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security status. Exit from non-farm enterprises, on the other hand, is found to significantly 
reduce household’s income. 
 
Chapter 5 addressed the last objective of the study and investigates various socio-economic 
factors leading to ethnic ties in trade relationships and examines the effect on economic 
performance by taking small-scale producers of the handloom sector in Ethiopia as a case 
study. To look at the impact of ethnic ties on performance, the chapter uses both 
(parametric) OLS regression and the non-parametric statistical method of propensity score 
matching and the results are compared accordingly. The data used in this chapter is a cross 
section survey on 486 producers in nine different clusters of rural and urban areas, collected 
by IFPRI and EDRI in 2008. Results show that ethnic ties play an important role for recent 
immigrants and less experienced producers and for those operating in remote areas further 
away from market. Ethnic ties in credit provision are also found to lock producers into trade 
relationships. The impact of ethnic ties on the economic performance of producers further 
reveals that ethnic ties result in lower profits. And the loss in profit due to ethnic ties is 
found to be higher for immigrant producers. The results are robust for both parametric and 
non-parametric statistical methods. 
 
The last chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6) provides the main conclusions and a discussion of 
the research and provide potential avenues for intervention and investment targeting to help 
promote clusters and enhance the performance of MSEs. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
In de ontwikkelingsliteratuur wordt de private sector vaak gezien als een belangrijke 
stimulerende kracht voor industrialisatie in Afrika. Een beslissende rol wordt gespeeld door 
micro- en kleinschalige ondernemingen (MSE’s) die het leeuwendeel van de Afrikaanse 
private sector vormen. Meer dan 90% van alle bedrijven buiten de agrarische sector zijn 
MSE’s  en zij zijn goed voor 50-60% van de werkgelegenheid buiten de landbouw in 
Afrika. Dat is de reden dat ontwikkelingsorganisaties en beleidsmakers het 
ondernemerschap in MSE’s willen bevorderen en het stimuleren van de groei van MSE’s 
beschouwen als belangrijk instrumenten om armoede te verminderen. 
 
Ondanks hun grote bijdrage aan de werkgelegenheid worden MSE’s gekarakteriseerd door 
lage productiviteit en leveren ze een onbelangrijk deel van de commerciële output in de 
meeste Afrikaanse economieën. Een gebrek aan marktintegratie wordt vaak genoemd als 
een van de redenen voor het slechte presteren van de MSE’s in veel Afrikaanse landen. 
Gebrek aan marktintegratie als gevolg van een lage concentratie van bedrijven en lange 
afstanden naar de markt resulteert in verlies van extern schaalvoordeel en hoge 
transactiekosten, wat de capaciteit van de MSE’s om te profiteren van handel en 
investeringmogelijkheden zou kunnen ondermijnen. De grootste uitdaging voor MSE’s is 
daarom om hun prestatie te verbeteren door middel van een verbeterde marktintegratie. 
 
In recente literatuur worden industriële clusters (de geografische concentratie van 
economische activiteiten) en sociale netwerken erkend als potentiële bevorderaars van 
marktintegratie, verder kunnen ze transactiekosten van zakelijke activiteiten tussen 
bedrijven verminderen. Hoewel er in de literatuur aanzienlijke aandacht is besteed aan de 
voordelen van industriële clusters voor zakelijke activiteiten, heeft veel onderzoek zich 
gericht op grootschalige bedrijven opererend in grootstedelijke regio’s, waar de markten 
relatief goed zijn geïntegreerd,  competitief zijn en technologisch goed zijn ontwikkeld. De 
potentiële voordelen van industriële clusters voor MSE’s die opereren in gefragmenteerde 
en niet-concurrerende markten zoals in Afrika zijn niet veel onderzocht. De weinige studies 
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beschikbaar over Afrika zijn ook gericht op casestudies; vaak ontbreekt een vergelijkende 
analyse. Verder werd empirisch onderzoek naar de rol en effect van sociale netwerken op 
MSE’s in Afrika lang beperkt door een gebrek aan goede data van gedetailleerde sociale 
verbanden tussen de verschillende betrokkenen. 
 
De algemene doelstelling van dit onderzoek is om empirisch te onderzoeken hoe clustering 
en sociale netwerken van invloed zijn op de prestatie van MSE’s in Afrika door te kijken 
naar het bewijs vanuit de weefsector in Ethiopië. Ethiopië verschaft hiervoor een relevante 
context, vanwege het bestaan van geclusterde en niet-geclusterde of verspreide MSE’s in 
stedelijke en rurale gebieden. Daarnaast biedt de beschikbaarheid van grote cross-sectionele 
datasets over MSE’s ons de mogelijkheid een gedetailleerd onderzoek uit te voeren naar 
geclusterde en verspreide MSE’s en te kijken naar het effect van clustering en sociale 
netwerken op hun prestatie. Vanuit deze algemene doelstelling zijn de volgende vier 
specifieke doelstellingen gedefinieerd en geanalyseerd in verschillende hoofdstukken. 1) 
Het onderzoeken van clustervoordelen door de prestatie te vergelijken van geclusterde 
micro-ondernemingen, in termen van winst, met die van controlegroepen van verspreide 
bedrijven in stedelijke en rurale gebieden. Het onderzoek richt zich ook op het identificeren 
van factoren die clustering van micro-ondernemingen in stedelijke en rurale gebieden 
bepalen. 2) Het onderzoeken van voordelen van clustering als een manier om financiële 
beperkingen van micro-ondernemingen te versoepelen. 3) Het onderzoeken van hoe 
clustering de besluiten van boeren beïnvloedt om over te stappen op niet-agrarische 
ondernemingen en vice versa in rurale gebieden van Ethiopië en het effect daarvan te 
onderzoeken op het welzijn van de betreffende huishouding en 4) Het identificeren van 
verschillende sociaaleconomische factoren die de etnische banden bepalen tussen 
producenten en handelaren en te analyseren hoe deze etnische banden de prestatie van de 
producenten beïnvloeden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt de eerste doelstelling van de studie en maakt daarbij gebruik van 
gegevens van meer dan 4000 micro-ondernemingen uit het 2002/2003 onderzoek  
“Cottage/Handicraft Manufacturing Industry” uitgevoerd door het Centraal Bureau van de 
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Statistiek van Ethiopië (CSAE). Het hoofdstuk beschrijft een gedetailleerd onderzoek 
waarin de prestatie van micro-ondernemingen, in termen van winst, wordt vergeleken met 
die van de verspreide ondernemingen in vier regio’s van Ethiopië in stedelijke en rurale 
gebieden. Om rekening te houden met het probleem van selectiebias dat kan optreden door 
de beslissing van ondernemers om hun onderneming op een bepaalde locatie te situeren, 
worden geclusterde micro-ondernemingen vergeleken met verspreide bedrijven die 
dezelfde waarneembare kenmerken hebben met uitzondering van het geclusterd zijn, met 
gebruik van de non-parametrische statistische methode van propensity score matching. Dit 
hoofdstuk behandelt tevens verschillende ondernemings- en regionaal-specifieke factoren 
die de clustering van micro-ondernemingen in rurale en stedelijke gebieden bepalen. Er is 
gebleken dat clustering tot hogere winst leidt. De toename in winst is hoger in stedelijke 
dan in rurale gebieden. Er is ook gebleken dat regionaal-specifieke factoren die clustering 
van micro-ondernemingen bepalen, verschillen in stedelijke en rurale gebieden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de tweede doelstelling en onderzoekt verder het voordeel van 
clustering door de rol te onderzoeken die clustering heeft bij  het versoepelen van financiële 
beperkingen van micro-ondernemingen bij afwezigheid van een goed functionerende 
kapitaalmarkt. Gebruikmakend van dezelfde data als in hoofdstuk 2 wordt het effect van 
clustering op het startkapitaal van micro-ondernemingen onderzocht na correctie voor o.a. 
de inefficiëntie van de kapitaalmarkt. Clustering bleek de financiële beperkingen van 
micro-ondernemingen te versoepelen door de toegang tot kapitaal te vergemakkelijken door 
middel van vermindering van de initiële investering, vereist om een onderneming te starten. 
Dit effect is significant groter voor ondernemingen die in districten investeerden met een 
sterk inefficiënte kapitaalmarkt. 
 
Gebruikmakend van data van 2000 plattelandshuishoudens van de 2006/07 Rural 
Investment Climate Survey uitgevoerd door de Wereldbank en de CSAE wordt in 
hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht hoe clustering de beslissing beïnvloedt van boerenhuishoudingen 
om over te stappen op niet-boerenondernemingen en vice versa. Na correctie voor 
kenmerken van de huishouding, verschillende indicatoren van het investeringsklimaat en 
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schommelingen in regenval, is gebleken dat het bestaan van clusters van micro-
ondernemingen in hetzelfde district de waarschijnlijkheid verhoogt dat boerenhuishoudens 
overschakelen naar niet-boerenondernemingen. Tevens is gebleken dat het minder 
waarschijnlijk is dat niet-boeren ondernemingen opererend in clusters stoppen in 
vergelijking tot bedrijven die opereren buiten de clusters. De studie onderzoekt verder het 
effect van de overstap naar niet-boerenondernemingen op het welzijn van de 
boerenhuishouding gebruikmakend van de indicatoren het totale boereninkomen, de 
voedselzekerheid situatie van een huishouden en het vermogen om genoeg geld te 
genereren in het geval van nood. Met gebruik van propensity score matching om een 
eventuele selectiebias teniet te doen is gebleken dat het starten van een niet-
boerenonderneming het inkomen en de voedselzekerheid significant verhoogt. Aan de 
andere kant bleek het stoppen met de niet-boerenonderneming het inkomen significant te 
verlagen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de laatste doelstelling van de studie en onderzoekt verschillende 
sociaaleconomische factoren die leiden tot etnische banden in handelsrelaties en onderzoekt 
het effect daarvan op economische prestatie. Hiervoor worden kleinschalige producenten in 
de weefindustrie in Ethiopië gebruikt als een case studie. Om het effect te bestuderen van 
de etnische banden op prestatie, worden in het hoofdstuk (parametrische) OLS regressie en 
de non-parametrische statistische methode van propensity score matching toegepast en 
worden de resultaten vergeleken. De gebruikte data in dit hoofdstuk komen uit een cross-
sectionele studie van 486 producenten in negen verschillende clusters in rurale en 
stadsgebieden, verzameld in 2008 door IFPRI en EDRI. De resultaten laten zien dat 
etnische banden een belangrijke rol spelen bij recente migranten en minder-ervaren 
producenten en bij die bedrijven opererend in afgelegen gebieden verder bij de markt 
vandaan. Etnische banden in kredietverstrekking maken producenten afhankelijk van 
bepaalde handelsrelaties. Het effect van etnische banden op de economische prestatie van 
producenten resulteert in lagere winsten. Het laatste geldt vooral voor 
migrantenproducenten. De resultaten zijn robuust voor zowel de parametrische als non-
parametrische statistische methoden. 
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Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 6) presenteert de belangrijkste 
conclusies en een discussie van het onderzoek en geeft mogelijke manieren voor interventie 
en doelen voor investeringen om clustervorming te stimuleren en de prestatie van MSE’s te 
verbeteren. 
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